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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Part one outlines the scope and purpose of the 
research and describes the conceptual framework for conduct­
ing the analysis. It begins by noting in Chapter I that the 
consumption side of this country's energy supply and demand 
system received little attention until the 1973 Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo. Fuel 
shortages and higher energy prices coming in the wake of the 
embargo resulted in conservation legislation, programs, and 
national goals aimed at reducing the rate of energy use in 
the U.S. The formulation and implementation of these poli­
cies reflects a convergence of technical, economic, and 
environmental and political perspectives. However, little 
research has been devoted to the political aspects of energy 
policymaking. Indeed, political scientists have not as yet 
brought their particular insights or skills to bear on the 
conservation policy area. This is partly because energy has 
only recently been recognized as an organizational concept 
for research. It is also because the analysis of substan­
tive policy problems and issues requires a "subject matter" 
expertise that few political scientists have traditionally 
been interested in developing. These conditions, which are 
further highlighted by a review of relevant conservation 
literature, make the conservation problem a prime candidate 
for applied policy analysis.
In this light. Chapter II begins with a discussion 
of the theoretical background for applied policy analysis
2
and suggests that no core theory exists in political science 
for doing policy analysis. This is followed with a defini­
tion and description of the conceptual approach used in this 
study— the "issue systems" framework. The framework draws 
from both incremental decision-making and systems analysis 
theory, seeking to combine the context of substantive policy 
problems and decision processes. Research questions and 
assumptions are delineated to guide the analysis toward 
meeting the objectives outlined in Chapter I.
ENERGY CONSERVATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY FORMULATION, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND ALTERNATIVES
CHAPTER I
Scope of the Study 
Energy in its various end use forms— electricity and 
liquid, gaseous, and solid fuels— serves a wide range of 
purposes, including heating, cooling and lighting of homes 
and commercial buildings, fueling private automobiles and 
public transportation systems, and automation of industrial 
processes among others. Stated differently, energy is con­
sumed to meet the needs of the residential and commercial, 
industrial, and transportation sectors of the U.S. economy.^ 
Until the 1973 energy shortages and subsequent price increases 
brought about by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, the consumption side of this 
country's energy supply and demand system received little
For a discussion of energy use by fuel and by sector, 
see The University of Oklahoma, Science and Public Policy 
Program, Energy Alternatives: A Comparative Analysis (Wash­
ington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 13-1 
to 13-45.
public attention. However, as domestic supplies and demands 
have become increasingly imbalanced and the nation has become 
more dependent on foreign oil, energy consumption has assumed 
a new significance as a public policy issue.
Indeed, recent federal activities to reduce demand in 
the major consuming sectors— residential and commercial, 
industrial, and transportation— have clearly placed "energy 
conservation" on the agenda of government. Initiatives for 
energy efficiency improvements, such as mileage standards 
for new cars, and public education programs to change indi­
vidual consumption habits in homes, have been adopted by 
Congress. In addition, conservation is the central thrust 
of President Carter's national energy goals.^
But the perceived need for conserving energy and the 
actual results of national efforts to conserve remains a
2As used in this study, energy conservation denotes 
slowing down the rate of energy consumption through techni­
cal fixes and by changing behavior; for example, by improv­
ing efficiency, reducing wasteful practices in utilization, 
and shifting to less energy-intensive activities.
^President Carter appears committed to the notion 
that the country's energy future is closely tied to slowing 
the annual growth in energy use. A goal of the Administra­
tion's National Energy Plan is to reduce the average growth 
rate of total energy demand from the present rate of three 
to four percent per year to below two percent. See U.S., 
Executive Office of the President, The National Energy Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977),
p. XIII. Although many of the plan's 113 separate initia­
tives went through Congress intact, debate surrounding 
approximately six provisions, especially those concerning 
natural gas pricing, have stalled Congressional efforts to 
formulate national energy legislation. See Steven Rattner, 
"Energy: Where Did The Crisis Go?" New York Times,
April 16, 1978.
matter of concern. To some extent this is because 
conservation policies have been introduced into a policymak­
ing environment oriented to a time when energy was both 
abundant and cheap.^ It is also because insufficient atten­
tion has been given to the linkage between policy alterna­
tives and the social, political and institutional factors 
that constrain efforts to implement conservation policies 
and programs. The issues stemming from these conditions 
make the conservation problem a prime candidate for policy 
research, research which falls within the domain of politi­
cal scientists as policy analysts.
• This study identifies and defines the substantive 
dimensions of the energy conservation problem in the resi­
dential and commercial, industrial and transportation sec­
tors; describes the key elements in the historical develop­
ment of conservation as a public policy issue area; identifies 
the relevant, current public and private, formal and infor­
mal institutional arrangements for dealing with conservation 
"problems,” and "issues;and identifies evaluates, and
4As aptly characterized by Norman Metzger, conserva­
tion is "The Intruding Samaritan" in traditionally production- 
oriented energy arenas. Metzger, Energy; The Continuing 
Crisis (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977), p. 181.
^The primary distinction between the terms problems 
and issues is that issues involve conflict among competing 
interests and values. As a result, only one or the other 
term will ordinarily be used in this study, "issue" when con­
flict is not involved or is not being stressed. See Irvin L. 
White et al., Work Plan for Completing a Technology Assess­
ment of Western Energy Resource Development (Washington, D.C.i 
U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, 1978), p. 32.
compares alternatives and implementation strategies to 
improve the policy results. As such, the study is designed 
to follow in the applied research tradition termed "policy 
analysis.More specifically, an "issue systems" framework 
is used to emphasize how problems of policy substance, in 
this case energy conservation problems, are related to those 
of the political process (procedures for dealing with politi­
cal issues or problem areas).^ Thus, the analysis is intended 
to enhance the information base needed for political decision­
making in this issue area and to inform the search for new 
energy conservation alternatives as well.
Edward S. Quade defines policy analysis in a broad 
sense as "any type of analysis that generates and presents 
information in such a way as to improve the basis for policy­
makers to exercise their judgment." Quade, Analysis for 
Public Decisions (New York: American Elsevier, 1975), p. 4.
For an overview of the development of the policy analysis 
movement, see Jacob B. Ukeles, "Policy Analysis: Myth or
Reality?" Public Administration Review 37 (May/June 1977): 
223-228.
^An issue system may be defined in terms of a single 
issue or for a category of problems and issues. The issue 
systems framework was first developed as a model for orga­
nizing knowledge about how political problems of an interna­
tional scope are dealt with in the international political 
system. Its theoretical bases are in systems analysis and 
decision-making approaches; however, instead of focusing on 
decision processes, the focus is on substantive international 
political issues and the procedures for dealing with them.
In sum, the focus is on "policy and policymaking and is 
intended to provide for the systematic analysis of both sub­
stance and procedure." See Irvin L. White, "Policy Analysis 
and International Law: Interdisciplinary Research in Law of
the Sea," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, New York City, N.Y.,
March 14-17, 1973. See chapter 2 in this study for elabora­
tion of how this framework has evolved as a useful heuristic 
tool for analyzing domestic energy problems and issues.
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Recognizing the broad implications of the research 
topic, there are important questions of procedure and judg­
ment as to what can and cannot be included. More and more 
government agencies and legislative bodies are making deci­
sions and attempting to implement policies for energy con­
servation. As a result, the study is limited according to 
the following parameters:
1. In terms of organizational and implementation 
responses to achieve energy conservation goals, 
the Energy Research and Development Administra­
tion (ERDA), the Federal Energy Administration 
(FEA)— both now in the Department of Energy 
(DOE)— and the Departments of Transportation, 
Housing and Urban Development, and Commerce 
deserve primary attention within the federal 
government.
2. Two pieces of legislation, the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975^ and the Energy 
Conservation and Production Act (EPCA) of 1976,  ̂
and President Carter's National Energy Plan codify
' most of what has taken place in government to spur 
energy conservation; therefore, the research looks 
primarily at the formulation and implementation 
of policies and programs stemming from these 
sources.
3. Finally, policy alternatives and implementation 
strategies will be developed and evaluated for 
those problems and issues which are judged to be 
the most significant within the conservation 
issue system. Significant problems and issues 
and alternatives are to be selected according to 
the description of overall goals of the energy 
conservation policy system and the interests and 
values of relevant participants.10
®Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871.
^Pub. L. 94-385, Stat. 1125, as amended Pub. L.
95-70, 91 Stat. 275. 
10For justification and elaboration, see chapter II.
Purpose of the Research
As with almost every other aspect of currently 
evolving energy policy, political scientists have yet to 
bring their particular skills and insights to bear on the 
emerging government role in energy conservation. This lack 
of research focusing on conservation, specifically, and 
energy policymaking, in general, is due largely to three 
existing (but in some cases changing) conditions in politi­
cal science: (1) political scientists have only recently
recognized energy as an organizational concept, (2) applied 
policy research depends on methods and concepts that are 
different than those employed in discipline-oriented 
research, and (3) policy analysis requires a "subject matter" 
expertise that very few behavioral political scientists have 
been interested in developing. Each of these factors is 
discussed briefly below.
First, there are technical, economic, environmental, 
and political perspectives of energy policy, and all of these 
need to be appropriately related if one is to understand 
energy policymaking. But political scientists have only 
recently recognized energy as an organizational concept for 
research.Consequently, most of the prevailing energy 
literature is concentrated in the technical, economic, and 
environmental areas. Although investigation of the political
^^For elaboration of this point, see Robert M. 
Lawrence, "Energy Policy," Policy Studies Journal 2 (Winter 
1973): 141-146.
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components of energy decision-making has been limited to date,
there is a small, but growing number of political scientists
12currently involved in energy-related research.
In the second place, difficulties arise when research­
ers of the micro- and behavioralist perspectives— the domi­
nant approach to knowledge in political science up until at 
least the late 1960s— try to translate their concern about 
the nature, composition, and functioning of the political
system into an interest in public policy problems and solu- 
13tions. In other words, systematic analysis of public pol­
icy requires methods and concepts that are different from 
those employed in micropolitical approaches. This differ­
ence stems largely from the purposes served by the two kinds 
of research. Basic research, or discipline-oriented research 
in the social sciences is usually defined in terms of
12Although by no means intended to be a complete 
list, names which immediately come to mind are Don Kash,
Irvin White, Robert Lawrence, David Davis, Gerald Garvey, 
Helen Ingram, Steven Ballard, Norman Wengert, Robert Rycroft, 
Alfred Light, and Andrew McFarland. Because of the recog­
nized need for familiarity with the substance of a policy 
problem area, it should also be noted that this author has 
kept abreast of developments in energy conservation since 
1973, and has written several papers on the topic.
13Theodore J. Lowi, "What Political Scientists Don't 
Need to Ask about Policy Analysis," Policy Studies Journal 2 
(Autumn 1973); 66. This difficulty leads Lowi to argue
that primary concern should be placed on internal political 
science development instead of on development of interdis­
ciplinary means for policy research. Further methodological 
problems with regard to the state of public policymaking 
study and analysis are discussed by Yehezkel Dror, Public 
Policymaking Reexamined (Scranton, Penn.; Chandler Publish­
ing Co., 1968), pp. 73-84.
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"knowledge in the abstract" where utilization of the knowledge
is not a principal c o n c e r n . I n  contrast, applied policy
studies are generally addressed to an audience outside, as
well as inside, the bounds of the discipline— i.e., the
researcher seeks to inform political discussion and public
decisionmaking.
Thirdly, policy analysis, whatever the policy area,
requires a familiarity with and a sense of relevance for the
substantive dimensions of a public problem,' a "subject
matter" expertise that very few political scientists have
traditionally been interested in developing.As explained
by Phillip Foss:
Stated differently, very few political scientists 
would qualify as "expert witnesses" in any of the 
substantive policy areas. Economics, on the other 
hand, has for years had experts in most of the major 
policy areas. An economics department of any size 
will ordinarily have specialists in public finance 
policy, transportation, public utilities, agricul­
ture, labor, and natural resources policy. There is 
nothing comparable in Political Science. The econo­
mists are now, and have been for years, the policy 
scientists. They have become the policy scientists
14Richard Rose, "Disciplined Research and Undis­
ciplined Problems," in Using Social Research in Public Policy 
Making, ed. Carol H. Weiss (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1977), p. 25.
^^See Phillip 0. Foss, "Policy Analysis and the 
Political Science Profession," Policy Studies Journal 2 
(Autumn 1973): 67-71. As noted by Foss, there are, of
course, exceptions. A number of researchers have distin­
guished themselves in specific policy areas, such as educa­
tion, minority rights, and natural resources.
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not only because they have actively involved 
themselves in policy studies but because Political 
Science has abdicated.
Although these circumstances are changing, the above 
three points generally characterize the existing state-of- 
affairs in applied policy research with the exception of a 
few substantive policy areas. And, as noted earlier, almost 
all of the energy policy research being undertaken is con­
centrated on the supply side of the energy supply and demand 
system rather than on energy consumption and relevant govern­
ment policies and programs to reduce demand. Thus, conserva­
tion as a distinct, substantive policy area is in an early 
stage of development. This explains in part why it has just 
begun to attract the attention of policy analysts.
But why study a specific policy problem like energy 
conservation? In general, given the complexity of most of 
society's urgent social problems, serious policy study re­
quires studying policy in the particular. There are, how­
ever, other answers to this question and in almost every case 
an answer fits into one of the three categories of resarch
goals identified by Austin Ranney: scientific, professional,
17and political. Scientific goals stress improved under­
standing of policy processes and results; professional goals
^^Foss, "Policy Analysis and the Political Science 
Profession," p. 69.
17Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A
Framework for Choice," in Political Science and Public Policy, 
ed. Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), pp. IS­
IS.
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emphasize the policy analyst's role of evaluation and advice- 
giving to policymakers; and political goals point to the 
need for political scientists to get involved in urging 
"right policies to achieve right goals."
With regard to this study, the scientific and profes­
sional goals are inseparable. That is, this policy analysis 
seeks to understand public decision-making processes and 
policies for conservation in the residential and commercial, 
industrial, and transportation sectors in so far as the knowl­
edge can be applied as a basis for identifying and evaluating 
policy alternatives. The effort, then, is to link problems 
of policy substance to political process problems. As ex­
pressed succinctly by Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and 
Carolyn Adams; "Discussions of policy process tend to be
skeletal without an understanding of how issues are related
18to policy substance."
In terms of specific, professional political science
goals, studies of the existing state of policy in a given
issue area help one to acquire the necessary knowledge base
19for providing policy advice. The researcher who aspires
18ArnoldJ. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn 
Teich Adams, Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of
Social Choice in Europe and America (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1975), p. 1.
19It should be noted here that findings associated 
with this research were shared in two national energy conser­
vation conferences attended by scientists, academics, and 
bureaucrats. Some of these individuals had conservation 
responsibilities in government. In addition, the research
14
to gain credibility in a specific policy area needs first to 
undertake exploratory research to define the goals, priori­
ties, relevant constraints on action, and values and inter­
ests of the major participants in a policy area. The con­
cepts, identifiable patterns and sensitivities that result 
from such analyses fulfill a pragmatic learning function that 
must occur prior to actual efforts to modify or refine social 
policies.
Of course, the long-run, and political goal of the
applied policy analyst,is to move "toward meeting the demand
for relevant research, available before policy decisions are 
20framed." Political scientists usually react to such state­
ments by contending they cannot possibly compete with profes­
sionals in the various substantive policy areas; that the 
dangers and costs are too great in terms of the scientific 
development of the discipline; and that, ultimately, research­
ers in the cause of government policymaking become "hand­
maidens" of the state. These pleas are worthy of attention,
the risks are to some extent real, and much thought has been
21devoted to each claim. Conventional arguments aside,
design was reviewed by individuals in the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Finally, involvement in the topic resulted in two 
separate consulting activities for the U.S. Congress, Office 
of Technology Assessment.
20Howard E. Freeman and Illene N. Bernstein, "Evalua­
tion Research and Public Policies," in Policy Studies and the 
Social Sciences, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (Lexington, Mass.: Lex­
ington Books, 1975), p. 23.
21Carol H. Weiss, "Introduction," in Using Social 
Research in Public Policy, provides an excellent summary of
15
however, political scientists (for example, those mentioned
above) have begun to argue straightforwardly that they do
have resources useful in the service of policymakers and that
their research can contribute more rationality to public
policymaking. The most fundamental assumption in this regard
is, as stated by Charles Jones, that political scientists can
bring their "more or less well ordered impressions about what
one might expect to find in politics" to bear on important 
22public problems.
The two research purposes of this study are derived 
directly from the needs and goals cited above. First, an 
analysis of how the problem of energy conservation is being 
dealt with by the political system has as a research purpose 
building a descriptive base in terms of:
-an investigation of why and how the problem became 
a major political issue;
-delineation of the existing policy system for con­
servation decision-making (i.e., a description of 
the roles and interactions of various participants 
and institutions); and
-a description of the policies and implementation 
strategies that have been developed to deal with 
the issue.
On the one hand, a detailed examination of this sort is 
expected to provide information about the particular policy
arguments for and against the use of social science research 
to inform political discussion and public decision-making. 
See especially, pp. 1-10.
22 Charles 0. Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and
Politics of Pollution Control (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p. 13.
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event and efforts to define national conservation goals, 
providing knowledge useful in its own right. In turn, the 
above information sets the context for an evaluation of con­
servation policy alternatives. Thus, a second purpose of the 
research is to delineate unresolved problems and issues of 
energy conservation in the three major consuming sectors, 
with the focus on evaluation of substantive and procedural 
alternatives to improve and/or change policy results.
From this description, the research purposes of this 
study can be summarized as follows;
-To define the substantive political issue and the 
policymaking system which led to the formulation 
and implementation of public policy with regard to 
energy conservation.
-To identify, evaluate, and compare policy alterna­
tives to improve and/or change energy conservation 
policymaking and policy results in the three major 
consuming sectors.
In the review of the literature which follows, developments in
the energy conservation policy area are summarized to set
the context for applying policy analysis categories to the
substantive problem. The intent is to place the above research
purposes within the mainstream of inquiry in the conservation
issue area. Then, the next chapter outlines the theoretical
background against which the current applied policy analysis
emphasis developed and describes the actual approach used in
this study— the "issue systems" framework.
17
Review of the Energy Policy Literature 
Although social scientists are currently analyzing 
a lot of policy-related matters, only a few noteworthy 
studies have appeared in the energy field. As noted by 
Daniel Dreyfus in a study prepared for the Senate Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs:
Until recently, surprisingly little attention 
has been given to the organization of the Federal 
government .to formulate and implement energy policy. 
The great size of the energy industries in economic 
and financial terms and their obvious critical sig­
nificance to the well-being of society, however, 
have attracted the interest of all levels of govern­
ment. A complex body of policy has evolved which 
constitutes a pervasive, if uncoordinated, Federal 
involvement in many aspects of the energy system.
The policy is presently (1973) administered by a 
diffuse and ill-defined assembly of agenices through­
out the Executive Branch.
A survey made by the Congressional Research 
Service of the major Federal reorganization proposals 
of the past 40 years reveals no specific considera­
tion for fuel and energy matters until the relatively 
modest energy recommendations of the Ash Council. 
Similarly, a review of over 100 studies of fuel and 
energy matters found that they include very few re­
marks on organization and even those few were in 
general and vague terms. These studies are evidence 
of the fact that energy has not been viewed as an 
organizing concept for government.
Thus, energy politics and policies were largely unnoticed by
political scientists and the public. Indeed, David Davis
observes energy politics has typically been "closed against
the intrusion of outsiders.
23Daniel A. Dreyfus, Federal Energy Organization 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 3.
Emphasis added.
24David Howard Davis, Energy Politics (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974), p. 3.
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Early Analyses in the Energy Area
As a result of this state of affairs, early analyses
in the energy area focused primarily on the "private govem-
25ment" or "elitist nature" of energy decision-making.
Another common approach for studies with a decided political 
orientation has been the focus on a variety of energy "mini­
policies" according to resource type, with policy analysis 
used as a means to make comparisons between resources. For 
example, in Energy Politics, David Davis analyzes five 
political arenas— coal, oil, natural gas, electricity, and 
nuclear energy— and compares them according to the "market 
forces," "physical characteristics," and "general political
environment" that shape the policy process and politics of 
26each arena. Other studies have similarly reserved for
energy policy analysis a comparative or descriptive rather
27than integrative role. And some studies with a policy 
focus have tended to be resource specific, such as Gerald
25For an analysis of the oil industry from the elitist
paradigm, see Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil (New York:
Macmillan, 1961). Aaron B. Wildavsky contributed a pioneer­
ing study on the public power-private power conflict in the 
Dixon-Yates case. See Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).
26Davis, Energy Politics, pp. 13-16.
27Examples of these contributions are Dennis L. 
Thompson, ed., Politics, Policy, and Natural Resources (New 
York: Free Press, 1972); and Robert H. Connery and
Robert S. Gilmour, eds., The National Energy Problem
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).
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28Nash's review of U.S. oil policy from 1890 to 1964, Dorothy
29Nelkin's study of nuclear power policy, and, more recently. 
The University of Oklahoma, Science and Public Policy Program's 
policy-oriented assessment of offshore oil and gas develop­
ment in the U.S.^^
As shown above, policy studies, at least until 1973, 
were driven almost totally by the concern for energy supply 
and the discovery of new energy resources and the develop­
ment of technologies which could produce them. In 1972,
Rogers C. B. Morton said a Secretary of Interior should "try 
to shape in his time an energy ethic," so that the U.S. would 
use its natural resources wisely, postponing the possible day 
"when you boil them off and you haven't got them anymore."
He noted that President Nixon had instituted wage and price 
controls, an action that would have seemed beyond feasibility 
several years prior to 1972. Morton then observed; "Maybe 
some future President somewhere down the line is going to 
have to do the same thing with energy," by imposing restric­
tions on consumption.Although Secretary Morton added that
28Gerald D. Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968) .
29Dorothy Nelkin, Nuclear Power and Its Critics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
^^Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White et al.. Energy Under 
the Oceans; A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Operations (Norman, Okla.: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1973).
31Richard Corrigan, "Administration Readies 1973 Pro­
gram to Encourage More Oil, Gas Production," National Journal 
Reports 4 (October 21, 1972): 1632.
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he hoped this would not be the case, his words were somewhat
prophetic because the ensuing energy crisis demonstrated to
policymakers and to the general public the serious social,
economic, and national security implications of the growing
32gap between domestic energy production and consumption.
Critiques of U.S. Energy Policy 
The immediate response was to declare a national 
policy goal of achieving "energy self-suffiency." By early 
1974, the federal government had unveiled "Project Indepen­
dence," which promised energy self-sufficiency in the short- 
33term future. The early (1973-1974) energy policy litera­
ture reflects the optimism of this period. By 1975, however, 
the drive toward energy independence had dramatically slowed. 
Public response to the program had been apathetic at best, 
and the dual policy objectives of reducing U.S. petroleum 
imports and increasing the domestic production of all forms 
of energy had proven more difficult to achieve than had been 
assumed immediately after the OPEC oil embargo.Thus,
32See John C. Fisher, The Energy Crisis in Perspec­
tive (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974).
33Peter L. Auer, "Energy Self-Sufficiency," in 
Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 1, ed. Jack M. Hollander (Palo 
Also, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1976), p. 692. See
also, U.S. Federal Energy Administration, Project Indepen- 
dence, A Summary (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing 
Office, 1974).
34 For a discussion of production problems, see 
Herman T. Franssen, Towards Project Independence: Energy in
the Coming Decade (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1975).
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studies began to appear which featured critiques of U.S. 
energy policy and Project Independence as being too short­
sighted and unresponsive to the changed economic and politi­
cal circumstances in energy.
Richard Mancke fixed the blame for national energy 
"policy failure" on poorly informed policymakers and an his­
torical "hit and miss" approach to policy formulation in the 
area:
These policy failures are chiefly due to an inability 
or unwillingness to coordinate existing policies and 
a failure to adopt flexible policies responsive to 
the inevitable changes in the fundamental "facts" 
upon which they are based. In sum, the crux of the 
United States' energy crisis lies in the contradic- 
• tion between economic, political and technologic 
realities and our policymakers' inappropriate 
responses. If the United States is to escape the 
enervating costs of a perpetual energy crisis, funda­
mental policy changes must now be made.35
Of course, others were just as quick to place the blame on 
the energy industry, or "special interests" in general, or 
on the "environmentalists" who were seemingly blocking the 
expansion of energy production with their concern for envi­
ronmental protection.Regardless of the different percep­
tions about who was at fault, the search for policy reform 
was broadening.
35Richard B. Mancke, The Failure of U.S. Energy 
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 162.
Mancke contributed another work representative of the post­
oil embargo criticism of U.S. energy decisions. See 
Squeaking By; U.S. Energy Policy Since the Embargo (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
36See chapter IV for a discussion of these points.
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Conservation Research 
Energy consumption began to receive attention, 
especially as both the executive and the legislature became 
increasingly aware that a good part of the nation's annual 
energy budget was being "wasted" in some manner. Perhaps 
the most comprehensive documentation of this is found in the 
numerous congressional committee hearings and background 
studies which appeared during 1971-1974. In one of a group 
of early documents published by Senator Henry Jackson's 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senator Jackson 
made the following remarks:
The unprecedented demand for energy in this 
country is the root cause of our energy crisis today. 
Clearly we cannot tolerate these spiraling rates of 
energy consumption. We are only now beginning to 
pay the price for our failure to recognize the impact 
of exponential growth in energy demand and move to 
control it.
Most experts would agree that we cannot hope 
to achieve any real degree of self-sufficiency in 
the next generation merely by working to satisfy 
energy demand. That is quite clearly a losing battle. 
Until we start questioning the legitimacy of demand, 
until we start challenging the widespread waste of 
energy resources, we cannot expect to satisfy our 
basic energy requirements in economically and envi­
ronmentally acceptable ways.37
However, as noted earlier, the prevailing bias in energy
policy institutions was towards increased development of
energy supply alternatives to meet demands. And so-called
"system inertia" made it difficult for conservation to be
viewed initially as a legitimate concern.
37U.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Energy Conservation and S.2176, Hearings, Part 2 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp.
479-480.
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Just as the search for themes to augment Project
Independence began to take shape, the Ford Foundation's
Energy Policy Project completed a major study which not only
covered many of the topics outlined above, but also served
as an introduction to policies aimed at the demand side of
38the energy system. It extolled the need for energy con­
servation as an important policy goal due to the increasingly 
uncertain nature of energy supplies. In addition,*the Ford 
study highlighted a particularly troublesome question regard­
ing the tradeoffs between exponential energy growth and the 
environment; Could the U.S. continue to pay the economic 
and environmental costs associated with the development of 
new energy resources at a rate sufficient to keep up with 
the average annual energy demand growth rate?
This question led to a tremendous number of analyses 
of future U.S. supply/demand strategies. By far the most 
influential evaluation came from Amory Lovins in a Foreign
38Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A 
Time to Choose (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1974). The Energy Policy Project commissioned two conser­
vation studies which focused on both the information and 
policy needs regarding the growing concern over per capita 
energy consumption. See Dorothy K. Newman and Dawn Day,
The ^erican Energy Consumer (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing Co., 1975)j and Robert H. Williams, ed.. The 
Energy Conservation Papers (Cambridge, Mass.; Ballinger 
Publishing Co., 1975). In The American Energy Consumer, 
which was the first systematic effort to determine how dif­
ferent socioeconomic groups actually use energy in their 
households, Newman and Day note that better theoretical 
frameworks are needed to assess the potential impacts of 
various conservation alternatives.
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39Affairs article which appeared in 1976. Lovins outlined 
and compared two courses that the U.S. could choose to fol­
low over the next 50 years: the "hard" and "soft" paths.
The hard path follows closely historical growth rates and 
patterns of energy development. It calls for the rapid 
deployment of large, centralized technologies to increase 
all forms of domestic energy supplies, especially supplies 
of electricity. Energy conservation receives very little 
attention in Lovins' hard path. On the other hand, the soft 
path relies on the combination of "technical fixes" and the 
development and commercialization of "appropriate" technolo­
gies (technologies which are diverse, flexible, matched in 
scale and quality to end uses, and generally based on renew­
able energy sources). According to Lovins, the soft path 
would eventually lead to minimal, equilibrium, or possibly 
negative annual energy demand growth rates.
But the basis for energy supply/demand questions and 
analyses had been developing since 1971 when the data collec­
tion needs for energy use first began receiving attention.
Two works by Stanford Research Institute (SRI), which actually 
pre-date the energy crisis, investigated energy use primarily 
to develop a more systematic data base.*^ SRI's studies
39Amory B. Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not
Taken?" Foreign Affairs 55 (October 1976): 65-69.
40Stanford Research Institute, End Uses of Energy 
(Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1971);
and Patterns of Energy.Consumption in the U.S. (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).
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classified energy consumption into the meaningful end use 
categories used today; residential and commercial, indus­
trial, and transportation.
Activities then increased to identify energy use 
targets within the major consuming sectors where opportuni­
ties for energy conservation exist. Besides the Ford Founda­
tion's report, the now defunct Office of Emergency Preparêd- 
ness (CEP) issued a staff study that attempted to identify con­
servation goals that the federal government could help meet 
through various executive or legislative actions.^^
Based on the early work of CEP, SRI, and the Ford 
Foundation,among others, several conclusions concerning con­
servation were advanced: (1) energy conservation is as
important as energy supply, (2) measures to reduce energy 
use should be evaluated by government as a way of achieving 
a better balance between energy production and consumption 
and reducing dependence on oil imports, (3) conservation 
might decrease or eliminate some of the requirements that 
might otherwise have to be satisfied by new or alternate 
energy sources> (4) slowing the average annual growth rate 
of energy demand could improve the longevity of domestic 
supplies and reduce environmental damage and pollution, and
41U.S., Office of Emergency Preparedness, The Poten­
tial for Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972).
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(5) conservation could buy time to develop and implement 
long-term energy solutions.
Besides these general works, studies concentrating 
on each consuming sector have served to clarify the substance 
of energy use problems and suggest conservation options. Most 
of the sectorial studies approach their topics from a tech­
nical, economic, or environmental frame of reference. Never­
theless, they provide valuable background information for the 
policy analyst. For the residential and commercial sector, 
research has focused primarily on the need to reduce energy 
waste in buildings. As early as 1972, the American Institute 
of Architects began to explore the relationships between 
energy and the "built environment."^^ Up until the early 
1970s very little work had been undertaken to characterize 
the way energy was being used in residences and commercial 
structures, and hardly any attention had been given to find­
ing ways to improve the efficiency of energy use or to the 
means to implement improvements. The potential role of gov­
ernment in this area has now been generally defined in terms 
of providing various incentives to encourage better building
42On several of these points, see U.S., Council on 
Environmental Quality, Energy and the Environment; Electric 
Power (Washington, D.C.l Government Printing Office, 1973), FT37.
43American Institute of Architects, A Nation of 
Energy Efficient Buildings by 1990 (Washington, D.C.: 
American Institute of Architects, 1974).
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44insulation standards, more energy-efficient architectural 
practices,more energy-efficient appliances,, and the use 
of alternative energy sources such as solar for heating, 
cooling, and lighting buildings.^®
Early analyses of energy use in the industrial sector 
dealt primarily with "housekeeping" measures that could be 
implemented to tighten up energy "leaks." These were usually 
aimed at specific industrial processes and activities.In 
addition, they were often coupled with basically technical 
discussions of capital projects which, if undertaken, could 
improve the fuel efficiencies of devices such as heat fur­
naces (used in the manufacture of steel and other products); 
and discussions of the energy saving potential of equipment 
still in the research and development s t a g e . P o l i c y  
research in this area has been confined mostly to exploring
44 John C. Moyers, The Value of Thermal Insulation 
in Residential Construction; Economics and the Conservation 
of Energy (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
1971).
^^Richard G. Stein, "Architecture and Energy," paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, Penn.,
December 29, 1971.
^^Richard A. Tybout and George 0. G. Lof, "Solar 
House Heating," Natural Resources 10 (April 1970): 268-326.
^^The Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation 
included a study to determine where and how energy is used 
in a number of selected manufacturing industries. See The 
Conference Board, Energy Consumption in Manufacturing 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974).
^^For example, see Charles A. Berg, "Conservation 
in Industry," Science 184 (April 19, 1974): 264-270.
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voluntary inducements to spur conservation programs and 
technological innovation in the most energy-intensive indus­
tries (e.g., plastics, aluminum, steel, and cement). A 
large part of the conservation research has been by econo­
mists who have emphasized the effect of price on the amount 
of energy used by industry. But, like the other sectors, 
the current literature stresses the need for further public- 
private sharing of responsibilities if conservation oppor- 
tunities are to be further identified and realized.
In the transportation sector, primary concern is with 
ways to reduce gasoline consumption. Two reports released 
in 1974 observed that gasoline use was the critical factor 
in the transportation supply/demand equation.Research 
describing transportation problems and possible solutions 
has, in essence, centered on technological means, such as 
more efficient vehicle engines, to get at energy waste. 
However, numerous "software" alternatives such as the appli­
cation of available government policy tools (incentives.
49J. Dicken Kirschten, "Conservation— The Corner­
stone of Carter's Plans for Energy," National Journal 9 
(February 26, 1977): 316-317.
^®U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Project Inde­
pendence Report, Appendix AIII (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Energy Administration, 1974), p. 118; and National Academy 
of Engineering, U.S. Energy Prospects (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy of Engineering, 1974), pp. 24-31.
^^For example, see Hittman Associates, Inc., The 
Automobile— Energy and the Environment (Columbia, Md.; 
Hittman Associates, Inc., 1974).
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subsidies, etc.) to stimulate urban mass transit and a shift
to less energy-intensive ways of hauling freight, have also
52received much attention. The more difficult attitudinal 
and behavioral questions and issues concerning individual 
transportation habits deserve greater consideration than 
they have received to date.
A number of studies have taken a more integrative 
approach to the problems and issues surrounding energy con­
sumption. That is, in a vein much like that of A Time to 
Choose, these studies have viewed conservation in a more 
holistic framework by discussing the relationships among all 
sectors. In general, such discussions have sought to iden­
tify appropriate policy initiatives and potential implementa-
53tion barriers, both public and private. Reports like those
of David Large and Lee Schipper have contributed substantially
to definitions of energy conservation problems and issues,
particularly in identifying the "non-technical" constraints
to efficient energy utilization and the need for government 
54action. Lee Schipper states;
52Eric Hirst, "Transportation Energy Conservation: 
Opportunities and Policy Issues," Transportation Journal 13 
(Spring 1974) : 42-52.
^^See David B. Large, ed., Hidden Waste: Potentials
for Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation
Foundation, 1973); and Lee Schipper, Energy Conservation: Its
Nature, Hidden Benefits, and Hidden Barriers (Berkeley, Calif.: 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1975).
^^Similarly, Denis Hayes’ Energy: The Case for Conser­
vation (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1976) popular­
ized the need for conservation as an element in overall 
national energy policy.
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lR]emoving these barriers entails political action 
as well as straightening out the economic system in 
nearly every phase of social activity, because all 
activity today uses energy. Government, industry, 
and the people must decide how much regulation, how 
many kinds of efficiency and performance standards, 
what pricing policies, what kinds of taxation on 
energy use or subsidies for more efficient energy 
utilization will be necessary.55
Needless to say, the purposes of this study have been defined 
to assess and improve the public response to this challenge.
The state-of-the-art in energy conservation research 
can be summarized, then, as having focused on; (1) the 
identification of conservation as an element in the overall 
national response to the energy crisis; (2) the substantive 
dimensions, usually defined in economic, environmental, and 
technical terms, of the problems within the various consuming 
sectors; and (3) delineation of potential conservation oppor­
tunities, initiatives, and implementation barriers.
Legislative and governmental reorganization efforts 
within the last few years to develop and implement conserva­
tion policies and programs have made it increasingly apparent 
that conservation problems and issues are inextricably meshed 
with social and political phenomena— i.e., public goals, 
needs, interests, values, social behavior and institutions. 
Analyses are now needed that give serious attention to the 
role these phenomena play in constraining or enhancing the 
effectiveness of conservation policymaking. And this under­
scores the place of this study in the field of conservation 
research.
^^Schipper, Energy Conservation, p. 60.
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Outline of the Study 
This chapter has set the stage for a policy analysis 
of energy conservation by reviewing relevant conservation 
literature and by suggesting the place of this study in the 
field of conservation research. In chapter II, the theoreti­
cal background for applied policy analysis will be addressed 
more fully including a discussion of the conceptual frame­
work used in this study. Part Two describes the social and 
political context within which conservation problems and 
issues are being addressed. It includes a description of 
the substantive dimensions of the energy conservation prob­
lem (chapter III), a review of key elements in the rationale 
for energy conservation as an integral part of overall 
national energy policy (chapter IV), a definition of the 
existing conservation policy system, and an identification 
of unresolved problems and issues in the major energy con­
suming sectors (chapter V). Part Three identifies, evaluates, 
and compares both substantive and procedural alternatives 
and implementing strategies for dealing with conservation 
problems and issues (chapter VI), and, finally, offers some 
overall conclusions regarding energy conservation research 
and the conduct of policy analysis (chapter VII).
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Introduction
To accomplish the research objectives outlined in 
chapter I, a conceptual framework is needed that facilitates 
the general understanding of the policymaking process and 
its relationship to a substantive problem area. That is, a 
framework is needed that provides for both describing the 
development of energy conservation as a public policy problem 
and analyzing policy alternatives which might mitigate exist­
ing unresolved problems and issues. To this end, the follow­
ing discussion is organized in two parts. The first part 
summarizes relevant developments in public policymaking, 
policy sciences, and policy analysis literature. It pays 
particular attention to recent efforts to strengthen policy 
analysis concepts and approaches in the service of policy­
makers and policymaking institutions. It is intended, 
therefore, to provide the theoretical beginning point for 
the study of a specific policy area from an applied focus.
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This is followed, in the second part, by a definition 
and description of the conceptual approach used in this 
study— the "issue systems" framework— which offers an approach 
to policy analysis that seeks to combine the context of sub­
stantive policy problems and decision processes.
Public Policymaking, Policy Sciences, 
and Policy Analysis
In general, policymaking can be characterized as "the 
process of deciding upon what the goals of government should 
be and what specific behavioral and environmental character­
istics should be maintained or achieved in order to satisfy 
those goals.According to this definition, policymaking 
involves "value selection" and the translation of values into 
facts through the choice of appropriate and feasible courses 
of action. One result of the policymaking process, then, is 
the selection of specific means to meet desired ends. Choices 
are constrained, of course, by the social context of a policy 
problem, by the legal-regulatory system, and also by the 
amount of available resources that can be expended to meet an 
identified goal. The most critical constraint is information 
and analysis concerning the likelihood of a policy decision 
producing the intended results. Estimates or projections of 
answers to this question is what policy analysis is all about.
Robert J. Mowitz, instructional materials taken from 
memoranda prepared in recommending organizational arrangements 
for various program budgeting and analysis functions in a 
number of states. The Pennsylvania State University, Insti­
tute of Public Administration, University Park, Penn.,
June 10, 1975, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)
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However, analysts approach contemporary policy 
research from a variety of perspectives. Some are discipline- 
bound viewing policy problems from the perspective of their 
professional group identity, whereas others (of an interdis­
ciplinary persuasion) view social problems and issues as 
beyond the paradigm of any one discipline and profession.
Some are concerned primarily with decision processes by 
which policies are made, and thus make recommendations for 
improving those processes; others hold to the assumption that 
policy analysis, by definition, includes the suggestion of 
reasoned alternatives to change the "impacts" of past poli­
cies and programs or predict the impacts of future policies.^ 
In addition, each analyst works with a conception of policy 
decision-making that falls somewhere on a continuum which at 
one end extolls the role of political bargaining (or "muddl­
ing through"^), and at the other end praises rational
2Duncan McRae, Jr., "Policy Analysis as an Applied 
Social Science Discipline," Administration & Society 6 
(February 1975): 365.
^"Impacts," as the term is used here, denotes the 
broad intended and unintended consequences or effects of 
public policy both on the specific policy issues and on 
society more generally. Thus, a distinction is made between 
political "outputs" (public policies) and "outcomes," or 
impacts. For elaboration of the difference, see David Easton, 
A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1965), pp. 351-352; and Larry L. Wade, The Elements of 
Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing
Co., 1972), pp. 4-5.
4Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of ‘Muddling 
Through,'" Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959): 
79-88.
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analysis and systematic planning. But as a general 
enterprise, almost everyone doing policy analysis is con­
cerned to a greater or lesser degree with improving public 
policy.
The discussion below begins with an overview of pol­
icy study during the 1950s and early 1960s. Parallel and 
later developments are considered in the "policy sciences" 
literature, which called explicitly for the application of 
informed knowledge (research and analysis) to problems in 
the political arena. Given this background, the central 
thrust in contemporary policy analysis is examined from two 
competing but complimentary dec is ion-making approaches; 
incrementalism and systems analysis. It is suggested that 
policy analysis can be strengthened by "marrying" elements 
and assumptions drawn from the two approaches.
Historically, public policy has not been the primary 
focus of political science. Rather political scientists have 
been more interested in the institutions and structures of 
government, in political behavior, governmental processes, 
and intergovernmental relations.^ Similarly, more modern 
"behavioral" political science has focused principally on 
the study of sociological and psychological dimensions of 
group behavior; determinants of voting and other overt polit­
ical acts; the roles and functions of interest groups and
5Charles S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics; The 
Present State of American Political Science (Urbana: Uni­
versity of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 38-39.
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political parties; and the description and explanation of 
legislative, executive, and judicial political behavior.
Thus, behavioral political science was not directly concerned 
with "finding out what governments do, why they do it, and 
what difference it makes."®
Policy and Process 
In fact, from the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, 
the study of American politics was dominated by the process
school of thought and group theorists. Group theory as ex-
7 8pounded by Arthur Bentley and David Truman begins with the
proposition that interaction among groups, who represent 
interests, is the central fact of politics. The task of the 
political system is to manage group conflict by establishing 
the "rules of the game," arranging compromises and balancing 
interests, enacting compromises in the form of public policy, 
and enforcing these compromises. Because of the prevailing 
confidence in group politics, political science researchers 
showed little interest in the outcomes (or "who gets what" 
in Harold Lasswell's formulation) of enacted government pol­
icies. As stated by Allen Schick; "The pluraliste were 
deterred from looking into such questions by their own focus
®Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis (University: Uni­
versity of Alabama Press, 1976), p. 1.
7Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Evan­
ston, 111.: The Principia Press, 1908).
ODavid B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York; 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).
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on process."® Schick suggests several reasons for this 
"deus ex machina faith in the goodness of the pluralist 
process";
1. American political science is habituated to con­
fidence in the formal relations among power 
holders.
2. The pluralists were impressed by their "dis­
covery" of interest groups.
3. The process approach offered a convenient escape 
from difficult value questions.
4. The pluralists emphasized the remedial features 
of incrementalisra.
5. The pluralists were impressed by the ability of 
the budgetary process to limit political and 
bureaucratic conflict.
6. Finally, the pluralists looked at the American 
political scene and liked what they saw— abun­
dance, growth, consensus, stability, satisfac­
tion with the American way.10
Given these "success indicators," the pluralists naturally 
assumed the shares of public satisfaction were being equit­
ably divided. Thus, they saw no need to subject public 
objectives to explicit and systematic evaluation, no reason 
to question the outcomes of competitive resource alloca­
tions. Again, as explained by Schick:
It was not a time for thinking about purpose or
worrying about priorities. Perspectives did not ex­
tend much beyond this year and the next. There was
great confidence in the capability of the political
9Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budget­




process to produce the right results. Muddling 
through was cannonized as the American virtue.11
As policy studies began to receive more emphasis in
the late 1960s, efforts to formulate conceptual frameworks
that better accounted for the public decision-making process
increased, A number of studies were published, including
12among others Charles Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process;
Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, editors. The Study
of Policy Formation; a n d  Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics
and the Public; a n d  more recently. Understanding Public
Policy; C h a r l e s  0. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of 
16Public Policy; and Ira Sharkansky, editor. Policy Analysis 
in Political Science. P o l i c y  analysis, as the term was 
used by political scientists during this period, generally 
referred to investigations which sought to isolate salient 
behavioral variables in policymaking (actors, roles, insti­
tutions, processes and so on). This conceptual approach 
reflected a professional "predisposition to assert the impor­
tance of political science characteristics in determining
lllbid., p. 142.
^^Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968.
^^New York, Free Press, 1968.
Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966.
^^Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1972.
^^North Scituate, Mass., Duxbury Press, 2d ed., 1977. 
First edition published in 1970.
17Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1970.
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18causes and consequences of public policy," often ignoring 
important social, economic, cultural, historical, and tech­
nological factors. In short, there was a substantial in­
crease in systematic research to test propositions about
what actually determined public policies, particularly at
19the state and local levels, and to explain "how" policies 
are made. Evaluating policy, to the degree that it was con­
sidered a functional category, centered mainly on examining 
evaluation procedures within the various branches of govern­
ment and governmental institutions. This work can be cate­
gorized mostly as being aimed at "disciplinary" development; 
that is, the policy analysts were guided in their choice of 
problems by standards that originated within the discipline
and not, as suggested by James Coleman, "in the world of 
20action." This led to charges, such as that made by Austin 
Ranney, that "at least since 1945, most political scientists 
have focused their professional attention mainly on the
18Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 22.
19Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter­
party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies 
in the American States," Journal of Politics (May 1963); 
265-289; Richard Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public 
Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in 
the American States," American Political Science Review 60 
(March 1966): 73-82; and Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment
and Public Policy in the States," Journal of Politics 27 
(February 1965): 586-601.
20For elaboration of this idea from a broad social 
science perspective, see James S. Coleman, Policy Research 
in the Social Sciences (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning
Press, 1972).
40
process by which public policies are made and have shown
21relatively little concern with their contents."
The Contents of Policy
During this same period, however, a few studies did
attempt to deal with the relationship between the policy
process and policy results. Particularly relevant in this
regard are the works of Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking 
22Reexamined; Austin Ranney, Political Science and Public
23Policy; and Larry L. Wade, The Elements of Public Policy.
For the most part these authors mirrored three common themes: 
(1) a growing discontent with the results of the policy pro­
cess (thus the need for conceptual models that paid more 
attention to policy contents); (2) a recognition of the in­
creasing complexity of social problems that cut across narrow 
definitions of what is "political"; and (3) the increasing 
need for expert attention by political scientists to policies 
or policy choices formulated to have impacts in environments 
external to the governmental system itself (e.g., policies 
concerned with such matters as science and technology, the 
use and conservation of natural resources, transportation.
21Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A
Framework for Choice," in Political Science and Public 
Policy, ed. Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968),
p. 3. Ranney equates policy content with Easton's concept 
of policy outputs and outcomes.
*>2San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1968.
23Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. Merrill, 1972.
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the environment, communications, health and welfare, education, 
money and banking, and law enforcement). Writing in the 
American Political Science Review in 1969, David Easton high­
lighted these themes by proclaiming the arrival of a "post- 
behavioral revolution," reflecting further dissatisfaction
with the lack of relevance of social science to pressing
24societal issues and concerns.
A similar concern had been advanced fifteen years
before Easton's article appeared (and likewise before the
works on public policy cited above) when Harold Lasswell and
Daniel Lerner had introduced the concept of the "policy 
25sciences." Although largely ignored at the time, the 
authors, in laying out the scope and methods of a policy 
orientation, argued that a policy focus should be directed in 
part toward the policy process and in part toward the "intel­
ligence needs of policy";
We have become more aware of the policy 
process as a suitable object of study in its own 
right, primarily in the hope of improving the ration­
ality of the flow of decision.
24David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political 
Science," American Political Science Review 63 (December 
1969); 1951-1061. Although Easton did his early work in
"systems politics," for example, see The Political System 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953, it is only in
recent years that the "input" and "output" categories have 
been operationalized with useful information and data.
25Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds.. The 
Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Methods
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).
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A policy orientation has been developing 
that cuts across the existing specializations. The 
orientation is twofold. In part it is directed to­
ward the policy process, and in part toward the intel­
ligence needs of policy. The first task, which is 
the development of a science of policy forming and 
execution, uses the methods of social and psycholog­
ical inquiry. The second task, which is the improv­
ing of the concrete content of the information and 
the interpretations available to policy-makers, 
typically goes outside the boundaries of social 
science and psychology.26
Approximately twenty years later, Yehezkel Dror, in his
introductory note to Lasswell's follow-up work, A Pre-View
of Policy Sciences, suggests:
Even though the concept was recognized as a revolu­
tionary one and the book [The Policy Sciences] it­
self was widely reviewed and discussed, the idea of 
policy sciences itself was not followed up until 
quite recently. Apparently, more progress in var­
ious policy sciences disciplines (e.g., decision 
sciences, applied behavioral sciences, systems 
analysis), more experience with policy research 
organizations (e.g., the Rand Corporation and the 
Hudson Institute) and, in particular, some disen­
chantment with "normal sciences" and their social 
consequences, were necessary requisites for acceler­
ated efforts to advance policy sciences.27
Lasswell's "pre-view" ostensibly led the way for
political scientists and other policy sciences professionals
interested in applying their specialized knowledge to the
manner in which government, business, and other institutions
seek to realize their policy goals. The literature that has
grown up around this approach to policy research stresses the
need for policy analyses that estimate the future impacts of
2®Ibid,, pp. 3-4.
27Harold D. Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences 
(New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. xi.
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past policy choices and the likely impacts of innovations 
advanced to deal with substantive policy problems. Jacob 
Ukeles adds that this does not mean the activities identified 
with policy analysis of the pragmatic or problem-solving mode 
are unlike those which traditionally have been associated 
with public policymaking studies, rather it stresses the
28formal association of analysis with public decision-making.
Systems Analysis and Incrementalism
Although there is now general agreement that policy
analysis is a worthwhile activity, disagreement continues
over the methods of analysis, whether policy analysis is
normative or positive, and over the role of the analyst in
29governmental policymaking. As noted in chapter I, part 
of the debate in all of these categories stems from philo­
sophical arguments about the place of policy research within 
the discipline of political science. However, much of the 
debate is reflected in the conflict between those who view 
the results obtained by political bargaining ("muddling 
through," or "disjointed incrementalism") as more favorable
28Jacob B. Ukeles, "Policy Analysis: Myth or
Reality?" Public Administration Review 37 (May/June 197.7) : 
223.
^^Ukeles, "Policy Analysis," pp. 224-225. See also 
Yehezkel Dror, "Policy Analyst: A New Professional Role in
Government," Public Administration Review 27 (September 1967) 
197-203; K. A. Archibald, "Three Views of the Expert’s Role 
in Policymaking: Systems Analysis, Incrementalism, and the
Clinical Approach," Policy Sciences 1 (1970): 73-86; and
Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences (New York: American
Elsevier, 1971).
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and those who contend that choosing alternative paths to 
social goals depends on rational or systems analysis of all 
possible courses of action relevant to achieving identified 
objectives.
Regarding the latter viewpoint, in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, Rand Corporation's "systems analysis" school of 
thought began to extoll the use of rational analysis to help 
a decision-maker choose a course of action from among compet­
ing alternatives by bringing expert judgment and quantita­
tive, economic methods to bear on a p r o b l e m . T h e  rational 
model structures analysis in four steps; (1) identify objec­
tives, (2) identify all possible alternatives relevant to 
achieving objectives, (3) predict the probable consequences 
of alternative courses of action, and (4) select that alter­
native which maximizes the attainment of objectives.Sys­
tems analysis therefore stresses the effectiveness of deci­
sions, with maximum results usually defined in "economic
32rationality," or "least unit cost" terms.
At the same time, Lindblom and other academics were 
arguing that attempts to apply the rational model— borrowed
For example, see David Novick, ed., Program Budgeting 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); and
Edward S. Quade and Wayne I. Boucher, eds.. Systems Analysis 
and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense (New York:
American Elsevier, 1968).
^^Ukeles, "Policy Analysis," p. 226.
32Archibald, "Three Views of the Expert's Role in 
Policymaking," p. 75.
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largely from "think tank" successes in defense policy— to
public policymaking ignore the way the policy process really
33works. In seminal works, Robert Dahl and Lindblom and 
David Braybrooke and Lindblom^^ contend that policy is made 
by small adjustments ("increments") in existing reality. 
Lindblom suggests the strategy of disjointed incrementalism, 
an elaboration of what he earlier referred to as "muddling 
through." In this approach, policies are the result of 
sequential decision-making through minor adjustments to past 
decisions on particular problems. The decision-maker exam­
ines only those alternatives which are incrementally differ­
ent from existing policy and from each other; and he does 
not attempt to analyze all the consequences of even this 
limited number of alternatives. But more importantly, as 
compared to systems analysis, Lindblom's strategy aims at 
political expedience instead of economic rationality— i.e., 
emphasis is on the "political feasibility" of an alternative. 
The incrementalist, then, may arbitrarily exclude some alter­
native from his analysis because of the assumption that pol­
itics will correct adverse decisions.
Further comparisons of systems analysis and dis­
jointed incrementalism have shown that there are important
33Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, 
Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper & Row, 1953).
34David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, The 
Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963). The best
treatment of incrementalism is found in Lindblom, The Intel­
ligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965).
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similarities as well as differences. For example, both 
approaches: recognize the need to make choices among con­
flicting policy objectives, at the margin; attempt to cope 
with complexity or uncertainty; use "satisficing" (expecta­
tions are adjusted to the limitations of time, cost, and 
information) rather than optimizing or maximizing criteria; 
continually restructure data, means, and ends; and recognize 
that constraints always prevent the analysis of all alterna­
tives.^^
The manner in which incrementalism and systems analy­
sis interact is significant for the applied policy analyst.
In fact, most current definitions of policy analysis gener­
ally reflect a blending of the advantages of both. Charles
36 37Schultze and Dror have tried to define some middle ground 
between incrementalism and systematic analysis. Both authors 
criticize incrementalist theory on normative grounds, arguing 
it does not fit an era of rapid increase in technological and 
behavioral knowledge and is unable to deal with changing 
values in an increasingly dynamic society. On the other hand, 
both realize that the high information requirements of the
Archibald, "Three Views of the Expert's Role in 
Policymaking," p. 75. See also James Schlesinger, "Systems 
Analysis and the Political Process," Journal of Law and 
Economics 11 (October 1968): 281-298.
36Charles L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of 
Public Spending (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1968).
37Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined.
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rational model can seldom, if ever, be met. More specifically, 
Dror contends that policy analysis should combine the data- 
oriented methods of systems analysis with qualitative tech­
niques and total awareness of the unique characteristics of
38political phenomena. In other words, if policy analysts 
are to provide an information base for political decision­
making, consideration must be given to a wider range of 
alternatives and to relatively intangible factors such as 
interests and values within the system.
Both approaches have had a tremendous influence on 
existing conceptions of policy analysis. Even though the 
two are significantly different, the most commonly advanced 
definitions of policy analysis include elements and assump­
tions from each. For example, one such general model for 
policy analysis included the following components:
Step One: Assess the policy-making environ­
ment within which the analyst and the relevant deci­
sion maker(s) are operating.
Step Two: Identify the policy question or
problem needing resolution.
Step Three: Identify policy alternatives
appropriate to the policy-making environment and 
the decision maker(s).
38Dror, "Policy Analyst: A New Professional Role,"
pp. 197-203. For further inquiry into the origins, appli­
cation, uses, and abuses of systems analysis, see Ida R. 
Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). On the
need to consider intangible factors in policy analysis, see 
Eileen Siedman, "Why Not Qualitative Analysis?" Public 
Administration Review 37 (July/August 1977) : 415-416.
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Step Four; Identify criteria that are 
relevant to choosing among alternatives.
Step Five: Using assumptions and limited
information, assess the pros and cons of each alter­
native in terms of the relevant c r i t e r i a . 39
No attempt is made to maximize the achievement of objectives, 
instead the analysis may simply "screen out the worst pos­
sible alternatives."
The purpose in recounting the above debate is to 
suggest its close ties with parallel developments in the 
policy sciences ideas discussed earlier. The literature 
cited is the theoretical beginning point for the study of a 
particular substantive policy problem, such as energy con­
servation, where the aim is to develop information that might 
improve the public policies that have been made to date.
From the discussion and review up to this point, one is able 
to discern that in a matter of a few years policy analysis 
evolved from an idea to reality, but not without growth pains. 
It is generally agreed, however, that policy analysis has the 
potential for enhancing the way government does business. It 
is to this end that the discussion now turns to an identifi­
cation and description of the framework to be used in this 
study.
The Issue Systems Framework 
The issue systems framework, outlined in figure II-l, 
is responsive to the contemporary trend in policy studies.
^^Ukeles, "Policy Analysis," p. 226,
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FIGURE II-l
AN ISSUE SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY
STEP 1 Identify and Define the Substantive Policy 
Problems and Issues
0 Identify trends and events in society that 
give impetus to the problems and issues;
o Define problems and issues being processed 
by the system.
STEP 2 Describe the Social and Political Context
o Describe the key elements in the histori­
cal development of the issue;
-When did the issue arise?
-Which participants perceived it as an 
issue?
-What interests and values did these 
participants represent?
-When and how did government respond?
-What policies were enacted or estab­
lished?
-What agency administered these 
policies?
-How have these policies affected the 
issue?
o Define the existing system for dealing 
with the issue:
-What are the relevant, current public 
and private, formal and informal 
institutional arrangements?
-What interests and values are at stake? 
-Who represents these interests and 
values and what strategies and tactics 
are they using?
-Are there situations or soical, cul­
tural and technical conditions and 
circumstances that could affect whether 




STEP 3 Identify, Evaluate, and Compare Alternative 
Policies and Implementing Strategies
o Identify and describe alternative poli­
cies and implementing strategies 
already being proposed for dealing with 
existing problems and issues;
o Describe alternative policies and imple­
menting strategies formulated in the 
conduct of the research;
o Describe the costs, risks, and benefits of 
most significant and feasible policies 
and implementing strategies;
o Compare alternatives and strategies on 
the basis of explicit criteria using a 
variety of measures.
SOURCE: Adapted from Irvin L. White, Steven C.
Ballard and Timothy A. Hall, "Technology Assessment as an 
Energy Policy Tool," Policy Studies Journal, forthcoming 
Fall, 1978; and Irvin L. White et al.. Work Plan for 
Completing a Technology Assessment of Western Energy 
Resource Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental
Protection Agency, 1978), pp. 29-39.
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It offers an approach to policymaking and analysis that is
intended to provide for the systematic investigation of both
problem and process. Its theoretical roots are largely in
systems analysis and decision-making approaches described
earlier. As will be shown below, the issue systems approach
attempts to "marry," or synthesize the advantages of the two
foci. The actual sets of research questions, also to be
specified below, are based on an interpretation of this
framework as it has been applied to domestic energy policy
40problems and issues.
Underlying Assumptions 
Use of this model implies the acceptance of two 
underlying assumptions about policymaking and politics.
This approach to applied policy analysis draws 
heavily on the cumulative experience of the Science and Public 
Policy Program (S&PPp) of The University of Oklahoma. S&PPP's 
interdisciplinary research teams have conducted two "technology 
assessments" which, as applied policy studies, focus on in­
forming interested publics and decision-makers of the pos­
sible ranges of consequences for new actions and associated 
policy alternatives. See Irvin L. White et al.. Energy From 
the West; Draft Policy Analysis Report (Washington, D.C.:
U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, forthcoming); White 
et al.. Energy From the West: A Progress Report of a Tech­
nology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development 
(Washington, D.C.; U.S., Environmental Protection Agency,
1977); and Don E. Kash et al.. Energy Under the Oceans; A 
Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Operations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
Related works by S&PPPare, Kash et al., Our Energy Future:
The Role of Research, Development, and Demonstration in 
Reaching a National Consensus on Energy Supply (Norman : 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Kash et al.. Energy 
Alternatives: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975); and White et al.. North 
Sea Oil and Gas: Implications for Future United States
Development (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
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These need to be made explicit. First, the framework has a 
substance basis; it emphasizes the observation that the struc­
ture of and behavior within issue systems vary according to 
the substance of the issue being considered. The interests 
and values at stake, relevant institutional arrangements, 
applicable laws and regulations, governmental and nongovern­
mental participants, and intensity of involvement of relevant 
stakeholders can all vary on the basis of substance.For 
example, the substance of energy problems leads to a differ­
ent policy system definition than would the substance of 
social welfare problems. And at a lower level of generality, 
the substance of energy conservation problems leads to the 
definition of a policy system different than the system that 
would be defined for nuclear energy problems.
Second, it is important to note, in relation to the 
above observation, that the nature of an issue may therefore 
influence how various policymaking processes develop and
The basic notion here is one which suggests 
instead of a single, integrated policy process, what exists 
is a number of individual, and largely independent policy 
"subsystems" defined according to the problem being examined. 
See J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process (New York: 
Random House, 1965). On the concept, see also, A. Lee 
Fritschler, Smoking and Politics: Policy-making and the
Federal Bureaucracy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1969); Irvin L. White, "Policy Analysis and International 
Law of the Sea," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the International Studies Association, New York City, N.Y., 
March 14-17, 1973; and Lester M. Salamon and John J. 
Siegfried, "Economic Power and Political Influence; The 
Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," American 
Political Science Review 71 (September 1977): 1030-31,
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function. But contrary to the position implied in the more 
traditional policymaking approaches which emphasize procedural 
aspects for dealing with issues, the expertise of the politi­
cal scientist acting as policy analysis is not just within 
the parameters of the political process and how it works, but 
in the substantive issue as well. In other words, questions 
of structural design and the day-to-day management of policy­
making systems must be complimented with another important 
question: How can the policy product be improved?
In summary, then, the issue systems framework rests 
on two assumptions which stress the fact that the policy 
analyst needs to understand the policymaking process and 
policymaking environment within which the analyst is operat­
ing to be able to inform policymakers about how to get desired 
results. However, instead of focusing on decision processes, 
the focus is on political issues and procedures for dealing 
with them.
Operationalizing the Framework 
The framework also serves a useful heuristic purpose 
by identifying relevant research questions and the structure 
and interrelationship among these questions. The remainder 
of this chapter will expand on the issue systems categories 
and research questions as they will be applied to the con­
servation policy problem.
Step 1: Identify and Define the Substantive Policy
Problems and Issues. The concern for energy conservation
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Obviously did not arise overnight, instead as will be shown 
in chapter III, it evolved from a closely related set of 
underlying circumstances and events that collectively cap­
tured policymakers' attention. Thus, a first step in the 
analysis of conservation policy can be stated in terms of a 
definition of the problem and an identification of issues 
being processed by the system and issues needing resolution.
Although political scientists are analyzing many 
policy-related topics, very few seek to clarify the substance 
of the problems they are addressing except as the problems 
have already been defined by the policymaking system. Some 
would even argue that the substance of policy problems is 
not a proper concern of the discipline. In recent years, 
however, it has been suggested that the demands that help 
give rise to public policy and administration are important 
empirical items for consideration in policy analysis. That 
is, the policy analyst must begin by "recycling thinking" 
about problem formulation and problem definition,an activ­
ity which is given limited attention in most policymaking 
models.
Charles Jones contends not only are problems stimuli 
to government action, but also the nature of a problem may 
determine the nature of political processes for addressing 
the p r o b l e m . T h i s  assumption is similarly supported by
42Thomas D. Lynch, Policy Analysis in Public Policy­
making (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 90-93.
43Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public 
Policy, chapters 1 and 2.
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the policy analysis literature discussed in the preceding 
section. From this perspective, applied studies of policy 
require systematic description of the trends and events that 
lead to a problem being identified as a political issue and 
lead to the public policy definition (or definitions) of 
the problem.
The need for policy analysts to identify the condi­
tioning variables or events in society that give impetus to 
policy problems and issues was espoused earlier (in the late 
1940s) by Professor John Merriman Gaus. Gaus, in what he 
calls an "ecological approach" to public administration, 
contends that;
[Tlhere is an explanation of the functions of gov­
ernment in the changes which coerce us into the use 
of government as an instrument of public housekeep­ing and adjustment.44
Drawing principally from his own work and from the writings 
of Felix Frankfurter, A. V. Dicey, Elihu Root, John Dewey,
J. W. Bews and Charles Beard, Professor Gaus developed a list 
of factors which appear useful in explaining the "ebb and 
flow" of the functions of government: people, place, physi­
cal technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catas-
45trophe, and personality. These, according to Gaus, are 
the "raw materials of politics." They help describe and
44John Merriman Gaus, Reflections on Public Admin­
istration (University: University of Alabama Press, 1947),
p. 5. Emphasis added.
^^Ibid., p. 9.
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interpret "why particular activities are undertaken through 
government and the problems of policy, organization and man­
agement generally that result from such o r i g i n s . T h u s ,  
in an ecological approach to government, the prerequisites 
of public policy are found in the observation of environ­
mental factors— the substance of the problem. More specifi­
cally, environmental change and the coercion which changes 
bring is linked with resulting administrative processes as 
will be discussed in chapters IV and V. Again, quoting 
Gaus:
The exhausting of a resource or some other upsetting 
of the natural environment, the redistribution of 
population by age or place, the introduction of new 
physical or social inventions, the seepage of new 
ideas, tastes, wishes, and dramatic catastrophe, the 
expertness and leadership of groups and persons, 
working in all sorts of combinations, frequently 
subtly and unnoticed until their consequences force 
attention, may become so widely coercive as to 
require collective action. Taken together, these 
factors are the ecology of government. In them 
administration as well as politics has its r o o t s . 4?
Despite claims to this effect, most studies are of a more
traditional policymaking mode and pick up the action after
a particular problem or issue has already been "perceived,"
48"defined," and placed on the agenda of government.
^^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
47Ibid., pp. 127-28. As will be shown in chapters 
IV and V, policies are closely related to the diagnosis of 
such environmental change.
^®Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public 
Policy, pp. 27-28, defines "perception" as the way people 
receive and register events in society, "Definition" refers
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Obviously, not all problems are acted on by 
government. In other words, some problems are of a re­
stricted or private nature and affect only the person or 
persons directly involved in a particular activity. For 
example, when an individual's automobile runs out of gaso­
line in that person's driveway, the problem is private. But 
if one should happen to run out of gasoline on an urban free­
way, the problem is public— i.e., it affects others and in
some cases is prohibited by law. Thus, using a distinction
49made by John Dewey, a problem becomes public if the conse­
quences of a human act or transaction are broad, and are per­
ceived to affect other persons not directly involved in the 
transaction. When the consequences of some action are con­
sidered significant enough to be controlled or regulated, 
the problem can be defined as a "policy d e m a n d . D a v i d  
Smith suggests that for policymaking purposes, a problem 
can be defined as "a human need, deprivation, or dissatis­
faction, self-identified or identified by others, for which 
relief is s o u g h t . T h o s e  demands which decision-makers
to the problem more than the events; "Something happens; 
someone receives it in a particular way and defines it as a 
problem for him."
49John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1927. Reprinted, Chicago; Swallow 
Press, Inc., 1954), p. 12.
James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York; 
Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 4.
^^David G. Smith, "Pragmatism and the Group Theory of 
Politics," American Political Science Review 58 (September 
1964); 607-10.
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either choose or in some manner feel compelled to act upon
52make up the government's "policy agenda."
As noted by Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, students
of public policy must be concerned with "how issues are
created and why some controversies or incipient issues come
to command the attention and concern of the formal centers
53of decision-making, while others fail." For these demands 
are the "stuff" of the policymaking process and, by this 
definition, influence not only the process itself but, ulti­
mately, the content of decisions. One way that problems may 
get on the government's policy agenda and be acted upon is as 
a result of a "crisis" or some otherwise dramatic circum­
stance. Crisis was originally a medical term used to describe 
a decisive or climatic stage in the course of a disease. By 
implication, when the term is applied to the affairs of gov­
ernment, it suggests that the country is at some critical 
turning point where immediate action is in o r d e r . T h e r e ­
fore, a crisis serves to raise the relevance of problems and 
issues and attract broad public attention. Consequently,
52For a discussion of "agenda building," see Layne 
Hoppe, "Agenda Setting Strategies: The Case of Pollution
Problems," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, Calif., 
September 1970.
53Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation 
in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 14.
54Davis, Energy Politics, p. 3.
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decision-makers often feel compelled to respond with 
measures to relieve perceived problems. In this sense, the 
"energy crisis" can be viewed as a "triggering event" (to 
use Cobb and Elder's t e r m ) t h a t  was needed to push the 
latent problem of energy resource use and conservation onto 
the policy agenda.
Step 2; Describe the Social and Political 
Context. In this second policy analysis step, substantive 
problems and issues are related to the social and political 
context within which they are being addressed. This requires 
the identification and description of the relevant policy 
system or systems. Implicit in this is the observation, as 
noted earlier, that political systems vary according to the 
issue being processed. In other words, participants who are 
actively involved, institutional arrangements, laws and 
regulations, interests and values at stake, and the intensity
with which participants press their interests in relevant 
policy arenas vary on the basis of su b s t a n c e . T h e  expli 
point is that the structure and behavior of an "energy
55Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,
pp. 84-85.
^^White et al., Work Plan for Completing a Technology 
Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development, p. 33. For 
a case study which underscores these points, see Helen M. 
Ingram, Patterns of Politics in Water Resource Development;
A Case Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin 
Bill (Albuquerque; Institute for Social Research and 
Development, University.of New Mexico, 1969), especially 
pp. 8-12.
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conservation policy system" are unique, although overlap with 
other energy-related policy areas is inevitable.
The social and political context description begins 
with an examination of key elements in the historical devel­
opment of issues in the major consuming sectors. This 
includes an account of the political and organizational con­
text for policy formulation, implementation, and impacts. 
Primary empirical questions to be answered are; When did the 
issue arise? Which participants perceived it as an issue? 
What interests and values did the participants represent?
When and how did government respond? What policies were 
enacted or established? What agency administered these 
policies? How have these policies affected the issue?
This step also includes a more detailed identifica­
tion of the existing system for dealing with problems and 
issues. Given the scope and purposes of this study, the 
framework must accommodate both state and national govern­
mental institutions. In addition, inputs from groups out­
side government, for example, private sector interests, 
public interest groups, nonprofit research organizations, 
and individuals play key roles in the issue system. The 
following questions will be considered: What are the rele­
vant, current public and private, formal and informal insti­
tutional arrangements? What interests and values are at 
stake? Who represents these interests and values and what 
strategies and tactics are they using? Are there situations
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or social, cultural and technical conditions and circumstances 
that either affect or could affect whether and how the issue 
is processed by the policy system?
These questions are aimed at describing how the prob­
lems and issues have been or could be acted on by government. 
In general, responses by government to the issues can be char­
acterized in terms of: (1) the actual organizational or
structural response; (2) the legislation passed and regula­
tions, orders, etc. issued; (3) implementation of policies; 
and (4) policy impacts. As will be shown in chapter V, more 
and more government agencies and legislative bodies are mak­
ing decisions and attempting to implement policies for energy 
conservation. Incentives for state conservation plans and 
programs are the result of federal initiatives taken during 
the period 1975 to 1977. Several pieces of national legis­
lation have codified most of what has taken place in govern­
ment to encourage energy savings at the state level. In 
terms of organizational and implementation efforts, the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the 
Federal Energy Administration(FEA)— both now in the Depart­
ment of Energy (DOE) which was established in 1977— and the 
Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, 
and Commerce deserve primary attention within the federal 
government. The roles and responsibilities of these admin­
istrative units will be described as they have attempted to 
respond toconservation problems and issues.
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Thus, delineation of the conservation policy system
provides information about how various values and interests,
which are almost always in conflict, are being or can be
accommodated in the policymaking process. Part of the effort
is also intended to initiate the evaluation stage of the
57analysis by defining costs, risks, and benefits of exist­
ing conservation policies, and assessing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the methods and strategies being used to 
deal with issues. Such information is necessary if the policy 
analyst is to begin to develop and evaluate policy alterna­
tives.
Step 3; Identify, Evaluate, and Compare Alternative 
Policies and Implementing Strategies. The evaluation step 
in the issue systems model calls for the assessment of alter­
native policies and implementation strategies. Alternatives 
and implementation strategies for dealing with issues already 
being addressed by the conservation policy system will have 
been identified in the preceding step. However, alterna­
tives will be included both for issues being processed and 
for those unresolved issues identified during the conduct of 
the research. The list of possible alternatives and strate­
gies will be reduced to a manageable number, which can then 
be evaluated and compared. This is accomplished by a pre­
liminary assessment of; (1) what the potential impacts of
57Costs, risks, and benefits in the context of 
applied policy analysis are discussed in the evaluation 
step below.
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each alternative might be on the relevant individuals, groups,
or organizations; (2) the extent to which an alternative
would transfer costs and benefits from some individuals,
groups, or organizations to others; and (3) existing barriers
or constraints (e.g., legal, ethical, moral, difficulty of
implementation, economic, and so on) which might impede
58acceptance and implementation.
For the reduced list of alternatives, the following 
questions will be pursued: What are the costs, risks, and
benefits of the selected alternatives? How will the costs 
risks, and benefits be distributed? Is the alternative 
applicable and adaptable? Is it socially and politically 
feasible?
In considering policy evaluation as characterized by 
these questions, it is important to recognize the following
58White et al.. Work Plan for Completing a Technology 
Assessment, pp. 35-36.
59 'Developed initially as an analysis technique by 
economists, cost-benefit analysis is now used extensively 
in applied policy research. Where cost-benefit is broadly 
construed, a variety of measures other than dollars are used 
to assess alternatives. This recognizes the fact that some 
impacts of a chosen policy alternative cannot be meaningfully 
expressed in monetary terms. The significant analytical 
point, which will be further explored below, is that multiple 
evaluative measures are required. On this point, see White 
et al.. First Year Work Plan for a Technology Assessment of 
Western Energy Resource Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S.,
Environmental Protection Agency, 1976), pp. 5-15 and 5-21.
For a detailed discussion of the cost-benefit approach to 
evaluation, see Jerome Rothberg, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Methodological Exposition," in Marcia Guttentag and Elmer L. 
Struening, eds., Handbook of Evaluation Research, Vol. 2 
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 55-88.
64
distinctions. First, as noted earlier, policy outputs are 
not the same as policy outcomes. Outcomes, or impacts as 
they have been referred to in this study, denote the broader 
consequences or effects of public policy both on the specific 
policy issue and on society more ge n e r a l l y . A n d  recall 
these can be indirect and unintended, as well as direct and 
intended. In the second place, a distinction is maintained 
between policy evaluation to understand "causality" (whether 
or not a specific impact can be linked to a particular policy 
alternative in a cause-effect relationship) and policy evalu­
ation for the purpose of developing alternatives that can be 
compared on the basis of their potential for dealing with 
specific policy issues.
Determining relevant criteria to be used to evaluate 
energy conservation policy alternatives and implementation 
strategies is a difficult task. Although there is a fairly 
extensive base in the policy literature which broadly defines 
categories of policy inputs, less attention has been given 
to specifying criteria, other than in traditional economic
* 6 0See Wade, Elements of Public Policy, pp. 4-5.
61The assessment of alternatives is a critical com­
ponent of applied policy analysis, as distinguished from 
policy analysis which attempts to understand the causes and 
consequences of particular policies. For an elaboration of 
attempts to understand causes and effects, see Dye, Policy 
Analysis. Elaboration of the analysis of alternatives in 
applied policy analysis is discussed in Dror, Design for 
the Policy Sciences. See also. White, Ballard, and Hall, 
"Technology Assessment as an Energy Policy Tool."
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efficiency and effectiveness terms, to evaluate and compare 
different courses of action.
According to the issue systems approach as defined 
above, two kinds of alternatives are to be identified—  
procedural and substantive. Table II-l identifies and de­
fines five basic criteria to be used in the evaluation and 
comparison of conservation policies and implementing 
strategies; effectiveness, efficiency, equity, flexibility, 
and implementability. These will be explored in a general 
manner below; however, greater specification and operation- 
alization is provided in chapter VI.
Procedurally-oriented criteria, flexibility and 
implementability, are intended to assess an alternative's 
policy formulation needs and barriers to implementation.
As applied to energy conservation, these two criteria encom­
pass centralization versus decentralization of conservation
authority and responsibility, recognition of regional dif-
63ferences in policy formulation, the place of energy con­
servation goals within the scope of the emerging national
62Each criterion is defined more specifically for 
conservation problems and issues in chapter VI. In addition, 
quantitative and qualitative measures are specified for the 
five criteria.
A. Berry Crawford, "Energy Conservation in the 
Interior Western States," paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Denver, Colo., February 21-25, 1977, p. 17.
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TABLE II-l
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING AND COMPARING ALTERNATIVE 
POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
Criterion What Does It Evaluate?
Effectiveness Achievement of Objective
. Avoid or mitigate the problem or issue? 
. Short- or long-term resolution or 
solution?
. Dependency on state-of-society assump­
tions?
Efficiency Costs, Risks, and Benefits
. Economic costs, risks, benefits?
. Social costs, risks, benefits?
. Environmental costs and risks?
. Reversible/irreversible, short- or 
long-term?
Equity Distribution of Costs, Risks, and Benefits 






. Are local and regional differences 
accommodated?
. Are social and sectorial differences 
taken into account?
. How difficult will it be to administer? 
. How difficult will it be to change?
Implement­ Adoptability/Acceptability
ability . Can it be implemented within existing 
laws, regulations, and programs?
. Can it be implemented by a single 
agency or level of government?
. Is it compatible with existing socie­
tal values?
. Is it likely to generate significant 
opposition?
SOURCE: Irvin L. White at al., Energy from the West;
Policy Analysis Report (Washington, D.C.l U.S., Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, forthcoming).
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energy policy apparatus,®^ and access to decision-making 
authority by stakeholders in the issue system.Thus, an 
estimate is made of the fit between an alternative, its 
flexibility, adaptability, and applicability.
Implementation strategies can also affect the dis­
tribution of costs, risks, and benefits. That is, imple­
mentation by the "bureaucracy" raises special problems for 
consideration in policy a n a l y s i s . F o r  example; What are 
the existing barriers to the execution of a selected alter­
native? How much "administrative discretion" should be 
allowed? What will be the effects of discretion on the 
policy objectives? Whether or not the generally agreed-upon 
goals of newly enacted or recommended legislation will be 
carried out depends on the public administration system and 
the application of programs. Special attention is therefore 
given to intergovernmental aspects of implementing strategies, 
for example, by defining what is expected of the various
64U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office,
Energy Policy Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977).
^^Kash et al., Our Energy Future, pp. 453-471, 
discuss the need for a wide range of parties to have access 
to and to participate in decisions concerning new technologies 
or the development of energy facilities in new source areas.
^^For a discussion of problems of implementation and 
the role of policy analysis, see Jeffrey L. Pressman and 
Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973); and Eugene C. Bardach, The Imple­
mentation Game (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1977).
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levels of government, barriers faced, and assessing their 
capabilities to respond to a course of action.
Substantive criteria, on the other hand, attempt to 
answer the questions of "whose impact" and "impact on what"
gofor each alternative. As shown in the table, effective­
ness is generally defined as a measure of the achievement of 
substantive policy goals— energy conservation goals for these 
purposes. Of course, effectiveness as a criterion in the 
more traditional sense raises issues regarding causality, but 
as noted already, understanding cause and effect is not the 
primary goal of this policy study. Even though it may be 
impossible (for many well-recited reasons) to isolate empir­
ical cause-effect relationships, some estimate of the aggre­
gate effectiveness of an alternative can be made. For 
example, this can be derived from measures of the potential 
reduction in energy use by sector or device compared to his­
torical consumption patterns, and by estimates of attitudinal
Policy analysts have increasingly recognized that 
implementation is an important research unit between inputs 
and performance. Besides Pressman and Wildavsky, and 
Bardach, see Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore, eds.. 
Social Program Implementation (New York: Academic Press,
1976). On the specific point that implementation is a con­
straint in translating policy into performance, see Donald S. 
Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation 
Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration & Society 6
(February 1975): 458-462.
^^For a discussion of these two kinds of impact per­
spectives, see Hugh Heclo, "Social Politics and Policy 
Impacts," in What Government Does, ed. Matthew Holden, Jr., 
and Dennis L. Dresang (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publi­
cations, 1975), pp. 153-157.
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and/or behavioral changes on the part of target
1 0 .- 69populations.
As discussed throughout this chapter, numerous 
social, economic, and political values are at stake with 
regard to energy decisions. The efficiency of a policy 
alternative or implementation strategy emphasizes its costs, 
risks, and benefits. In an economic sense, the efficiency 
criterion deals with the actual dollar costs of the alterna­
tive as compared to its energy-saving returns. In some 
cases, there may be hidden costs or externalities which need 
to be accounted for. Thus, an evaluation of a policy's 
efficiency must also include some assessment of technical 
and political risks and related social costs and benefits.
The costs and benefits of alternative policies may 
not be shared equally by all stakeholders since policies 
always have the potential to affect economic sectors and 
political jurisdictions in different ways. Consequently, 
the equity criterion attempts to measure the dislocational 
and distributional impacts of an action for conservation. 
Dorothy Newman and Dawn Day's study of energy consumption 
by American households suggests the value of applying this
Besides attitudinal and behavioral changes 
associated with an alternative, information utilization 
(improvements of public knowledge of energy saving tech­
niques) is also closely tied to effectiveness considera­
tions.
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criterion— i.e., the need to consider who benefits,
experiences the costs, and assumes risks.
The essential point about evaluative criteria is
that while many policymakers desire a "bottom line," no
single evaluative criterion can provide an adequate summary
of the potential impacts of alternative public policies.
The combination of criteria to be used is determined both by
what is being evaluated and the interests and values at stake.
Although effectiveness and efficiency criteria are used most
frequently, they are not always applicable and do not always
71provide an adequate basis for evaluation. For example, 
dollars are not always an adequate indicator of how equitably 
a policy might distribute costs, risks, and benefits. And 
while it is possible to determine the dollar cost of some 
"technical fix" policy, the associated social costs often 
cannot be determined in a precise way. Of course, the same 
circumstance holds for evaluating benefits.
7rDorothy K. Newman and Dawn Day, The American 
Energy Consumer (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1975), p. 189. Recent work by the Congressional Budget 
Office has attempted to forecast equity impacts of proposed 
conservation measures, thereby providing an additional 
basis for using this criterion. See U.S., Congress, Congres­
sional Budget Office, President Carter*s Energy Proposals: A
Perspective (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office,
1977), pp. 115-127.
^^Irvin L. White et al.. Energy from the West: Draft
Policy Analysis Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environ­
mental Protection Agency, 1978), pp. 3-19 to 3-20.
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Summary
Although the sequence of research tasks outlined 
in the preceding discussion guides the policy analysis, 
reporting of the results will be more integrative. That is, 
because the research questions for each step are by no means 
as neatly differentiated as the model and description sug­
gest, results will synthesize information and be responsive 
to areas of duplication and overlap among issues. At any 
rate, since the framework is intended as a heuristic policy 
analysis device, and the focus is on the substantive problems 
and issues, modifications in light of the issue system in 
question are to be expected.
To recapitulate briefly, this chapter has shown that 
applied policy analysis challenges the process emphasis in 
public decision-making research by calling for the appraisal 
of policy objectives and evaluation of alternative policies 
for meeting specified objectives. The issue systems frame­
work has been identified as a model to investigate decision­
making and policy performance. Consequently, the framework 
should provide a useful means for analyzing energy conser­
vation policymaking and policy results. As described above, 
the evaluation of conservation policy alternatives and 
implementing strategies is viewed as an attempt to summarize 
the costs, risks, and benefits of a range of options in order 
to better inform policymakers about the potential impacts of 
choosing one alternative over another. It is hoped that the
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results obtained can make a contribution both to our 
understanding of the issues associated with the need to 
reduce national energy demand and to the concepts and 
techniques of applied policy analysis.
PART TWO
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF 
CONSERVATION PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
Part Two defines the social and political context 
within which conservation problems and issues are being 
addressed. Chapter III examines the substantive dimensions 
of energy conservation problems and issues by tracing the 
trends and events in society and factors in each of the 
major consuming sectors that have contributed, and continue 
to contribute, to the need for conservation. The context 
description continues in chapter IV with a review of the 
rationale for energy conservation as an integral part of 
national energy objectives. It delineates both public and 
elite perceptions of the energy use problem and formulates 
the "case" for conservation and conservation strategies as 
defined by key individuals and in a number of early energy 
research reports. Chapter V extends this phase of the 
research by describing the background and status of existing 
policies and programs. Chapters III, IV, and V therefore 
provide the basis for the identification of unresolved prob­
lems and issues and for the categorization of policy alter­
natives to be evaluated in Part Three.
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CHAPTER III 
THE ENERGY CONSERVATION PROBLEM
Introduction 
Interest in problems related to the consumption 
and conservation of natural resources is underpinned by rich 
tradition, from political, economic, and ecological 
perspectives.^ Frank Smith, in. The Politics of Conserva­
tion, noted that the emphasis in conservation problems and 
issues "shifts with the changing econoiry and the changing 
environment, but though there may be fluctuations, the impor­
tance of these problems will be even greater in the future
2than it has been in the past." Smith's prediction in the 
mid-1960s was firmly based given the growing awareness of 
social and environmental costs associated with rapid indus­
trial expansion and resource use in this country. Indeed, 
just a few years later the traditional conservation emphases 
— land, water, forests, and wildlife— had to expand to
For example, see John Rodman, "Four Forms of Ecolog­
ical Consciousness, Part One: Resource Conservation—
Economics and After," paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 
Illinois, September 2-5, 1976.
2New York, Pantheon Books, 1966, p. x.
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include concern over the consumption and depletion of finite 
energy resources, especially petroleum and natural gas. In 
essence, this concern resulted from one central fact: demands
for energy in the U.S. outstripped domestic supplies, which are 
heavily based on nonrenewable or depletable resources.
This chapter examines the substantive dimensions of 
energy conservation problems and issues by tracing the trends 
and events in society that were instrumental in causing energy 
demand to surpass supply, thereby giving impetus to the need 
for conservation. First, the historical components of the 
current U.S. energy supply/demand imbalance are described.
This is followed by an identification and description of fac­
tors that have contributed to increasing energy use within 
each of the major consuming sectors. Although social changes 
and trends discussed for the residential and commercial, 
industrial, and transportation sectors help to explain why 
energy consumption became a problem, public attention focused 
more readily on the issues of energy use as a result of, first, 
regional and spot energy shortages, and second, the 1973 OPEC 
oil embargo. Thus, the final section of this chapter 
describes these events.
The underlying premise of this chapter is the conten­
tion that any subsequent attempt to analyze energy conserva­
tion policymaking and policy alternatives depends on this 
investigation into the substance of the problems and issues.
In other words, the goal, as explained in chapter II, is to
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further understand the "environmental changes," trends and 
events, that influenced or determined the definition of 
energy conservation as a public policy issue.
Energy Supply and Demand 
Energy supplies can be characterized as "inputs" into 
the U.S. economy in the form of primary fuels (petroleum, 
natural gas, and coal, including imports from other nations) 
or derivatives of these fuels (e.g., gasoline, butane, and 
propane), plus electricity from domestic hydro and nuclear 
power generation. Total energy consumption, on the other 
hand, consists of two components : "final demand," or the
fuels and purchased electricity consumed directly by the 
residential and commercial, industrial, and transportation 
sectors; and energy that is "lost" in converting a primary 
energy source into electricity and transmitting this source 
from the power plant to the point of use.^
Since 1950 there has been a growing gap between U.S. 
energy production and consumption levels. An important 
reason for the energy market disparity has been the rapid 
growth of demand during a period when domestic production 
was declining. As shown in Figure III-l, energy consumption 
has consistently outpaced population growth since the indus­
trial revolution. This fact, coupled with technical
Definitions adapted from Walter G. Dupree, Jr., and 
John S. Corsentino. United States Energy Through the Year 
2000 (Revised) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975) , p. 3.
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FIGURE III-l
ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND POPULATION 
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SOURCE; Scientific American Edii^ors, Energy 
and Power: A Scientific American Book (San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman, 1971).
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inefficiencies and rising energy use per capita during a 
period when energy was relatively inexpensive, has resulted 
in unprecedented levels of energy consumption. Today although 
the U.S. represents only six percent of the world's popula­
tion, it consumes one-third of the energy used in the
4world.
The Historical Record 
The historical record for energy consumption in this 
country is shown in Table III-l. In all but five years since 
1947, demand for energy has risen progressively each year.
And four of the five years in which a decline was recorded 
were years of "lessened economic activity" as measured by 
gross national product (GNP).^ More precisely, during the 
1947-1973 period, total energy consumption more than doubled, 
from 33.0 to 74.7 quadrillion (10^^) Btu's. The combined 
effects of the 1973 OPEC embargo (and concurrent price in­
creases for energy), a declining economy, and consecutively 
mild winters, resulted in total consumption dropping to 72.9 
quadrillion Btu's in 1974 and declining again to 71.1 quad­
rillion Btu's in 1975. Prior to this, the last decline had 
come in 1954. Data for 1976 and 1977 indicate, however.
4Earl Cook, "The Flow of Energy in an Industrial 
Society," Scientific American 224 (September 1971): 135.
^Dupree, Jr. and Corsentino, United States Energy 













1947 29.2 3.8 33.0
1948 29.1 4.8 33.9
1949 27.3 4.2 31.5
1950 29.7 4.3 34.0
1951 32.1 4.7 36.8
1952 31.6 4.9 36.5
1953 32.6 5.0 37.6
1954 31.2 5.1 36.3
1955 34.3 5.4 39.7
1956 35.8 5.9 41.7
1957 • 35.6 6.1 41.7
1958 35.5 6.2 41.7
1959 36.4 6.7 43.1
1960 38.2 6.4 44.6
1961 38.7 6.6 45.3
1962 40.5 6.9 47.4
1963 42.0 7.3 49.3
1964 43.6 7.6 51.2
1965 45.3 8.0 53.3
1966 47.6 8.8 56.4
1967 49.4 8.9 58.3
1968 52.2 9.5 61.7
1969 54.4 10.6 6.50
1970 56.0 11.1 67.1
1971 57.0 11.7 68.7
1972 59.5 12.6 72.1
1973 61.3 13.4 74.7
1974 59.3 13.6 72.9
1975 57.5 13.6 71.1
SOURCE: U.S., Department of the Interior, Energy
Perspectives 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 206.
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that substantial increases in domestic energy consumption
. 6are occurring once again.
A better perspective of energy consumption in this 
country is gained by examining the magnitude of modern demand 
growth rates. Demand for energy grew at an average rate of
3.0 percent per year from 1950-1965, meaning that consump­
tion would double every 23 years. Then, as shown in 
Table III-2, over the next eight years, 1965-1973, the 
average growth rate of total consumption increased consider­
ably to 4.5 percent, a doubling time of just 16 years.
At the same time, domestic energy production grew at 
roughly 3.0 percent annually from 1950 to 1970, but has been
7at a virtual standstill since 1970. Thus, as illustrated 
in Figure III-2, the progressive rise in consumption could 
not be equalled by production solely from U.S. sources.
Moreover, recent projections for the present through 
the year 2000 indicate an even greater disparity between 
domestic supply and demand growth rates unless measures are
Otaken to adjust these trends.
U.S., Federal Administration, Monthly Energy Review, 
September 1977, p. 1; and U.S., Department of Energy,
Monthly Energy Review, December 1977, p. 1. Total consump­
tion in 1976 was 74.0 quadrillion Btu's, almost equal to the 
highest year on record. Estimates for 1977 indicate consump­
tion will surpass the 1973 peak, reaching 77.6 quadrillion 
Btu's.
^Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A 
Time to Choose, p. 5.
8Edison Electric Institute, Economic Growth in the 
Future (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1976); Energy Policy
Project of the Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose; National
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TABLE III-2
AVERAGE ANNUAL ENERGY GROWTH RATES, 







1950 - 1960 2.7 2.5
1960 - 1965 3.7 3.5
1965 - 1970 4.7 4.5
1970 - 1973 3.7 3.0
1950 - 1965 3.0 2.9
1950 - 1976 3.0 2.7
1965 - 1973 4.5 3.9
1965 - 1975 2.9 2.4
SOURCE; Calculated from data in U.S., Department 
of the Interior, Energy Perspectives 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 207.
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FIGURE III-2
TOTAL U.S. ENERGY PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION, 1947-1975
7 0











SOURCE: Data from U.S., Department of the Interior,
Energy Perspectives 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1975), p. 206.
84
Another indicator of our increasingly energy-intensive 
society is energy use per capita over the last 25 years.
Total energy use per capita grew from 229.0 million (10®)
Btu's in 1947 to 246.8 million Btu's in 1960, depicting a 
rather slow average annual growth rate of 1.0 percent. But 
growth rates for energy use per person dramatically increased 
after 1960. For example, in sharp contrast to the above 
figures, the 1960-1965 average annual growth for energy use 
per person was 2.1 percent, and the 1965-1970 rate was 3.7 
percent. These five-year trends are shown in Table III-3.
As in the case of total energy consumption, although 
per capita demand declined for two years in a row following 
the 1973 energy shortages and price increases, it is once 
again climbing at a substantial rate.
Thus, the magnitude of overall energy growth in the 
U.S. reflects the fact that the average consumer was using 
more energy each year. This rapid increase in energy con­
sumption by individuals was induced by two related factors; 
declining relative prices of energy and rising real incomes 
for consumers. Looking at the 10-year period 1960-1970, 
while the wholesale price index for all commodities increased 
at an average rate of 1.5 percent per year, the wholesale
Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: 
National Petroleum Council, 1972); and U.S., Federal Energy 
Administration, 1976 National Energy Outlook (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). These forecasts
and their policy implications are discussed in chapter IV.
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TABLE III-3













1950 152.3 223.2 _
1955 165.9 239.3 1.4
1960 180.7 246.8 0.6
1965 194.3 274.3 2.1
1970 204.9 327.5 3.6
1975 213.4 338.0 0.6
SOURCE: Calculated from data in U.S., Department of
the Interior, Energy Perspectives 2 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 206.
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price index for fuels and electricity rose an average of
91.0 percent per year. In addition, energy prices increased
at a slower rate than the per unit costs of labor during this
same 10-year p e r i o d . I n  sum, while the real price of
energy was growing, the price relative to all commodities
and labor was declining. This trend continued for two more
years. In 1973 the wholesale price index for energy grew at
an average rate of 13.2 percent, whereas the index for all
commodities grew at a slightly lower average rate of 13.1
percent. The effect of the oil embargo on energy prices was
reflected in 1974 growth rates (an increase of 55.1 percent
in the energy wholesale price index compared to 18.9 percent
for all commodities.^^
The period 1960-1970 was also one of rising incomes
as U.S. economic activity rose every year except for 1970.
For example, real per capita income (in constant 1958 dollars)
12increased as an average rate of 3.5 percent per year. In 
combination, rising incomes and declining relative prices of 
energy had three "mutually reinforcing" effects on energy
9U.S., Department of Commerce, The U.S. Fact Book,
The American Almanac, the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
(New York: Grossett & Dunlap, 1976), p. 418.
^^Bruce Hannon, "Energy Conservation and the Consumer," 
Science 189 (July 11, 1975); 96.
^^The U.S. Fact Book, p. 416.
l ^ i b i d . ,  p .  3 8 3 .
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consumption.^^ First, declining relative prices of energy 
led to changes in production processes and techniques.
Energy from fossil fuels was increasingly substituted for 
human labor.Secondly, this substitution kept the costs 
of production from rising as high as they, would have other­
wise, thereby creating a favorable economic climate for 
energy-intensive, as compared to labor-intensive, products. 
Thirdly, because of lower relative prices of energy-intensive 
goods and services and rising per capita incomes, consumers 
began to spend more on energy-using commodities. Increas­
ingly, the population became dependent on lifestyles based 
on the acquisition of such energy consuming products as 
automobiles, televisions, clothes dryers, dishwashers, air 
conditioners, disposable goods, and similar energy-intensive 
articles. And, as will be discussed below, in terms of 
energy requirements, many of the products currently avail­
able to consumers are less energy efficient than earlier 
counterparts, or have added luxury features that increase 
their energy use. This trend toward goods that use more 
energy holds equally for some types of services.
13Thomas H. Tietenberg, Energy Planning and Policy 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 14-15.
14This was especially true for agriculture and food 
production where between 1920 and 1950 the proportion of 
the U.S. population involved in agriculture decreased by 
one-half. It did so again by 1962, and again has declined 
by almost half since then. See Carol E. Steinhart and 
John S. Steinhart, Energy: Sources, Use and Role in Human
Affairs (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).
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Up to this point, energy supplies and demands have 
been described in aggregate terms. Although this approach 
has merit for the purpose of introducing historical 
production-consumption trends and effects, it is less than 
complete. Energy technologies and utilization efficiencies 
differ among the residential and commercial, industrial, and 
transportation sectors. Likewise, the types and amounts of 
fuel in demand vary according to end uses. As with popula­
tion, changing lifestyles, and energy prices, factors unique 
to each sector have influenced the course of supply and 
demand. The discussion below: (1) takes a detailed look
at consumption trends and uses in each of the major energy 
consuming sectors, and (2) describes problems associated with 
supplying energy to meet these sectorial needs.
Energy Consumption by Sector^^
Table III-4 shows that all sectors of the economy 
have substnatially increased their use of energy over the 
past 25 years. However, the rate of increase has varied
This discussion of energy use by sector is based 
in part on research undertaken by the author in conjunction 
with the Science and Public Policy Program, conducted under 
Contract Number EQAC034 with the Council on Environmental 
Quality, funded by the Atomic Energy Commission (now part of 
the Department of Energy (DOE)), Council on Environmental 
Quality, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage­
ment, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Energy Admin­
istration (now in DOE), and the Federal Power Commission 
(also now a part of DOE). See The University of Oklahoma, 
Science and Public Policy Program, Energy Alternatives: A
Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
Office, 1975), pp. 13-1 to 13-45.
TABLE III-4
U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY ECONOMIC SECTORS QUADRILLION (lO^S) Btu's*
Year
ResidentialandCommercial Industrial Nonfuel Uses Transportation Pinal. Demand Losses TotalEnergy PercentLost
1950 8.1 11.9 1.0 8.6 29.7 4.3 34.0 13
1960 11.4 14.4 1.5 10.8 38.2 6.4 44.6 14
1970 17.0 19.8 2.9 16.4 56.0 11.1 67.1 17
1971 17.4 19.6 2.8 16.9 57.0 11.7 68.7 17
1972 18.1 20.0 3.1 17.9 59.5 12.4 71.9 17
1973 18.0 20.0 3.2 18.8 61.3 13.4 74.7 18
1974 17.6 20.2 3.2 18.3 59.3 13.6 72.9 19
1975 17.3 19.0 3.1 18.4 57.5 13.6 71.1 19
1976 18.8 21.2 (NA) 19.3 59.6 14.4 74.0 19
00VO
(NA) Not available
SOURCE: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Senate, Committeeon Energy and Natural Resources and the National Ocean Policy Study of the Committee on Commerce, Project Interdependence; U.S. and World Energy Outlook Through 1990, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.» Government Printing Office, 1977), p. Il4.
^Oata for residential and commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors are for direct energy 
use only. Losses due to the conversion, transmission, and distribution of electricity are not allocated to each sector.
^Lines may not add due to rounding.
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among sectors such that shifts have occurred in their 
relative importance to the national total. Historically, 
the industrial sector has been the largest consuming sector, 
but recent increases have been going into the other sectors. 
Using final demand as the measure, in 1950 American indus­
tries used 40 percent of the nation's energy requirement for 
that year. By 1976 this share declined to approximately one- 
third of the total. On the other hand, transportation and 
residential and commercial use climbed from about one-fourth 
each to one-third during the same period.
A relatively few end uses within these sectors com­
prise a significant proportion of all energy used. For 
example, as indicated in Table III-5, residential and com­
mercial space heating and cooling, industrial heat processes 
for manufacturing, and transportation fuel usage equal approx­
imately three-fourths of all energy used. In recent times, 
changes within these end use categories have boosted the 
rate of sectorial consumption, contributing to the shifts 
noted above. By far two of the most important patterns have 
been the rising use of electricity for residential and com­
mercial purposes, particularly space conditioning, and the 
large-scale commitment of national energy resources to a 
massive transportation system accompanied by a shift of 
people and goods to less energy-efficient ways of transport. 
Industrial use is refractory to such a generalizable pattern 
— i.e., the way energy is used obviously differs greatly
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TABLE III-5 





Space heating (residential, commercial) 17.6
Process steam (industrial) 16.0
Direct heat (industrial) 10.4
Electric drives (industrial) 8.2
Feedstocks, raw materials (commercial, 
industrial, transportation) 5.1
Water heating (residential, commercial) 3.8
Air conditioning (residential, commercial) 3.3
Commercial lighting 2.6
Refrigeration (residential, commercial) 2.4
Cooking (residential, commercial) 1.1
Electrolytic processes (industrial) 1.1
Other 2.2
Total 100.0
SOURCE: Electric Power Research Institute, "R&D
Status Report," EPRI Journal 2 {December 1977): 40.
®Total energy consumption in 1975 was approximately
71 quadrillion Btu's.
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among industries. Even so, two facts about industrial 
energy consumption since 1950 are important; one, industry 
has used more energy each year (except 1975); and two, the 
amount of energy invested in a product has progressively 
declined. These features and others will be explored below.
Residential and Commercial 
The residential and commercial sector consists of 
single- and multi-family dwelling units, and diverse commer­
cial establishments such as office buildings, hotels, whole­
sale and retail stores, hospitals, schools, service stations, 
restaurants, and so forth. Energy use in residences is pri­
marily a function of the number of households, size and 
technological characteristics of the home, number of per­
sons, and number of appliances in the household.During 
the recent past, the average annual growth rate of residen­
tial energy consumption has exceeded that for energy consurap- 
17tion in general. This is due in part to population growth 
and energy-intensive lifestyles. These factors have con­
tributed to a more widespread use of electricity consuming 
devices, particualrly for heating, air conditioning, clothes 
drying, refrigeration, lighting and assorted small
Dorothy K. Newman and Dawn Day, The American 
Energy Consumer (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1975), p. XXV.
17Stanford Research Institute, Patterns of Energy 
Consumption in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1972), p. 6.
18
93
appliances. Table III-6 illustrates the role of these 
devices in energy consumption, and indicates the growth of 
appliance ownership over the 1960-1973 period.
In addition to these appliances, the growth in 
electric resistance heating is noteworthy. In 1974, 49 per­
cent of the homes built were heated electrically, and 48 per-
18cent were centrally air conditioned. This trend is com­
pounded by the fact that houses are also increasing in size. 
For example, in 1960 only 16 percent of the houses built had 
seven or more rooms; this had risen to 22 percent by 1974.^^ 
All of these variables, more appliances, larger homes, and 
the widespread use of electric space conditioning, are 
bound to increase the future intensity of energy consumption 
in the American household.
Commercial energy uses are very similar to those 
within the home; space heating and cooling, appliances, 
cooking, and so on. About one-half of the energy demand is 
for space conditioning. Rising consumption in this sector 
reflects the expansion of commercial and service activities
generally in the economy, which have outpaced industrial
20growth consistently over the last decade. Significant
18U.S., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1975), p. 713.
^®Ibid., p. 721.
20Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, 
Exploring Energy Choices: A Preliminary Report (Washington,
D.C.: Ford Foundation, 1974), p. 3.
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TABLE III-6






Appliances 1960 1973 Consumed^
Air conditioner (room 
or central 13 49 1,389^
Television
Black and white 87 69 362
Color 56 502
Clothes dryer 17 48 993
Dishwasher 5 . 22 363
Freezer (NA) 32 1,761
Refrigerator 86 80 1,217
Washing machine 75 69 103
SOURCE: Appliance ownership data are from U.S.,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The U.S. Fact 
Book, The American Almanac, The Statistical Abstract of the 
U.S. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1976), p. 406. Energy
consumption figures for appliances are from Alvin Kaufman, 
Warren Farb and Barbara Daly, "U.S. Energy Demand Forecast, 
1976-90," in Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Energy
Outlook througb 1990, Committee Print, ed. U.S., Congress, 
House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcom­
mittee on Energy and Power; and Senate, Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources and the National Ocean Policy Study 
of the Committee on Commerce (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977), p. 116.
®One Kilowatt-hour of electricity equals 3,413 Btu's.
Room type.
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increases in commercial energy consumption have been in air
conditioning for buildings and other electricity uses (e.g.,
lighting, computers, elevators, office machines, and some
electric heat).
Thus, one of the primary reasons for rising energy
consumption in the residential and commercial sector is the
growing use of electrictiy. In the 25-year period, 1950-
1975, electricity demand in this sector increased close to
sixfold. The effect of this on total U.S. energy consumption
has been compounded by the leveling off of the efficiency
with which power plants convert primary fuels to electricity.
Between 1950 and 1975 the heat input required to produce one
Kilowatt-hour (Kwh) of electrictiy declined at an average
annual rate of 1.5 percent, but during the latter part of
this time period, 1964-1975, it increased at a rate of 0.1
21percent per year.
While all energy conversions are more or less limited 
in theoretical efficiency by the "laws of thermodynamics," 
in the case of electrical power generation there are losses at 
the power plant and in transmission to the point of use. For 
example, in 1970 almost 10 percent of the country's useful 
"work" was done by electricity; however, producing that elec­
tricity accounted for 26 percent of the nation's total energy 
22consumption. The losses ended up as "wasted" energy— i.e..
21Kaufman, Farb, and Daly, "U.S. Energy Demand Fore­
cast, 1976-90," in Project Interdependence, p. 115.
^^Cook, "The Flow of Energy," p. 136.
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waste heat released into the environment. Of course losses
also occur when fuels such as natural gas and heating oil
are directly burned. But the efficiency with which, for
example, natural gas home furnaces use energy ranges from 60
to 80 percent, compared to 32 percent for the electric power 
23plant.
The implications of these efficiency considerations 
can best be summarized by the following three illustrations. 
First, as noted above, electric air conditioning is one of 
the fastest growing areas of energy use. Because of the 
typical inefficiency of many cooling units, air condition­
ing accounted for almost 16 percent of the total increase in 
electric power from 1960 to 1970.^^ Secondly, if present 
electricity growth rates continue unabated, demand could 
almost double by 1990, from 2 trillion Kwh to 3.8 trillion. 
Finally, a distinguishing characteristic of an affluent, 
energy-intensive society is the total amount of energy con­
sumed by the residential and commercial sector compared to 
that used by the industrial sector. As shown in Figure III-3, 
increasing electricity use reveals an interesting convergence 
of residential and commercial use and industrial consumption. 
In fact, if conversion losses are allocated to the two sec­
tors, in 1975 for the first time in our history, industrial 
energy use actually fell slightly below that of the other
23Stanford Research Institute, Patterns of Energy 
Consumption in the United States, p. 153.
^^Cook, "The Flow of Energy," pp. 137-138.
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FIGURE III-3: ELECTRICITY USE BY SECTOR, 1926-1971
SOURCE : Earl Cook, "Energy
Flow Through the U.S.
.Economy," in T. Nejat 
Veziroglu (ed.). Energy Conser­
vation; A National Forum (Coral 
Gables, Fla.: Clean Energy
Research Institute, University 
"of Miami, 1975), p. 25.
U . S .  E L E C T R I C - U T I L I T Y  S ALE S ( k w h )
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sector (26.08 quadrillion Btu's compared to 26.11 quadrillion
Btu's).^^
Industrial
Historically, the industrial sector has been the 
largest consuming sector in the U.S. About one-half of the 
energy is used in industrial thermal (heat) processes alone 
(e.g., in the direct burning of fuels or the manufacture of 
steam), or about the same amount as that required to supply 
all residential energy needs. Manufacturing consumes approx­
imately 85 percent of industrial energy and the remainder is 
equally shared by agriculture and mining.
Industry uses energy in extremely diverse ways, but
the top six manufacturing industries— chemicals and allied
products; primary metal products (particularly steel and
aluminum); petroleum and coal refined products; paper and
allied products; stone, clay, and glass products; and food
processing— account for about 80 percent of the total 
26demand. Although the specific fuels and amounts used by 
these six groups varies considerably, natural gas has been 
the largest (about 40 percent) and most rapidly growing
• 25U.S., Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review, 
December 1977, p. 47.
26Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald, Inc., First Interim 
Technical Status Report, Study of Alternative Strategies and 
Methods of Conserving Energy (Vienna, Va.; Braddock, Dunn, 
and McDonald, Inc., 1974), p. III-IO. See also. The Con­
ference Board, Energy Consumption in Manufacturing (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974).
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energy source consumed directly in industrial plants, followed 
by coal and coke (27 percent), electricity (22 percent), and 
petroleum (11 percent). Electricity and coal are both 
expected to replace natural gas as the growth source of some 
industrial fuels in the future.
As depicted in Table III-7, the top six industrial 
groups (on the basis of annual energy consumption) also in­
clude the top five energy-intensive groups, identified by 
the ratio of input energy for each dollar of production
goods shipped out. Among the largest industrial energy users,
27only food processing is not energy intensive.
Industrial energy demands also include small amounts 
of energy for space heating, air conditioning, water heating, 
lighting, and so on. As noted, half the energy used in this 
sector is for heating processes. In 1975, process steam 
accounted for 16 percent of total U.S. energy consumption. 
Direct heat— heat obtained when fuel is burned directly in 
an industrial process, for example, in the production of 
steel or cement— comprised almost 11 percent of the nation's 
energy requirement. Much of the remaining demand in this 
sector is for mechanical energy in the form of electric 
drives, or motors, electrolysis to manufacture primary metals, 
and for "non-energy" purposes (e.g., raw materials or feed­
stocks for manufacturing processes).
27Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, 
Exploring Energy Choices, p. 5.
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TABLE III-7
ENERGY INTENSIVENESS OF FIVE 
MANUFACTURING GROUPS, 1973
Industrial Group Energy Intensiveness^
Stone, Clay and Glass 
Products .090
Petroleum and Coal Products .072
Chemicals and Allied 
Products .060
Paper and Allied Products .063
Primary Metals .052
SOURCE: Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald, Inc., First
Interim Technical Status Report: Study of Alternative
Strategies and Methods of Conserving Energy (Vienna, Va.: 
Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald, Inc., 1974), p. III-12. Based 
on data from U.S., Department of Commerce, Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1973).
^Total energy consumed for each dollar of production
goods shipped out.
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Recent increases in industrial energy use are, as 
alluded to in the discussion of aggregate production- 
consumption trends, the result of automation and the rising 
ratio of worker's wages to the cost of electricity and elec­
trical machinery. Bruce Hannon suggests that the replace­
ment of labor by tools and energy gave the industrialist a 
means to better control and predict production costs and 
profits. However, he further points out that the transition 
from labor-intensive production processes to energy-intensive 
processes has its disadvantages as well— i.e., "capital can be
recycled, but, of course, energy cannot. Labor cannot only
28be recycled, it can be multiplied."
However, in this regard, it should be recognized that
the amount of energy invested in a manufactured product has
consistently declined. That is, savings in energy use have
been realized by the manufacturing industries in the past.
Energy use per unit of manufactured product has dropped an
average of 1.6 percent from 1954 to 1967, and approximately
292.0 percent since then. As a result, total manufacturing 
output rose 87 percent during this same period, while total 
energy use rose only 53 percent. A recent report to the 
Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation identified 
several reasons that contributed to the decline in the 
energy-output ratio for manufacturing, among them:
28Hannon, "Energy Conservation and the Consumer," p. 96,
29Norman Metzger, Energy: The Continuing Crisis (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977), p. 194.
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1. The long-term historical trend away from energy- 
intensive industries such as basic materials 
production to less energy-intensive ones such as 
fabrication.
2. Capital investment in new technologies and 
management that resulted in more efficient pro­
duction processes and/or "housekeeping" changes 
to reduce energy waste.
3. Increasing use of Btu "accounting" in manufactur­
ing— i.e., more careful tracking of all energy- 
bearing materials that enter a plant in order to 
determine where energy is used.jO
A last point about industry and energy is that what 
now appears efficient in an economic sense, may not have 
appeared so in the past. Past industrial decisons that led 
to more energy use per unit of output, or to the use of fossil 
fuels that are now in short supply, such as natural gas, were 
efficient as designed on the basis of conditions that prevailed 
during the 1950s to the late 1960s. As stated in The Con­
ference Board's report:
When energy prices were constant or falling relative 
to the general price level, and that pattern was 
expected to continue into the future, machinery was 
purchased and plants built in order to utilize pro­
cesses that now may be inappropriate.31
Events of the 1970s sharply revised industry expectations 
about future energy prices and the relation of energy price 
to other prices. Whether intentional or unintentional, manu­
facturing companies seem to have been more responsive to this




changing reality in energy than have the other two sectors. 
This is highlighted especially when recent actions to reduce 
waste are compared to activities in the transportation sec- 
sector.
Transportion
The transportation sector accounts for a significant
32percentage of total U.S. energy consumption, averaging 
24-25 percent since 1950. Like total energy consumption 
in this country, transportation energy requirements have 
been growing exponentially. Figure III-4 shows that require­
ments almost doubled from 1950 to 1970 (from 8.7 quadrillion 
Btu's to 15.8 quadrillion Btu's). It is instructive to 
note that 1974 transportation energy use, partly in reaction 
to the 1973 oil embargo, was below that of 1973. In 1975 
demand was up by a relatively small amount, but 1976 saw 
energy use in this sector increase by 5.0 percent (up to 19.3 
quadrillion Btu's), indicating an upward trend that continued 
throughout 1977.
Most of the 1950-1970 increase was due to the explo­
sion of the number of automobiles, which grew twice as fast 
as the human population in the 10 years spanning 1960-1970, 
and the rapid expansion of the country's jet aircraft 
services. Thus, primary fuel demands in this sector have
32This description does not deal with the energy 
required to build transportation systems, only with the 
energy used to operate them.
104
FIGURE III-4
ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY THE TRANSPORTATION 
SECTOR, 1950-1976
20




1950 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976
Year
SOURCE; Data from U.S., Department of the Interior, 
Energy Perspectives 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1976), p. 75.
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been in the form of petroleum products used in cars, trucks,
and aircraft. In fact, transportation accounts for more than
half of the total U.S. petroleum use, contributing signif-
icantly to our dependence on petroleum imports. Table III-8
gives a breakdown by fuel types of the total consumption of
energy for transportation. Approximately 50 percent of this
fuel went for urban and intercity automobile transportation,
trucks were second, and domestic/international air travel
third. Growth projections suggest that pressure on petroleum
reserves will continue from these three uses.^^
While due primarily to growth in traffic levels and
miles travelled, there are other reasons for rising energy
demand in the transportation sector. For example, two of
the most significant factors are recent shifts to less
energy-efficient ways of moving freight (shifting freight
from rail to truck and air), and declining energy efficiency
35for individual modes of travel. Since a basic challenge 
in this respect is what to do about the automobile and
33Stanford Research Institute, Patterns of Energy 
Consumption in the United States, p. B-8; and Hittman 
Associates, Inc., Environmental Impacts, Efficiency, and 
Cost of Energy Supply and End Use, Vol. I (Columbia, Md.: 
Hittman Associates, Inc., 1974), Table 30.
34U.S., Office of Emergency Preparedness, The 
Potential for Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1972), p. 14.
^^Eric Hirst and John C. Moyers, "Efficiency of 
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SOURCE: Calculated from data in Hittman Associates,
Inc., Environmental Impacts, Efficiency, and Cost of Energy 
Supply and End Use, Final Report, Vol. 1 (Columbia, Md.: 
Hittman Associated, Inc., 1974), Table 30.
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gasoline consumption, the remainder of this discussion will 
focus largely on this end use.
The largest single energy consumer in this sector 
is by far the passenger car. Eight out of 10 American house­
holds presently own at least one car, and three in 10 have 
two or more cars.Increasing auto use is related to ris­
ing affluence, suburb development, and shifting employment 
patterns. In many cases, access to a private car is con­
sidered a basic necessity. In essence, the automobile is 
very much a part of the American lifestyle, reflecting 
mobility and independence. It offers distinct advantages 
over competing ways of travel, such as privacy, speed, per­
sonal comfort, and freedom to choose one's own route of 
travel. As a consequence, consumers have tended to ignore 
many of the energy tradeoffs involved in their transportation 
decisions.
Trends in ownership and use are exacerbated by the 
fact that most autos are presently heavy, high-powered, and 
inefficient. Calculations for overall vehicle efficiency 
show a decline from 12.4 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1960 to
11.9 mpg in 1973. During this same period, passenger car 
efficiency alone fell eight percent, from 14.5 mpg to 13.3. 
And while efficiency was declining, vehicle miles driven
p. 69.
3GNewman and Day, The American Energy Consumer,
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rose from 719 billion in 1960 to 1.3 trillion in 1973, an
37increase of 82 percent.
Until recently, the primary reasons for declining 
passenger car efficiency were steady increases in engine 
displacement (from six-cylinder engines to larger V-8's), 
weight, and average operating speed, in conjunction with 
the widespread introduction of energy consuming options such
as air conditioners, power steering, and automatic transmis-
38sions (see Table III-9). The recent imposition of the 
national 55-miles per hour (mph) limit has somewhat reduced 
the average speed and Environmental Protection Agency emis­
sion standards have caused some reduction in engine size. 
However, the installation of pollution abatement equipment 
and the saturation of power accessories on larger cars con­
tinues to affect average fuel economy.
All of the above factors— joined with low average
car occupancy (one passenger for urban use, two passenger
39for average use), the growing use of cars for short dis­
tance trips, and projections for total travel over the next
37Statistical Abstract of the U.S., p. 575.
38Eric Hirst and Robert Herendeen, Total Energy 
Demand for Automobiles (New York: Society of Automotive
Engineers, 1973). Reprinted in U.S., Senate, Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Energy Conservation and S. 2176, 
Hearings (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1974), pp. 970-976.
39See Richard A. Rice, "Systems Energy and Future 
Transportation," Technology Review 74 (January 1972): 31-37.
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TABLE III-9
PERCENT OF CARS EQUIPPED WITH SELECTED 
ACCESSORIES, 1960-1974
Accessories




Air conditioning 7 67
Automatic transmission 72 90
Power steering 39 83
V-8 engine 57 68
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1975), p. 576.
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decade— have not only increased petroleum consumption, but 
also contributed significantly to local air pollution and 
traffic management problems. Some of these conditions may 
be relieved by a shift to smaller, lighter, and more effi­
cient autos, but it seems reasonable to assume that;
(1) travel by car will increase, and (2) pressures on petro­
leum supplies will cause the per gallon price of gasoline 
to continue rising.
Problems of Supply 
Interaction of the elements already identified with 
a number of domestic energy supply problems is so great that 
which is cause and which is effect is not always obvious.
Yet rapidly expanding demand explains only one side of the 
U.S. energy gap. The 1973 "energy crisis" was as much a 
collision of trends and events on both sides of the energy 
supply and demand system as it was a direct result of the 
decisions made by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). To obtain a more complete perspective of 
the energy conservation problem, some of the problems related 
to producing the energy to meet the nation's growing needs 
must be examined.
Growing Dependence on Foreign 
Energy Resources
Each energy resource has its own characteristics and
consumption history. America's expanding economy has gone
through what has been characterized as three eras in terms
Ill
of its use of energy resources: wood era (1850s), coal
era (1900s), oil and natural gas era (1950s to present). 
Table III-IO shows that wood fuel was predominant until 1900 
when it was replaced by coal. Coal remained the primary 
fuel until around 1950 when consumers began to use petroleum 
fuels in substantial amounts. The switch from coal was not 
caused by a shortage since coal was and still is our most 
abundant fossil fuel, but by the economic and technological 
attractions of oil and natural gas. Emergence of these two 
fuels as the primary forms of energy resulted from the fact 
that the two are frequently found together in the same geo­
logic formation; they are easier to extraact, transport, and 
burn; both are cleaner, more versatile; and initially they 
were cheaper. In addition, the 1960s prices of coal rein­
forced this substitution process.
By 1973, coal's share of the energy supply picture 
had fallen to about 18 percent, while oil and natural gas 
together had soared to 77 percent. This displacement was 
further spurred by the growth of the automobile industry,
increasing demand for gasoline, and technological advances
40in industrial processes.
See Charles A. Berg, "Process Innovation and 
Changes in Industrial Energy Use," Science 199 (February 10, 
1978): 608-614, for a discussion of how important techno­
logical advances in basic industrial process, such as glass- 
making, cementmaking, and steelmaking, may have been more 
important in fuel switching from wood to coal and similarly 
from coal to oil than the relative prices of the resources.
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TABLE III-IO
CHANGING PATTERNS OF ENERGY RESOURCE 
USE IN THE U.S. FOR SELECTED YEARS, 
1850-1973
Resource Era Year Fuel and Composition
Wood 1850 Wood 91%
Coal 9
Coal 1900 Coal 73
Wood 18
Other^ 9

















SOURCE : Compiled from data in G. Tyler Miller, Jr.,
Energy and Environment; Four Energy Crises (Belmont,
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1975).
Primarily hydropower.
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■ More importantly, by 1970 the combination of
increasing demand, as described in the preceding sectorial 
descriptions, and the growing role of oil in the energy mar­
ket- outstripped domestic production capabilities. In fact, 
the early 1950s signaled the end of the U.S. role as an 
exporter of oil. Almost all of the increase in energy con­
sumption after 1970 was met by crude oil and refined petro­
leum products imports. For example, in 1960 oil imports 
supplied 19 percent of our consumption of petroleum products. 
This figure had reached 38 percent by September of 1974.^^ 
Briefly then, energy consumption was rising, the nation's 
limited fuel reserves were being depleted, and as a result,
the U.S. was becoming more dependent on foreign oil
. . 42supplies.
The prospect of reliance on foreign markets for fuels 
was seen as a threat to national security. Opponents of the 
trend feared the U.S. was opening itself to political black­
mail since the oil nations of the Middle East could choose
^^Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation,
A Time to Choose, p. 5.
42Increasing dependence on foreign imports can be 
explained partly by government policy. Following World War 
I, the U.S., fearing the exhaustion of domestic reserves, 
adopted: (1) a program to exploit oil reserves in other
parts of the world, and (2) policies to artificially hold 
down domestic production rates. See further, Edward H. 
Shaffer, The Oil Import Program of the United States: An
Evaluation (New York: Praeger, 1968); and Stephen L.
McDonald, Petroleum Conservation in the United States: An
Economic Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for the
Resources for the Future, 1971).
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to "close the valve" at any time, thereby threatening the 
43U.S. economy. Equally threatening was the prospect of a
mushrooming balance-of-payments deficit due to foreign oil 
44purchases. Petroleum imports which cost $3.7 billion in 
1971, cost $42 billion in 1977. And even though published 
estimates vary widely, one source projected that the U.S. 
could be importing about 17 million barrels of oil a day by 
1985 compared to only six million barrels per day in 1973.*^
Early Warnings of Impending 
Supply Problems
Many energy supply problems are closely related to 
the larger energy and environment issues that emerged during 
the 1960s. Long before the advent of the "energy crisis," 
per se, public attention had settled on a crisis of another 
sort— the "environmental c r is i s. De clining supplies of
43Joseph A. Yager et al.. Energy and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 5.
44The 1977 trade deficit in fact rose to a record 
$26.7 billion, four times larger than the previous record 
deficit set in 1972. Imports of foreign oil were a major 
cause, costing $42.1 billion, an increase of $10 billion over 
1976. The growing import-export imbalance is considered by 
some to be a chief reason for the U.S. dollar's decline on 
world money markets. See "Deficit Hits $26 Billion," The 
Daily Oklahoman, January 31, 1978.
45U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
"Background Paper for OTA Energy Policy Analysis," paper pre­
pared for the OTA review of President Carter's National Energy 
Plan, Washington, D.C., May 1977. (Mimeographed.)
^^For an excellent summary of how and why the envi­
ronment and ecology became a major concern of public policy, 
see Lynton Keith Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to
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energy can be linked to components of this prior concern.
One investigator of energy policy issues aptly summarized
this link as follows:
As a society we appear schzoid. While on the one 
hand we consume and demand more and more energy, on 
the other we manifest great public anxiety concern­
ing the environmental aspects of our consumption.47
Peak years for public attention on the environment
were 1969 and 1970. In December 1969, Congress passed the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)^® and in 1970, the
49Clean Air Act Amendments. NEPA required federal agencies 
to issue an "environmental impact statement" (EIS) on "major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment." Consequently, the Act established the 
general substance of environmental policy for the nation.
Its provisions for interagency and public review and comment 
have had an impact on power plant siting, outer continental 
shelf oil and gas development, and on the Alaska pipeline, 
to cite only a few examples.
The "highpoint of harmony" on the issue of environ­
mental protection was marked by the celebration of "Earth
Modern Society (New York: Anchor Books, 1971); and Barry
Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
^^Irvin L. White, "Energy Policy-Making: Limitations
of a Conceptual Model," in The Energy Crisis, eds. Richard S. 
Lewis and Bernard I. Spinrad (Chicago: Educational Founda­




Day"— originally suggested by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.)
— on April 22, 1970. This day w a s  observed by millions of 
Americans through such activities as environmental teach- 
ins, anti-pollution protests, and a variety of clean-up pro­
jects. Congress adjourned for the day as members addressed 
"Earth Day" rallies across the country.
In terms of its interrelationship with energy supplies, 
increased environmental consciousness and regulation forced 
cutbacks in the use of certain polluting fuels and blocked 
short-term efforts to relieve the widening energy gap by 
bringing new energy facilities on line. For example, strin­
gent air quality regulations limited the use of high-sulfur 
eastern coal and oil. Efforts to reduce sulfur oxide emis­
sions caused many industries to switch to burning clean 
natural gas, rather than internalize the cost of cleaning 
up "dirty" f u e l s . T h i s  substitution was especially signif­
icant for many electric generating plants. As gas supplies 
became tighter, many industries and power plants changed over 
to oil (low-sulfur heating oil) to meet the imposed air 
quality regulations. These last shifts, as will be shown 
below, probably contributed substantially to the heating oil 
shortages experienced by residential and commercial customers
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Energy Crisis In 
America (Washington, D.C.; Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
1973), p. 1. See also. Environmental Action, Earth Day; 
The Beginning (New York: Bantam Books, 1970).
^^This also contributed to the declining role of 
coal as a power plant fuel in the early 1970s.
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in the late fall of 1972. As pointed out by John Fisher,
this "switch by northeast utilities increased the demand
for petroleum and for refining capacity beyond that which
had been anticipated by the petroleum industry who— along
with most others in industry— were taken unaware by the
52environmental movement."
Another indicator of potential supply problems comes 
to light if one examines oil and gas exploration activity 
and drilling trends over the recent past. After a sharply 
rising trend that began in 1948 and continued through 1956, 
by 1972 drilling activity measured in well completions had 
declined to about the 1945 level.Al though gas drilling 
activities dramatically increased in 1973, the turn-around 
was not matched in oil drilling.
In addition to the above circumstances, potential 
supplies from outer continental shelf (OCS) lands received 
a setback from a series of tanker accidents and oil spills 
from Santa Barbara, California, and Louisiana oil wells.
These accidents served as a catalyst for environmentalists
52John C. Fisher, Energy Crisis in Perspective 
(New York; Wiley-Interscience, 1974), p. 34.
53In 1945, according to industry figures, 24,666 
oil and gas wells were completed in the U.S. See American 
Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures (Washing­
ton, D.C.: American Petroleum Institute, 1971), p. 24. In
1972, API estimates show 27,291 wells completed. See 
Quarterly Review of Drilling Statistics for the United 
States 6 (February 1973): 15.
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who opposed further offshore exploration and development.^^ 
Similarly, the development of the Northern Alaska oil field 
was temporarily halted due to environmentalist opposition 
regarding construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline system 
(TAPS). Blocking or at least impeding the development of 
offshore and North slope oil and gas had a substantial impact 
on prospective supplies. While not intended as an evaluation 
of environmental objections, one study points out that those 
two sources could have contributed substantially more than 
10 percent of demand, or more than a third of 1973 U.S. oil 
imports had they come into production as first expected.
There are other energy supply problems which, for our 
purposes, will be only briefly considered. As shown in 
Table III-ll, U.S. crude oil capacity at refineries had not 
kept pace with demand. The reasons for this are numerous 
and complex— i.e., import limitations, suspension of the 
investment tax credit, tax advantages for location offshore, 
and rising difficulties in obtaining low-sulfur oil which 
most U.S. refineries are built to process. It is sufficient 
to note here that the limited expansion in refinery capacity 
has since the 1960s contributed to the rising dependence on 
product imports, a topic already discussed.
Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White et al., Energy Under 
the Oceans; A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Operations (Norman; University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1973), pp. 10-12.
55Hans H. Landsberg et al.. Energy and the Social 
Sciences: An Examination of Research Needs (Washington, D.C.;
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1974), p. 45.
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TABLE III-ll
U.S. CRUDE OIL CAPACITY AT REFINERIES 




















SOURCE; Hans H. Landsberg et al.. Energy and the 
Social Sciences (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the 
Future, Inc., 1974), p. 49. Based on data from U.S., Depart­
ment of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S., Department of the Interior,
successive editions); and U.S., Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Mines, "Mineral Industry Surveys," newsletter.
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Also, hydroelectric power (water power) which had
been used so successfully in regions of the U.S., such as the
the Tennessee Valley, was declining in terms of its share of
overall national supply. By 1960, most of the hydropower
sources that were economically feasible had already been
harnessed. In 1940, these sources supplied about 30 percent
of the total electrical energy supply used in the U.S.^®
Although the nation's hydroelectric generating capacity has
expanded since 1940, its role in relation to other energy
sources fell to only 15 percent of the installed capacity in 
571971. Part of this was due to heightened levels of opposi­
tion to the building of new dams and generating facilities 
expressed by groups concerned with fish and wildlife conser­
vation and outdoor recreation. This opposition in the 1960s 
and 1970s, in conjunction with the limited availability of 
feasible dam sites, contributed to the declining relative 
importance of hydropower in the overall energy picture.
Finally, nuclear plants did not measure up to early 
expectations. With the creation of the Atomic Energy Commis­
sion following World War II, plans were made to construct 
numerous nuclear-fueled power plants in the U.S., but 
trouble appeared in several forms. Environmentalists were
James J. Doland, Hydro Power Engineering (New 
York; The Ronald Press, 1954), p. 5.
57U.S., Atomic Energy Commission, Draft Environ­
mental Impact Statement: Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
Program, Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974), p. A.3-3.
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vocal in their concern over: (1) routine as well as
accidental radiation emission levels, (2) the management of 
disposed plutonium waste materials, (3) the thermal pollu­
tion of lakes and rivers, and (4) potential large-scale 
disasters (e.g., plant explosions). But the environmental­
ists were only a part of a much more complex problem. The 
nuclear industry was from the outset plagued with unsuspected 
technical problems, cost overruns, inflation, and other prob­
lems endemic to a new industrial venture, such as worker 
strikes, delays in delivery of critical components, and 
other similar time-consuming delays. These problems were 
compounded by bureaucratic-organizational issues such as 
the government-industry relationship, AEC's licensing pro­
cess, and the multiplicity of agencies involved in régulât-
58ing the nuclear industry. Although nuclear power seemed 
ideally to have the capacity for an almost limitless energy 
production capability, constraints like the above signif­
icantly clouded its future. As noted by Metzger: "Whatever
the reason, by 1971 the utilities were short twenty-one
59plants representing 16,000 megawatts of unavailable power."
While the above conditions can be generally cate­
gorized as "environmental changes" that forced recognition 
of a problem, public attention focused more readily on the
58Arthur D. Little, Inc., Energy Policy Issues for 
the United States during the Seventies (New York: Engineers 
Joint Council, 1971) , p. 20.
59Metzger, Energy, p. 30.
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energy problem through a series of events that hinted of 
impending trouble. The early warning signs were essentially 
regional and seasonal. For example, as early as 1965, North- 
easterners faced the prospects of periodic voltage reductions 
and load shedding in the form of brownouts or blackouts 
(though none as drastic as the New York power failure of 
November, 1965). Fearing they could not meet increased de­
mands, a number of gas companies began refusing to connect 
new residential customers. In 1964, the Oregon Public 
Utility Commission warned electric and natural gas utilities 
in the state against "imprudent statements" for their products. 
An Oregon utilities commissioner stated: "There appears to
be no reason for gas utilities to promote sales that will 
increase peak loads in the face of such a bleak supply situa­
tion." However, some companies in other parts of the U.S. 
where shortages were either nonexistent or not so acute indi­
cated they were still seeking new residential and commercial 
customers.
The next consumers affected were oil customers. Dur­
ing the winter of 1970, a number of areas across the North­
east and Middle West prepared for the possibility of heating 
fuel shortages due to a potentially inadequate supply of 
petroleum derivatives.^^ Then in an unprecedented crisis
^^"Power Shortage Leads to Ad Cut," New York Times, 
December 27, 1970.
^^Wayne King, "Worse Shortage of Heating Fuels Feared, 
Some Urge Federal Action to Provide Relief," New York Times, 
September 28, 1970.
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of wintertime electric power supplies, the northern U.S. was
hit by 19 voltage reductions in a span of just 21 days dur-
62ing January and February of 1971. According to Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) data, the crisis began in New England 
on January 14 and grew until it reached as far south as 
Virginia and as far west as Chicago. By February 4, power 
cutbacks had affected an estimated 50 million persons. FPC 
Commissioner John A. Carver, Jr., claimed; The way our 
demand for energy is growing faster than our ability to 
supply that energy, any year we don't have a problem will be 
a lucky year.
The Nation's Energy Crisis 
In the late Fall of 1972, shortages of heating oil 
prompted schools and other public buildings to close, adding 
to the growing number of direct effects from energy supply/ 
demand problems. Farmers in the Midwest began to worry about 
their ability to secure enough fuel to power their tractors, 
other farm equipment, and to dry wet crops. Soaring prices 
of fuel, fertilizer, and food were experienced all over the 
country.Petroleum product shortages, once regional and 
seasonal, became chronic.
62 "Winter-Caused Power Cutbacks Affect 50 Million 
Persons," Tulsa Daily World, February 4, 1971.
G^lbid.
64Landsberg, "Low-Cost, Abundant Energy," p. 247.
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Prospects for short-term relief dimmed considerably 
when the OPEC imposed oil embargo and production cutback was 
invoked during the October 1973 war between the Arab nations 
and Israel. The oil importing countries of the western 
industrial world were caught offguard for they all in some 
degree had become dependent on imports from the Arab states 
to take up the slack in domestic production. A total em­
bargo was announced for exports to the U.S., Canada, the 
Bahamas, Trinidad, the Netherlands, Antilles, Puerto Rico, 
and Guam. The OPEC nations also made it clear for other 
states that their stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute would 
affect the amount of oil they would be supplied. Further­
more, posted prices for oil were immediately raised by 70 
percent, and increased again in mid-December by 130 percent. 
This sequence af events reduced consumption levels, resulted 
in the transfer of large amounts of money from this country 
to the OPEC nations, and created an environment of uncer­
tainty with regard to future energy supplies.
65Member of OPEC are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela, Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Gabon. A par­
allel group, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC), includes all Arab members of OPEC, plus 
Egypt, Syria, and Bahrein. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
Continuing Energy Crisis in America (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975),p. 37. For a detailed 
discussion of the embargo and its effects, see U.S., Federal 
Energy Administration, U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil 
Embargo: The International Allocation of Constricted
Supplies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975) .
fi ATitenberg, Energy Planning and Policy, p. 26.
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Assigning a particular date to the time the energy
crisis appeared full blown is at best speculative. However,
in terms of public perception and actual effects, the Arab
embargo signaled, in the words of David Davis, that the "day
of reckoning was at hand":
If this judgment were to be assigned a literal date 
it would be October 17, 1973, for on that day, in­
scrutable kings, emirs, and sheiks met in the wind­
swept Arab capital of Kuwait to proclaim the end of 
an era. The old era was one of cheap and dependable 
energy, epitomized by the easy exploitation of the 
crude oil lying just beneath the Middle Eastern 
sands. The new era was to be one of more costly 
and more uncertain energy.bV
By the winter of 1973, distillate fuel oil, gasoline, 
and crude oil as well were all in short supply. Reduction 
in supplies reached a high point of over 3 million barrels a 
day during February and March of 1974. This represented a 
shortfall of about 17 percent of the expected domestic con-
gosumption during that period. More dramatic were the 
accompanying price increases which affected all oil: the
price of crude rose from about $3.50 a barrel in September 
1973 to over $13,00 per barrel by the following May.^^ 
Although prices received by oil companies were controlled 
and programs to allocate the shortages were established, the
^^Davis, Energy Politics, p. 1. Emphasis added.
go U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Project 
Independence Report, Appendix AIII (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 284.
^^U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Monthly 
Energy Review, December 1974, p. 41.
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increases in costs due to rising import prices were allowed 
to be passed through to consumers. Although lengthy, Davis's 
comments regarding the effects of the crisis are worth 
quoting:
Within the United States the boycott (oil embargo) 
sparked violence on the turnpikes (trucking industry 
reaction), fostered the birth of a new federal agency, 
and further undercut support of a President trying to 
stage off impeachment (Nixon and "Watergate"). In 
Washington, senators investigating American relations 
with the Arabs discovered a secret decision of Harry 
Truman's National Security Council that had quietly 
guided foreign policy for a quarter of a century.
Other probers revealed the machinations of giant 
petroleum corporations aimed at enriching Texas pro­
ducers of oil and gas in return for millions of 
dollars of campaign contribuitons. In the state 
Capitols, governors proclaimed schemes to ration 
gasoline, and state legislators negotiated deals to 
buy from secret s upplies.70
Long gas lines and about a 50 percent increase in the 
price of gasoline acted as involuntary consumption-reducing 
measures, just as the brownouts and blackouts had in 1964 
and 1965. Early weekday and Sunday closings of service sta­
tions, or "sold out" signs on gasoline pumps became a familiar 
sight that had to be dealt with by American motorists. 
Restrictions on driving habits, like those noted above, were 
made mandatory in most states by early 1974 and remained in 
effect until the OPEC nations lifted the oil embargo in March 
of that year. But the effects on prices remained as a 
reminder that the era of cheap energy was over.
^^David Howard Davis, Energy Politics (New York; 
St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 2.
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Summary
To recapitulate briefly, this chapter has shown that 
interest and concern with energy supplies and demands in this 
country did not arise full blown overnight. Instead, public 
attention focused on energy problems as a result of many 
interrelated trends and events that converged in the energy 
crisis. Environmental concern over the earth's finite 
resources served as the forerunner of the argument that en­
ergy resources, especially fossil fuels, were also limited. 
And by the early 1970s, there was a growing realization that 
the primary cost in coping with environmental problems is to 
place considerable limits on both the supply and use of var­
ious energy resources. Because of these constraints and a 
variety of social, economic, and technical factors, nation­
wide energy consumption outraced the combined domestic pro­
duction of conventional fuels and nuclear energy. Oil im­
ports grew to fill the gap, and as a result, raised criti­
cal issues of national security. These events were brought 
to a climax by the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, which caused 
national attention to focus on energy problems, particularly 
increasing energy prices. The most important point here is 
that for the first time in this country's history plentiful 
and secure supplies of energy could no longer be taken for 
granted.
The chapter has also shown that three areas comprise 
the bulk of energy demands in the U.S.: heating and cooling
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of buildings; industrial processes; and transportation, 
especially automobiles. More importantly, much of the 
energy consumed for these purposes is wasted as a result of 
technical inefficiencies and social-economic circumstances. 
The events of 1973 and 1974 were important in precipitating 
both the awareness of energy waste and the search for actions 
to ease the imbalance between energy supplies and demands 
through effective energy conservation.
CHAPTER IV 
THE CASE FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION 
Introduction
The energy use trends and events described in the 
previous chapter were perceived differently by indi- . 
viduaIs and groups who held different values and interests. 
For example, some saw the imbalance of supplies and demands 
as a production problem that could be solved, as it always 
had been in the past, by an intensive effort to increase 
domestic production of all forms of energy. At the same 
time, information documenting the exponential growth of de­
mands in this country caused attention to turn to oppor­
tunities to conserve energy. A number of individuals, public 
interest groups, and policy research organizations pushed for 
a national debate that would examine the historical supply- 
oriented approach to energy needs.
But an energy future that did not focus on accel­
erated supply required to a large degree changing the "rules 
of the game," as well as allowing new participants into the 
traditionally closed arenas of energy policymaking.
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Energy-related policies had been designed to deal only with 
the management of supply and growth, and as a consequence, no 
"plans” were available to address problems of resource scar­
city. Advocates of energy conservation pointed out funda­
mental conflicts between public and private sector policies 
and programs that promoted energy use and the need to reduce 
oil imports. As energy problems wore on and domestic produc­
tion remained more problematical than had been estimated at 
the time of the OPEC embargo, strategies to reduce consump­
tion increasingly gained support as legitimate alternatives. 
That is, energy conservation goals and strategies were 
identified.
This chapter continues the description of the social 
and political context within which conservation problems and 
issues are being addressed. Its purpose is to review key 
elements in the rationale for energy conservation as an inte­
gral part of overall national energy objectives. First, 
public perceptions of the energy crisis and attitudes con­
cerning who was to blame and what should be done are examined. 
As will be shown, the public demonstrated a general awareness 
of the need to use energy more efficiently immediately fol­
lowing the OPEC embargo. Furthermore, policymakers were 
even more sensitive to energy problems and issues during 
1973-1974 than the public-at-large. Next, the chapter 
delineates the "case" for conservation as formulated by 
several key individuals and in a number of early energy 
research reports.
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Of course, the activities discussed below did not 
occur apart from executive and legislative attempts to define 
the conservation response to energy problems. They are con­
sidered separately only for heuristic purposes. Chapter V 
extends this discussion by describing the background and 
status of energy conservation policies and programs.
Aftermath of the OPEC Embargo;
Who Perceived What?
A large percentage of the population was affected by 
energy shortages and price increases that came in the after- 
math of the embargo, and this focused their attention on 
energy problems. Three features of this attention are sig­
nificant to understanding the development of the case for 
conservation; the extent to which energy problems were per­
ceived to be a policy problem, public perceptions of the 
reasons for the energy shortages, and attitudes concerning 
who was to blame for the state of affairs in energy. Whereas 
the first consideration provides insight into the salience of 
energy consumption as a public problem, the other two extend 
beyond public awareness of the problem by -introducing rele­
vant parties-at-interest and identifying who was held as most 
responsible for doing something about energy needs. These 
factors will be addressed below by reviewing reported results 
of national surveys of public attitudes.
Did the Public Perceive Energy 
as a Problem?
First, to what extent was the energy problem viewed 
as a public policy problem? The answer to this question is
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more complex than it first appears, for "it involves not 
only whether the salience accorded this issue is essentially 
the same for both leaders and the public, but it also deals 
with the salience relative to other issues at the moment.
An open-ended question used in Gallup surveys conducted dur­
ing the period 1973-1975 provides some meaningful answers:
respondents were asked to identify what they considered to
2be the "most important problems facing the nation today."
In a March 1973 survey, energy was not listed among 15 sub­
stantive categories of identified national problems; however, 
by June, 83 percent of all respondents said they had heard 
or read about the "energy crisis." By October 1973, eight 
percent of all respondents identified the energy crisis as 
an "important problem. Then, during the OPEC embargo, fuel 
shortages momentarily replaced traditional economic concerns 
(the high cost of living and inflation) as the number one 
problem worrying the public (see Table IV-1). This appeared 
to be the high point of concern because other surveys
James F. Sheffield, Jr., "Public Opinion and Energy 
Policymaking," paper presented at the American Society for 
Public Administration, Region VII Annual Meetings, Omaha, 
Neb., October 7-8, 1977.
2American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup 
Opinion Index. Issues cited in this section include March 
and September, 1973 (Nos. 93 and 99); January, March, Septem­
ber, and October, 1974 (Nos. 103, 105, 111, and 112); and 
April, July, and October, 1975 (Nos. 118, 121, and 125).
^With this percentage, the energy issue ranked 
eighth in 15 substantive categories of problems. In an 
earlier May survey, energy was 13th in 16 categories.
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TABLE IV-1
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
BY U.S. REGIONS, JANUARY 1974 
(percent)
Question: "What do you think is the most important problem 
facing this country today?"
Problem East Midwest South West
Energy crisis/fuel 
shortage 46 47 49 38
High cost of living 25 23 28 24
Dissatisfaction with/ 
lack of trust in 
government 16 17 11 19
Corruption in govern­
ment/Watergate 7 8 5 8
Moral decline/lack 
of religion - 5 - -
Unemployment 4 - 5 10
All others 24 23 27 30
No opinion 3 2 5 3
Total^ 125 125 130 132
SOURCE: American Institute of Public Opinion, The
Gallup Opinion Index, March 1974 (No. 105).
^Totals add to more than 100 percent since some per­
sons named more than one problem.
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conducted in late 1974 and through 1975 show responses ranging 
from three to seven percent, ranking energy and fuel short­
ages about third or fourth in comparison to all other prob­
lems.
Public Versus Elite Perceptions 
As documented by James Sheffield, citing data derived 
from an elite-mass study sponsored in 1974 by the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations (hereafter referred to as the 
CFR survey), there was a substantial difference between the 
perceptions of opinion leaders and the public-at-large with 
regard to energy problems and issues/* Although the primary 
focus of the CFR survey was in terms of representation of 
those elites having influence and knowledge about foreign 
affairs, the results are still instructive. Sheffield found 
in his analysis of the data that an elite sample, made up of 
members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Congres­
sional Committees and officials of the Department of State, 
was "substantially more sensitive to the (energy) problem 
than the public.Whereas the Gallup surveys reported above 
and the CFR survey show that by 1974 the public was more 
likely to cite two or three problems as "most important" 
ahead of energy, this apparently did not hold for opinion
*See Sheffield, "Public Opinion and Energy Policy- 
Making," pp. 6-7, and Tables 1 and 2.
^Ibid., p. 6,
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leaders. Indeed, energy problems ranked second for them out 
of five categories.®
Perceptions of Responsibility
The second significant feature within the public's 
perception of energy as a public policy problem centers on 
who was perceived to be responsible for the existing state 
of affairs. The open-ended nature of the typical opinion 
poll leaves unanswered evaluative questions of intensity and 
responsibility: for example, how seriously did the public,
and policymakers, view energy problems; and who was seen as 
most responsible for the fuel shortages? As will be shown 
below, answers to these questions are related to perception 
of the need for energy conservation.
Since 1974, the Opinion Research Corporation has sur­
veyed public attitudes and behavior toward energy problems 
and issues for the Federal Energy Administration (PEA)— now 
part of the newly created Department of Energy (DOE). Re­
sults of the March 1974 survey indicate that slightly more 
than 20 percent of the public believed energy shortages to 
be either "very serious" or "somewhat serious" and of "long
®In contrast, in the same survey the public-at-large 
ranked energy problems last among the categories.
^Opinion Research Corporation, General Public 
Attitudes and Behavior Toward Energy Saving, prepared for 
the U.S., Federal Energy Administration (now Department of 
Energy) (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information
Service, monthly beginning in September 1974). (Title 
varies.)
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gduration." Table IV-2 shows that the percentage of people 
taking this position increased to 31 percent by September of 
that year, and that persons with "some college or more" or 
who are "environmental activists" were more likely than the 
publie-at-large to view the energy problems as severe, likely 
to become more severe, and likely to last a long time. The 
difference between the two groups and the general public 
corresponds to the results reported for the elite sample in 
the CFR survey. In both cases the greater sensitivity to 
energy problems appears to be explained by a difference in 
the knowledge of and interest in the problem on the part of 
leaders or "activists."
The early FEA surveys also found that the degree to 
which people thought the energy situation was serious corre­
lated strongly with perceptions of who they held most respon­
sible. As shown in the first part of Table IV-3, answers 
to an open-ended question on responsibility ranged over a 
spectrum that included the energy industries or business 
(one or more oil companies, the oil industry, big business 
or business leaders), the government (the President or 
Congress), and the public (consumers or everyone). Further­
more, as the second part of the table shows, although the 
public was almost evenly divided on the question of whether 




PERCEPTIONS OF THE SERIOUSNESS AND DURATION 






Will Become More Severe 
In the Next Few Months
Total Public 31 51 31
Some College 
Education or 
More 31 63 30
Environmental
Activists^ 41 63 37
SOURCE; Opinion Research Corporation, General Public 
Attitudes and Behavior Toward Energy Saving, Vol. I, pre­
pared for the U.S., Federal Energy Administration (now 
Department of Energy) (Springfield, Va.: National Technical
Information Service, September 1974), p. 2.
^Includes people who either belong to an environmental 
organization or have written a letter on an environmental sub­
ject to a newspaper, legislator, or other government body, or 
have done both.
TABLE IV-3
PUBLIC ATTITUDES CONCERNING WHO CAUSED AND IS 





Most Responsible for the Shortage Nature of the Shortage
Oil Public/
















Not at all 
Serious 57 35 78
Total 34 23 27 35 38 20
SOURCE: Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Attitudes and
Behavior Toward Energy Saving, Vol.. I, prepared for the U.S., Federal Energy 
Administration (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service,September, 1974), p. 5.
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high relationship between those who believed that fuel problems 
were "contrived" and "not very serious." And according to 
the FEA survey report, skepticism about the severity of the 
energy problems and issues occurred "among all age, educa­
tion, and income groups, and in all sections of the 
9country."
What Happened and What 
Should Be Done?
As with any event of unexpected, or crisis propor­
tions, efforts to define what happened correlated closely 
with attempts to search out the guilty party or parties.
Since the public generally lacked information necessary to 
evaluate long existing supply-demand trends, or could not 
assess available competing information about the events 
leading to the energy crisis, few were willing to believe 
that consumers faced shortages simply because demand had 
confronted real problems of s u p p l y . W h e n  presented with 
a list of possible reasons for energy shortages, a majority 
of the public, in almost every case, saw seven reasons as 
"very important." As Table IV-4 illustrates, environmental 
activists most often blamed the public for wasteful habits 
and industry for not being concerned with the energy effi­
ciency of its products. On the other heind, as might be
9Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Atti- 
tudes Toward Energy, Vol. I, p. 6.
^^Hans H. Landsberg, "Low-Cost, Abundant Energy; 
Paradise Lost?" Science 184 (April 19, 1974): 248.
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TABLE IV-4
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR 
THE ENERGY SHORTAGE (Percent saying 
reason is "very important")
See Energy Shortage As;










ly wasteful 64 70 49 64
Too many ineffi­
cient consumer 
goods 59 62 44 70
Expansion of 
industry 55 57 54 56
No national energy 
policy by 
government 53 61 42 57
Oil companies 
didn't prepare 50 54 36 45
Various pollution 
controls 50 55 49 35
Population
growth 48 55 49 53
SOURCE: Opinion Research Corporation, General
Public Attitudes and Behavior Toward Energy Saving, Vol. 1, 
prepared for the U.S., Federal Energy Administration (now 
Department of Energy) (Springfield, Va.: National Technical
Information Service, September 1974), p. 6.
^Includes people who either belong to an environ­
mental organization or have written a letter on an environ­
mental subject to a newspaper, legislator, or other govern­
ment body, or have done both.
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expected, environmentalists were less willing to accept the 
argument that environmental, or pollution, controls were to 
blame. Similarly, a Gallup poll reported in February 1974, 
parallels these results, showing 25 percent of the public- 
at-large blamed oil companies for energy problems; 23 percent 
blamed the federal government (including three percent who 
said "Congress"); 19 percent specifically blamed the Nixon 
Administration or Nixon himself; 16 percent blamed U.S. 
consumers; seven percent, the Arab nations; and six percent 
identified big business to be at f a u l t . A s  summarized 
succinctly by Hans Landsberg, when assessed by their adver­
saries industry "conspired," government "bungled," and the
12environmentalists "obstructed." Each of these perceptual 
categories served as a catalyst for both defining energy 
problems and identifying where responsibility lay for deal­
ing with the problems.
Environmentalists, as well as some segments of the 
general public, argued that the managers of the major energy 
industries constituted an interlocking power elite which was 
literally controlling all facets of the U.S. energy economy. 
Due to the operation of this elite, the American public 
allegedly had been giving up billions of dollars each year 
through special privileges (e.g., through various tax
11American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup 
Opinion Index, February 1974 (No. 104).
12Landsberg, "Low-Cost, Abundant Energy," p. 248.
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privileges) granted to these industries. Robert Engler's
The Politics of Oil was written from such elitist
assumptions.^^ Echoes of Engler's theme, essentially
referred to as the "conspiracy theory," were heard at the
height of the debate over who was to blame for and what
14should be done about fuel shortages. The charges can be 
summed to the effect that energy problems were, if not 
planned, being used by oil companies to drive up their own 
prices, to force government out of the regulatory business 
(e.g., regulation of wellhead natural gas prices), and to 
crowd the independent dealers who often undersold major oil 
compaiiiès out of the market.Whether or not these charges 
have merit, it is crucial to recognize that they contributed 
to citizen suspicions as to whether or not an energy short­
age actually existed.
This skepticism resulted in part from public dis­
closures of information which documented the holdings of 
energy companies in competitive fuel forms— i.e., the fact
^^New York, Macmillan and Co., 1961.
14See Raleigh Warner, Jr., "That Alleged Oil 
Conspiracy," Conference Board Report 10 (October 1973): 3 0-
15; Richard B. Mancke, "Petroleum Conspiracy; A Costly 
Myth," Public Policy 12 (Winter 1974): 1-13; and Mira
Wilkins, "The Oil Crisis in Perspective: The Oil
Companies," Daedalus 104 (Fall 1975): 159-178.
^^Gerald Garvey, "Research on Energy Policy: 
Processes and Institutions," in Energy and the Social 
Sciences; An Examination of Research Needs, ed. Hans 
h. Landsberg et al. (Washington, B.C.: Resources for
the Future, 1974), p. 566.
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the conglomerate oil companies owned coal and uranium 
resources. Such patterns of ownership were perceived by 
some as potentially beneficial to these industries should 
oil and gas remain in short supply.However, the major 
issue which did much to create the "villain" image of the 
oil industry was the question of excess profits. The 1973 
profits of the top 10 oil companies rose 51.2 percent over 
1972 profits for a total of $7.8 b i l l i o n . I t  was this 
circumstance that led to a large part of the criticism of 
the industry and subsequent congressional committee investi­
gations into the federal regulations and tax laws which 
operate to their benefit. Some individuals, among them 
congressional representatives, believed the companies were 
making excess profits and contributing to problems of eco­
nomic inflation at the expense of the public during a time 
of national stress. The industry, however, argued that its 
profits were "windfall" profits coming about when world and 
domestic prices were increased more than the costs of pro­
ducing oil.^®
S. David Freeman, Energy; The New Era (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 154-155. Freeman states: "[W]hen
the oil companies enter the coal business by taking over 
existing large coal companies, as has occurred, or when the 
integrated energy company represents a significant share of 
the market in both fuels, there is a real danger that inter­
fuel competition will disappear."
17"The New Shape of the U.S. Oil Industry," Business 
Week, February 2, 1974, p. 50.
18For elaboration, see U.S., Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Competition in the Energy Industry (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).
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As noted earlier, environmental activists were quick
to blame industry, the public (especially for its wasteful
habits), and government for the nation's energy dilemma. In
contrast, there were those who held the environmentalists in
part responsible— i.e,, environmental activists were viewed
as obstructing progress, and often portrayed as "hopeless 
19idealists." Public interest lobbies such as the Sierra
Club and Common Cause had made issues of offshore leasing
and coal leasing by taking them out of the private arena of
energy policy and placing them on the public sector's agenda.
In addition, environmental concern had caused local resistance
to the construction of nuclear plants, refineries, oil and
gas terminals, and expanded port facilities for supertankers
21bringing foreign oil to the U.S. And, as discussed in 
chapter III, almost every source of energy was faced with 
some environmental constraint that affected all phases of 
resource development from mining/extraction to consumption. 
While the environmental movement was clearly not single- 
handedly to blame for energy problems, it did at least
20
19Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Continuing Energy 
Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
1975), p. 21.
20Andrew S. McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies; 
Decision Making on Energy (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), 
pp. 86, 119-120.
21Arthur D. Little, Jr., Energy Policy Issues for 
the United States During the Seventies, report prepared for 
the National Energy Forum, United States National Committee, 
World Energy Conference (New York; Engineers Joint Council,
1971), p. 20.
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exacerbate supply problems and accelerate the timetable for 
shortages. On the other hand, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, 
Inc., Common Cause, Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, 
League of Women Voters, and other smaller groups were polit­
ically active in support of alternate means, especially con­
servation and appropriate technologies, to overcome some of
22the projected supply-demand imbalance.
Perceptions of responsibility also aggregated around 
criticism and dissatisfaction with the government's role in 
energy markets. The pressures of the energy crisis high­
lighted the awareness that the federal government's histor­
ical approach to resource management— rate-making and the 
promotion of market competition— did not respond with the
"speed, flexibility, clarity and decisiveness appropriate to
23our country's energy-related needs." But even in this 
case, views of what was wrong depended largely on personal 
and group goals and beliefs. Industry charged government 
with holding down prices, reducing production incentives, 
cutting subsidies, and involving industry in a multiplicity 
of agencies, standards, and regulations that in effect 
destroyed efficiency and initiative. Consumers charged gov­
ernment with not holding down prices and failing to regulate
22See McFarland, Public Interest Lobbies.
23William 0. Doub, Federal Energy Regulation; An 
Organizational Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1974), p. 2.
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properly the industry. In both cases, however, government 
was seen as falling short in areas of energy regulation.
In 1973, a federal energy regulation study team 
found that more than 40 agencies, bureaus, and commissions 
had some role in energy regulation. This multiplicity of 
actors created acute problems of flexibility to deal with 
immediate energy shortages. Industry claimed the existing 
regulatory structure favored environmentalists and environ­
mentalists asserted just the opposite. At any rate, the 
different groups seemed to agree that the federal regulatory 
system, to the extent it could be called a system, was
"biased, confused, and indecisive" even if they could not
24agree on the direction of the bias.
The issues surrounding government responsibility 
actually go much deeper than simply regulation. It was evi­
dent during 1973-1974 more than ever before that the U.S. 
lacked an overall energy policy. Instead, what had developed 
was a range of fragmented, uncoordinated, and conflicting 
energy-related policies. In spite of the perceptual environ­
ment described above— skepticism, confusion, uncertainty—  
within a few weeks of the embargo, national leaders recog­
nized that short-term crisis measures were necessary, as well 




Early Efforts to Define a 
Conservation Response
General George A. Lincoln, former head of the now
defunct Office of Emergency Preparedness (CEP) which for
years maintained high-level administrative responsibilities
for energy policy, suggests:
[I]t can be argued that the American way of dealing 
with a large unexpected problem is, first, to be 
skeptical of its existence, then to search for 
scapegoats, and finally to settle down to dealing 
with the problem.25
Prior to the OPEC embargo, studies were already underway 
examining how the estimated demand for foreign oil could be 
reduced through increasing existing domestic supplies. On 
the surface there was little reason to expect that the U.S. 
could not supply the resources to meet its energy needs and 
protect the economy and foreign policy from insecure foreign 
sources. For example, a 1972 report of the National Petro­
leum Council stated: "No major source of U.S. fuel supply
is limited by the availability of resources to sustain higher 
production.
Indeed, in terms of the availability of fuels for the 
major consuming sectors, the few decades preceding the energy 
crisis have been referred to as a "promotional era" in energy
25George A. Lincoln, "Background to the U.S. Energy 
Revolution," in The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
eds. Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill (New York; 
Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 26.
26National Petroleum Council. U.S. Energy Outlook 
(Washington, B.C.; National Petroleum Council, 1972), 
p. 4.
148
growth. A variety of government policies and programs
supported the promotional practices of various resource
industries to make abundant supplies of energy available to 
27consumers. This relative abundance (compared to most 
other nations) led to few policies to restrain energy use.
In fact, the historical ability of the U.S. to respond to 
its rapidly expanding demands by promoting increased fuel 
supplies had a substantial influence in molding the direc­
tion of government energy concerns away from conservation. 
Although this state of affairs with regard to government 
policy will be further explored in the next chapter, the 
important point here is that the only assumption for the
demand side of the nation's energy system was the seemingly
28unquestioned concept of rapid growth. Restrictive programs 
that were adopted, for example, state regulation of petroleum 
production, oil import quotas, and Federal Power Commission 
pricing policies for natural gas, were not implemented spe­
cifically to conserve energy or reduce demand. Rather, they 
were adopted to protect energy suppliers and consumers by
27S. David Freeman, "Toward a Policy of Energy 
Conservation," in The Energy Crisis, eds. Richard S. Lewis 
and Bernard I. Spinrad (Chicago: Educational Foundation for
Nuclear Science, 1972), p. 67.
28Don E. Kash, "Energy in the 1970's— The Problem 
of Abundance to Scarcity," in Energy Impacts on Public 
Policy and Administration, ed. Walter F. Scheffer (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 24.
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maintaining what were thought to be appropriate prices in the
29face of downward price pressures.
Definitions of Conservation 
But a portion of the ultimate objective achieved by 
increasing supply can be reached by the adoption of measures 
to reduce demand. In the early 1970s a number of individuals, 
such as Paul Ehrlich, E. F. Schumacher, Barry Commoner,
General Lincoln, James Schlesinger, S. David Freeman, and 
Earl Cook, had begun to sound a call for more efficient use 
of resources and the reduction of "waste." Much of their 
writing was aimed at the generally prevailing American phi­
losophy that "more is always better," pointing out the con­
sequences of overconsumption, rapid population growth, and 
the direct and higher order impacts of technology. Commoner^^ 
and Freeman^^ paid special attention to the way in which 
energy use is related to the broader questions of environ­
mental degradation and the future. Cook was concerned with 
the exponential nature of U.S. energy consumption. For 
example, in 1971 he wrote:
Democratic societies are not noted for their ability 
to take the long view in making decisions. Yet
29U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Project Inde­
pendence Blueprint: An Historical Perspective (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 8.
^^Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man &
Technology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971).
^^Freeman, Energy: The New Era, especially chapter
4.
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indefinite growth in energy consumption, as in 
human population is simply not possible.32
Cook suggested further that major changes in power tech­
nology were required to reduce pollution and manage wastes 
— the by-products of consumption. Moreoever, these changes 
called for "hard political decisions."
The most significant results of Cook's research were 
his estimates that five-sixths of the energy used in trans­
portation, two-thirds of the fuel consumed to generate elec­
tricity, and nearly one-third of the remaining energy— that
is, more than 50 percent of the energy consumed in the U.S.r-
33was discarded as waste heat. These data were widely 
accepted and cited as the basis for the assumption that con­
servation of energy was "a worthy and increasingly important 
goal."̂ ^
Then, in October 1972 the Office of Emergency Pre­
paredness (OEP) released a staff study which recommended 
conservation as a competing strategy for countering expected 
energy shortages in this country. OEP reviewed existing 
projections of energy demand to beyond the year 1985, and 
suggested measures to reduce future energy consumption.
The authors of the report concluded that although the con­
servation measures they recommended "will not, taken alone.
32Earl Cook, "The Flow of Energy in an Industrial 
Society," Scientific American 224 (September 1971): 135-144.
^^Ibid., pp. 138-139.
■̂ Âllen L. Hammond, "Conservation of Energy: The
Potential for More Efficient Use," Science 178 (December 8,
1972): 1079.
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eliminate the need for increased oil imports, they can
35substantially reduce this neéd." Also appearing in 1972 
was a study conducted by the Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI) of Menlo Park, California, for the U.S. Office of 
Science and Technology.SRI's report detailed the end use 
of energy in the U.S., underscoring the trends discussed in 
the previous chapter: rapidly and haphazardly increasing
energy consumption over the recent past.
Most of these early conservation studies recognized 
that even extreme conservation measures would not halt the 
need for more energy; however, the authors rejected the idea 
that from this it followed that wasteful and inefficient uses 
of energy should be perpetuated. Instead, they argued that 
energy conservation should be viewed as a "source" of energy 
within the scope of supply and demand strategies. Conclu­
sions drawn from the two major studies noted above, along 
with the specific sectorial analyses (discussed in chapter I) 
of where and how more efficient uses of energy might be 
achieved were widely disseminated among relevant energy 
agencies, published in scholarly and scientific journals, 
and reviewed by the media, newspapers and television.
U.S., Office of Energy Preparedness, The Potential 
for Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1972), p. vi.
36Stanford Research Institute, Patterns for Energy 
Consumption in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972).
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Although, as will be discussed in chapter V 
President Nixon's national policy goal of achieving "energy 
self-sufficiency" included energy conservation measures, the 
Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, under the direc­
tion of S. David Freeman, made what is considered to be the 
first comprehensive "case" for energy conservation, A Time 
to Choose, published in 1974, took the supply-oriented 
energy picture to task by positing three alternative energy
futures: "historical growth," "technical fix," and "zero
37energy growth." In the historical growth scenario, energy 
demand would continue to rise at the average annual growth 
rate of the 1950-1970 period (about 3.5 percent) while energy 
supply policy would attempt to match the rapid increases in 
consumption. This alternative would essentially emphasize 
"business as usual," but with an expanded energy research 
and development effort, more vigorous domestic resource 
development, and continued reliance on foreign oil imports. 
The technical fix scenario would reduce energy demands (con­
sumption would increase at an average rate of below 2.0 per­
cent per year) by improving the efficiency with which energy 
is used in the major consuming sectors. In other words, 
scientific and engineering expertise would be used to dev­
elop more energy efficient technologies to improve such end
37Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation,
A Time to Choose (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1974), pp. 19-112.
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uses as automobile fuel economy, industrial processes, and 
power plant conversion efficiency. This energy future, by 
reducing demand, would allow greater flexibility in deter­
mining energy supply policy and would delay the deployment 
of environmentally controversial, or other high risk, supply 
options.
By far the most controversial scenario outlined by 
the Energy Policy Project was zero energy growth. This 
alternative would include all the technical fix efficiency 
measures, but would also attempt to redirect economic growth 
away from energy-intensive activities such as manufacturing, 
and toward less energy-intensive purposes such as public 
services. Thus, annual energy demand growth would ultimately 
be reduced to zero. This would allow large energy technolo­
gies to be deemphasized and in their place, smaller scale, 
renewable energy resources could be implemented.
Essentially, the Ford Foundation study was the first 
attempt to specify an energy future based largely on using 
energy more efficiently, and in some cases, using less. Its 
impact was far-reaching, substantially altering the energy 
debate. As noted in a recent article:
A Time to Choose was published in October 
1974 with all the expensive ceremony that the [Ford] 
foundation attaches to announcements of grave social 
significance. It was presented at press conferences 
convened simultaneously in New York and Washington.
At least 6,000 copies of the report were given to 
members of Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the 
press; during the autumn of 1974 another 30,000 
copies were sold in bookstores, and the foundation
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arranged for the Book-of-the-Month Club to offer 
an additional 300,000 copies of an abridged text 
to its civic-minded subscribers.
In the minds of many people on Capitol Hill 
at the time, the report was thought to provide the 
first coherent explanation of energy matters not sub­
mitted by the oil and gas lobby. Politicians spoke 
of the report's "filling a vacuum," of the way in 
which it "exploded the myth of a connection between 
energy growth and economic growth as a whole."38
A number of conservation-focused analyses followed 
closely after the Ford Foundation report. For present pur­
poses, it is sufficient to suggest only that these studies 
significantly advanced the definition of energy conservation 
and potential energy saving strategies, and that they re­
flected certain common themes regarding the advantages of 
reducing energy demands (see Table IV-5). Although conser­
vation was increasingly defined as denoting efficiency in 
energy use and avoidance of waste, problems of identifying 
what was waste in the U.S. energy system, and how it should 
be measured, occupied most of the debate over conservation 
strategies during this early period. That is, waste means 
different things to different people. To compound this 
philosophical difference, the concept is always tied to 
some professional or technical meaning of "efficiency."
This perceptual difficulty over the definition of waste and
38Lewis H. Lapham, "The Energy Debacle," Harpers 225 
(August 1977): 59. Lapham goes on to suggest that the
report was not so enthusiastically received by some "knowl­
edgeable people." In fact, his contention is that the 
report was inadequate, reflecting the narrow interests of a 
few of the work's authors, especially Freeman.
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TABLE IV-5 
ADVANTAGES OF ENERGY CONSERVATION
o A barrel of oil saved is as useful (and often better)
than a barrel produced; it typically costs less to save 
a barrel of oil than to produce one through new tech­
nology.
oIn contrast to increased production, conservation reduces 
environmental damage and pollution.
0 Can result in more efficient utilization of finite re­
sources, thereby reducing waste.
0 Reduces dependence on oil imports and improves balance 
of trade.
0 Some conservation technologies and measures can be 
applied faster than new energy supply systems.
0 Reduced demand buys time to develop and implement long­
term energy solutions.
0 Creates new job opportunities through such activities as 
retrofitting older buildings (must be weighed against 
possible job displacement).
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conservation is important, since as will be shown, 
decision-makers had to settle on some meaning for prescrip­
tive policy purposes.
Physicists and engineers contend that "wasted energy 
results from fundamental physical constraints upon the effi­
ciency with which energy can be converted from one form to 
39another." Waste can also result from inappropriate mechan­
ical design. On the other hand, an economic perspective of 
waste often ignores physical or technical considerations, 
arguing that pricing mechanisms in idealized markets "have
assigned appropriate dollar values to all possible pur- 
40chases." In other words, externalities (residuals in the 
form of waste heat) are ignored. In this light, current 
levels of energy use could not be considered wasteful since 
consumers behave rationally and always act in their own eco­
nomic self-interest, and because overall the economy appeared
41to be operating in a reasonably efficient manner. However,
39Statements of Dr. David A. Large in U.S., Senate, 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Energy Conserva­
tion, Hearings, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1973), pp. 143-144.
40Denis Hayes, Energy; The Case for Conservation 
(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1976), p. 10.
This discussion of waste definitions draws heavily on Hayes' 
interpretation and explanation, as well as Barry Commoner's 
discussion of thermodynamics in. Commoner, The Poverty of 
Power: Energy and the Economic Crisis (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1976), pp. 6-29.
41For an elaboration of this perspective, see 
Morris A. Adelman et al.. No Time to Confuse (San Francisco: 
Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1975),
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not only does this ignore externalities, but it also ignores 
institutional factors that determine the mix of energy and 
other economic inputs in fuel purchase decisions (e.g., gov­
ernment policies which artifically keep energy prices low 
and/or subsidize inefficiency in terms of technical stan­
dards) .
A different perspective on waste and efficiency is
offered by thermodynamic analysis. Energy is consumed to
perform "work," and after it is used, the energy remains
but it is no longer as useful. The Laws of Thermodynamics
state that all energy moves from a highly organized state to
a more disorganized state— i.e., it degenerates to low-grade
heat. Denis Hayes illustrates this in the following manner:
Television sets get hot; light bulbs get hot; 
automobile tires get hot. This heat flows relent­
lessly from warmer to cooler objects, becoming even 
more dilute. In the terminology of physics, it 
demonstrates an increase in entropy.
Thus, energy has a qualitative dimension. The Second 
Law of Thermodynamics states that the quality of energy de­
clines as it is used. An analysis of energy use, then, needs 
to distinguish between the relative entrophy levels of the 
flow of Btu's in a given process. This represents a valuable 
concept in defining waste and how efficiently the U.S. uses 
its energy resources. For example, a high-grade energy 
source should not be used to perform work which actually re­
tires low-grade energy such as using electricity to provide
^^Hayes, Case for Conservation, p. 69.
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electrical resistance space heating. Such a practice, 
according to the Second Law, is wasteful.
Physicists of the American Physical Society intro­
duced this "second law efficiency" concept and applied it to 
a number of significant end uses in this country. They con­
cluded that the overall efficiency of energy use is 10 to 
15 percent. According to this criterion, autos were deter­
mined to be 10 percent efficient, space heating in homes six 
percent, air conditioning five percent, and hot water heat­
ing only three percent efficient.Although a perfect 
second law efficiency is impossible, research by Marc Ross 
and Robert Williams in 1975 indicated that had second law 
efficiency been applied to total energy use in 1973, the
"same living standard could have been provided with nearly
4445 percent less energy." This suggested that energy 
sources were not being as appropriately matched to various
The American Physical Society, "Efficent Use of 
Energy: A Physics Perspective," reprinted in U.S., House,
Committee on Science and Technology, ERDA Authorization—  
Part I, 1976 and Transition Period, Conservation (Washing­
ton, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 397- 
659.
^^Marc H. Ross and Robert H. Williams, "Assessing 
the Potential for Fuel Conservation: A New Definition and
Analysis of Energy Efficiency Helps to Clarify Policy 
Alternatives," unpublished manuscript, July 1, 1975, 
p. 18. (Mimeographed.) See also, Ross and Williams, "The 
Potential for Fuel Conservation," Technology Review 79 
(February 1977); 49-57.
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45tasks as they could have been, lending more support to 
conservation ideas and strategies.
Conservation Strategies
Based on the various kinds of energy uses described 
in chapter III, and flowing from the attempts to define 
energy waste and efficiency discussed above, important kinds 
of conservation strategies have come generally to include :
1. Improving the efficiency of end use. Preventing 
energy losses in Ixfe-support systems and in 
production systems, ensuring that energy systems 
are operating at their designed efficiency, and 
eliminating inefficiently utilized energy by 
retrofitting in all energy systems. For example, 
using more efficient air conditioning devices or 
improving maintainence of furnaces, insulating 
buildings, or adopting new technologies to in­
crease the efficiency of transportation and 
industrial processes.
2. Reducing unnecessarily wasteful practices. 
Involves changing thermostat settings, turning 
off lights in a room when not in use, using 
better driving habits to reduce gasoline con­
sumption, and similar minor alterations in life­
styles and habits.
3. Shifting to less energy-intensive activities. 
Examples are shifting freight from truck or 
air to rail, shifting passengers from autos to 
car pools and mass transit, shifting from manu­
facturing to services in the economy. Can mean 
major changes in lifestyles, consumer prefer­
ences, or behavior.
4. Fuel and resource substitutions to better match 
energy and end use. Using energy in alternate 
forms to conserve those resources in scarce 
supply.
45It should be noted that this omits consideration 
of the economic fact that the costs of some technical oppor­
tunities for conservation may simply be too prohibitive to 
be implemented.
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5. Curtailment. Conservation by doing away with a 
particular process, or banning some activity.
For example, driving bans or prohibiting a pro­
ductive activity by rationing or allocation 
of fuels.
The extent to which energy savings are being or can be 
captured through the application of specific measures that 
fall within the above categories depends on public accept­
ance and efforts by the public and private sector to imple­
ment the various strategies. The next chapter describes the 
background and status of the national response to these 
conservation strategies.
Summary
This chapter has shown that beginning in the early 
1970s, the idea that conservation could help close the gap 
between supplies and demands received explicit attention 
from the general public, prominent individuals, research 
organizations, environmentalists, and government agencies. 
Moreover, the public held government largely responsible 
for the energy dilemma. Thus, the basic attitudinal struc­
ture existed which could be built upon to foster support 
for government action to encourage conservation. In addi­
tion, analyses during the two years following the OPEC em­
bargo demonstrated that besides reducing demands for energy, 
conservation had other advantages over increasing energy 
supplies such as less pollution, decreasing dependence on 
foreign imports, more time and investment capital to
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develop renewable resources. Specific strategies were 
advanced to capture energy savings in the major consuming 
sectors. These factors formed the underlying assumptions 
which paralleled and influenced the growth of government 
involvement/intervention in the conservation issue area.
CHAPTER V 
THE POLICY SYSTEM 
Introduction
Essentially, because of the 1970s crisis, the U.S. 
confronted a number of complex choices regarding the avail­
ability of energy resources and resource use in the major 
consuming sectors. These choices become issues as they 
influence relevant parties-at-interest, the values they 
hold, and existing political and social institutions. In 
many ways, the conservation policy system parallels the 
overall political context within which energy policy, in 
general, is developing. That is, it exhibits piecemeal, ad 
hoc policy formulation and implementation, reflects conflicts 
in intergovernmental relations, and is characterized by con­
frontation among public and private sectors. For example, 
prior to 1977, federal authority and responsibility in 
energy conservation was shared by some 25 institutions.
More importantly, most of the policies and programs within 
these agencies were not the result of any coordinated effort 
to formulate a national "conservation policy." In addition.
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the executive branch and Congress were more often than not 
deadlocked over the choice of policy tools to promote conser­
vation in the economy. Then, in 1977, President Carter sub­
stantially reorganized the existing policy structure, 
placing many of the diffuse conservation programs under the 
aegis of the newly established Department of Energy (DOE). 
How much centralizing conservation authority in a single 
department-level organization will reduce conflict and uncer­
tainty remains an open question.
This chapter begins with an overview of the organi­
zational and legislative response to conservation as a 
strategy within the scope of national energy policy. It 
therefore continues the context description and analysis by 
focusing on the way in which conservation policies were 
formulated and decisions made. The last three sections of 
the chapter extend this discussion of the policy system by 
looking further at existing policies and programs for imple­
menting energy conservation as well as assessing the impacts 
of these actions within the three major consuming sectors.
With regard to the purposes of this chapter, two 
observations should be noted. First, the policy system for 
dealing with energy conservation problems and issues has 
developed only within the last four or five years. Thus, 
roles and responsibilities among parties-at-interest are 
still evolving. As will be shown, the early approach taken 
was to rely on federal exhortation and pleas for voluntary
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actions to curb energy use in the consuming sectors. More 
recent congressional legislation has aimed largely at decen­
tralizing responsibility for conservation to the states, 
establishing goals and guidelines, and providing technical 
and financial assistance for meeting federal objectives.
These actions have already resulted in significant policy 
clashes, and, with the lingering energy situation, more 
debate is expected.
Secondly, the chapter attempts to describe the 
impacts of substantive policies as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the policymaking system. This provides the 
basis for the identification and categorization of alterna­
tives to be evaluated in chapter VI. In this light, however, 
the chapter should not be viewed as an attempt to contribute 
directly to knowledge of the processes and functions of gov­
ernment in general. Instead it seeks to delineate the policy 
system in which policy decisions are made, and to portray the 
various participants and actions that are a part of. this 
system.
Historical Development of 
Conservation Policy
As noted above, the historical development of the 
policy system for dealing with conservation problems and 
issues parallels the record of government involvement in 
energy matters generally.^ Conservation policies and the
For an excellent review of the history of U.S. 
energy policy and organization, see U.S., Senate, Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Federal Energy Reorganization;
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roles of relevant parties-at-interest have developed in a 
piecemeal, incremental way over the past few years. Indi­
vidual decisions were made in response to specific needs, at 
a specific time, and with little thought until recently about 
their interrelationships. This development has taken place 
through administrative actions, such as Presidential Execu­
tive Orders and Reorganization Plans, legislative decisions, 
agency programs to implement legal mandates, state responses 
to federal initiatives, and other private and public sector 
activities such as the dissemination of research results 
described in the previous chapter. Three patterns encapsulate 
this evolutionary development. These are; (1) efforts to 
reorganize the federal bureaucracy to include energy conser­
vation, (2) executive-congressional debate over appropriate 
policy tools to promote conservation, and (3) conflicts in 
intergovernmental relations with regard to conservation 
policies.
Reorganizing the Bureaucracy 
to Include Conservation
Historically, the association of government agencies 
and energy industries arose out of the industries' interests 
in resources beneath publicly-owned lands, and in hydroelec­
tric sites. Another early concern was the significance of 
energy resources to the federal responsibility for national 
defense. Then, in response to the monopolistic growth of gas
Historical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1976).
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and electric utilities during the 1930s, government interests 
broadened into the areas of economic regulation and develop­
ment. Finally, in the 1950s and 1960s, the federal govern­
ment assumed a stronger role in matters related to health, 
safety, and the environment, culminating in the enactment of 
national legislation to control water and air pollution and 
the impacts of major federal decisions. To support its grow­
ing role in all of these areas, government funded more and 
more energy-related research and development.
Based on this expansion of interests and responsi- 
bilities, one can speculate that the essential role of 
energy in the above policy areas would have eventually forced 
the development of a national energy policy, with or without 
the 1973 OPEC embargo. Similarly, the depletion of finite 
energy resources would have ultimately forced the nation to 
consider its exponential rate of energy consumption, but not 
necessarily during the 1970s. However, in the wake of summer­
time "brownouts" in the northeastern U.S. in 1970, and facing 
prospects of potentially serious fuel shortages as winter 
approached, the Nixon Administration took several actions to 
ease the energy situation. Paul W. McCracken, chairman of 
the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and General 
George Lincoln announced these actions, which ranged from
2Daniel Dreyfus, Federal Energy Organization 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973) ,
pp. 29-40.
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relatively minor relaxations in oil import quotas^ to the 
creation of a joint board of top government officials to 
deal with emergency fuel shortages and coordinate remedial 
action. In addition, the Administration urged the public to 
conserve the "use of energy," and noted that federal agencies 
would set an example in this respect. Although both McCracken 
and Lincoln said it was the President's basic policy to rely 
on private industry to deal with present and future demands 
of energy;
[I]t was decided that, in the present 
situation, "certain actions by the Federal govern­
ment can help both to assure the adequacy of supplies 
and thereby moderate the increase in prices."
But they conceded, "in view of numerous 
uncertainties, no one can now be sure that these 
steps will be adequate."^
Whether or not the relaxation of oil import restrictions 
could do much to relieve the fuel shortage was not as impor­
tant as the fact that the actions taken by the Administration 
publicly acknowledged the potential fuel oil crisis, and for 
our purposes, cited the need to conserve energy. But the 
President placed the responsibility for long-term solutions 
squarely on the energy industries.
E. W. Kenworthy, "U.S. Eases Quotas on Importing of 
Oil as Shortage Looms," New York Times, September 30, 1970. 
Because the increasing flow of petroleum imports from differ­
ent parts of the world since the early 1950s was seen as a 
potential threat to the economy, quotas were adopted by the 
federal government to restrict the average number of barrels 
per day of fuel oil, natural gas liquids, liquefied petroleum 




Then, on June 4, 1971, President Nixon forwarded a 
message to Congress on the subject of energy.̂  Nixon warned 
that the U.S. was facing increasing shortages of electrical 
energy, and supplies could no longer be taken for granted:
For most of our history, a plentiful supply 
of energy is something the American people have taken 
very much for granted. In the past twenty years 
alone, we have been able to double our consumption 
of energy without exhausting the supply. But the 
assumption that sufficient energy will always be 
readily available has been brought sharply into 
question within the last year.®
Not only did the President again acknowledge that the U.S. 
faced significant energy problems, he also suggested a 
program to help alleviate them. The initial program con­
tained the following goals:
-To facilitate research and development for clean 
energy;
-To make available the energy resources on federal 
lands ;
-To assure a timely supply of nuclear fuels;
-To use our energy more wisely (calling for a new 
Federal Housing Administration standard requiring 
additional insulation in new federally-insured 
homes, dissemination of information on how con­
sumers can use energy more efficiently, and other 
efforts to encourage energy conservation);
-To balance environmental and energy needs, including 
a system of long-range open planning of electric
This had not happened since 1939 when Franklin D. 
Roosevelt called the Congress' attention to the need to 
preserve our country's energy resources. Lester A. Sobel, 
ed., Energy Crisis: 1969-1973, Vol. 1 (New York: Facts on
File, Inc., 1974), p. 2.
%.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Presidential Energy Statements (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1.
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' power plant sites and transmission line routes with 
approval by a state or regional agency before 
construction;
-To organize federal efforts more effectively,
referencing the need to create a single structure 
within a Department of Natural Resources to unite 
all important energy resource development 
programs.7
These concepts and objectives remain basically 
unchanged. That is, much of the energy legislation, proposed 
or passed since 1971, and a good part of recent activity to 
resolve institutional disorganization (at both the federal 
and state levels) has been responsive to the basic goals 
outlined by the Nixon Administration. However, as discussed 
earlier, no agency existed or was established to address 
specifically the problem of energy consumption and conser­
vation.
In his second energy message to the Congress, Nixon 
announced in April, 1973, he was establishing by executive 
action a Special Committee on Energy made up of his Assis­
tants for Economic Affairs (George Schultz), Domestic Affairs 
(John Erlichman), and National Security (Henry Kissinger).
At the same time, Charles DiBona was appointed Special Con­
sultant to the President for energy matters and assigned
responsibility for establishing a separate policy analysis
8staff in the White House. This staff was given the name of
^U.S., Senate, Presidential Energy Statements,
pp. 1-2.
PRichard Corrigan, "Nixon Message Follows Months of 
White House Wrangling," National Journal Reports 5 (April 
21, 1973): 574-575.
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National Energy Office (NEC) and was charged with advising 
the President through the Special Committee on Energy on all 
federal energy problems, policies, and related matters.
With regard to conservation, in the same message the 
President stated:
Common sense clearly dictates that as we 
expand the types and sources of energy available to 
us for the future, we must direct equal attention 
to conserving the energy available to us today, and 
we must explore means to limit future growth in 
energy demand.9
Since his 1971 speech first calling for wise energy use, the 
President had directed the Department of Commerce (DOC) in 
cooperation with the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop a 
voluntary "labeling" program which would apply to major 
energy-using home appliances and automobile accessories. 
Manufacturers had been asked to voluntarily display labels 
that provided information on an item's energy use, as well 
as a rating of the product's energy efficiency compared to 
other similar products. Standards for testing appliances 
were to be developed by the National Bureau of Standards 
(NBS) and for autos by EPA. Also, as noted earlier, FHA 
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
had been directed to strengthen FHA insulation requirements 
for single and multifamily housing and to evaluate the exten­
sion of insulation standards to mobile homes. Furthermore,
9U.S.; Senate, Presidential Energy Statements,
p. 24.
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as .cited in the 1971 message, all federal agencies had been 
ordered to develop programs to conserve energy, including 
programs in building design and construction^® and in the 
procurement of energy consuming products, and to thoroughly 
account for the energy impacts of major agency actions.
But by 1973 it was recognized that the diffusion of 
these fledgling conservation programs in several federal 
departments and agencies was proving to be an impediment to 
the formulation of an effective conservation response. And 
since Congress had not acted on the President's proposal to 
create a single department level agency for energy matters, 
Nixon announced the establishment of the first major organi­
zational mechanism to deal explicitly with conservation.
The Secretary of Interior was directed to create an 
Office of Energy Conservation within the Department of the 
Interior (DOI). The Office was given the authority to co­
ordinate federal energy conservation programs, to conduct 
research on issues related to the need to reduce energy 
demand, and to work to educate the public on energy effi­
ciency and costs. However, these organizational initiatives
Federal efforts to develop analytical techniques 
for predicting energy use in new buildings were already 
underway in a demonstration project being conducted by the 
General Services Administration (GSA) in Manchester, New 
Hampshire. Similarly, NBS was evaluating energy use in 
full size houses in its laboratories in Gaithersburg, 
Maryland. See U.S., Department of Commerce, Energy Conser­
vation Programs at the National Bureau of Standards (Wash- 
ington, D.C.; National Bureau of Standards, 1975), pp. 4 
and 7.
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at the executive level failed to eliminate the institutional 
chaos that had for so long characterized energy policymak­
ing and conservation policymaking more recently. By mid- 
1973, confronting additional fuel shortages, the President 
decided to modify his earlier organizational arrangements 
by forming an Energy Policy Office (EPO) in the Executive 
Office. John A. Love, the Governor of Colorado, was 
appointed "energy czar" to direct the new energy office.
EPO was to be responsible for identifying major energy prob­
lems, reviewing alternatives, making policy recommendations, 
assuring that agencies developed short- and long-range plans, 
and monitoring the implementation of approved energy 
p o l i c i e s . T w o  additional actions were taken. First, the
President reintroduced legislation to establish a Cabinet-
12level Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) 
which was to assume functions transferred from the Department 
of the Interior and several other federal agencies. Secondly, 
he proposed the establishment of a new independent agency, 
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
President Overhauls Energy Machinery," Oil & Gas 
Journal 71 (July 9, 1973) ; 34-36.
12U.S., Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
To Establish a Department of Energy and Natural Resources, 
Energy Research and Development Administration, and a Nuclear 
Safety and Licensing Commission, Hearings (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 401-440.
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to focus on all federal energy research and development 
activities.
Whereas the energy message of April 18, 1973,
Nixon's second, had an underlying tone of optimism regarding 
the potential for voluntary energy conservation measures, 
the message by June of that year, though still based on 
voluntary actions, went beyond verbal persuasion. Three 
broad categories of users were addressed: the government,
industry, and the public. Agencies of the federal govern­
ment were given approximately one month to report on spe­
cific steps taken to meet a seven percent reduction in energy 
consumption anticipated over the next 12 months. Precise 
measures for conserving energy were left up to the depart­
ment or agency heads; however, the following general guide­
lines were to be included:
1. Reduction in the level of air conditioning of 
all federal office buildings throughout the 
summer.
2. Reduction in the number of official trips taken 
by federal employees.
3. Purchasing or leasing of automobiles and other 
vehicles which provide good gasoline mileage.
OEC was directed to develop and implement a consumer infor-
14mation program on energy conservation.
^^U.S., Senate, To Establish a Department of Energy 
and Natural Resources, pp. 441-468.
^^U.S., Senate, Presidential Energy Statements, 
pp. 53-55.
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For the private sector, the Secretaries of the 
Interior and Commerce and the head of the EPO were to meet 
with representatives of industry to discuss ways of reducing 
unnecessary energy consumption and to encourage their par­
ticipation in developing long-term conservation plans. The 
Secretary of Transportation was directed to work with the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to reduce airline 
flight speeds and better plan the frequency of commercial 
flights.
Finally, the President appealed to the public to 
help reduce the level of national consumption by individual 
consumers by five percent. Among the measures suggested 
were many of those reported in the Office of Emergency Pre­
paredness staff study discussed in the previous chapter—  
for example, raising thermostat settings on air condition­
ing by four degrees, and lowering winter home heating tem­
peratures as much as five degrees, purchasing more energy 
efficient autos, carpooling to increase vehicle load factors, 
using mass transportation, and reducing driving speeds.
Nixon concluded his remarks on conservation by stating:
The conservation of existing resources is 
not a proposal; it is a necessity. . . I believe 
that the American people must develop an energy 
conservation ethic.
Although the EPO had theoretically been given the 
lead in policymaking for energy, the Office was not given
^̂ Ibid,
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the resources, authority, or staff to meet its mandated policy 
responsibilities. Because of these constraints, most of 
the Office's time was spent "fire fighting," dealing with 
short-term emergency situations which had developed by the 
fall of 1973. In fact, by November, a Cabinet-level 
committee— the Emergency Energy Action Group (EEAG)— was 
established to address supply-demand imbalances that had 
developed. Another group, the Energy Emergency Planning 
Group (EEPG), was given the task of providing policy analysis 
support to the EEAG.^^
It was apparent that this country's problems of 
energy supplies and demands had developed into a full blown 
crisis. The immediate response was to declare a national 
policy goal of achieving "energy self-sufficiency." In a 
speech on November 7, 1973, President Nixon, assuming a 
strong executive role in the matter of reducing U.S. depen­
dence on foreign imports, advocated a "Project Independence" 
in energy. Pending legislative approval of a new Federal 
Energy Administration, Executive Order 11748, of December 4, 
abolished the EPO and established a Federal Energy Office 
(FEO) to play an interim role in managing and coordinating
energy policy. William Simon was named Director of FEO and
17nominated as FEA Administrator.
16Juan Cameron, "Reaching for an Energy Policy: Years
of Drift, Weeks of Panic," Fortune 89 (January 1974): 76-77
and 158-159.
^^Frank V. Fowlkes and Joel Havemann, "President 
Forms Federal Energy Body with Broad Regulation, Price
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It is instructive to note that FEO differed
substantially from its earlier counterparts (NEC, EPO)
which had small staffs and little operational control over
other federal energy organizations. FEO Administrator Simon
pulled together a staff of over 3,000 people loaned from
various other agencies performing specific energy func- 
18tions. In May, the Federal Energy Administration Act was 
19signed into law creating the FEA which was given responsi­
bility for energy conservation and planning for Project 
Independence. Concerning its functional responsibilities in 
conservation, the FEA was charged with developiong and over­
seeing the implementation of "equitable" voluntary and man­
datory conservation programs and promoting efficiency in the
_ 20 use of energy resources.
Project Independence, which was initiated in March 
of 1974, included energy conservation and demand management 
among the broad strategic options available to the U.S. Most 
of the conservation measures considered in the Project Inde­
pendence energy supply and demand model were derived from
Control Powers," National Journal Reports 5 (December 8, 
1973): 1830-1838.
18"Simon Heads New Federal Energy Setup," Oil & Gas 
Journal 71 (December 10, 1973): 50-51.
^®Pub. L. 93-275.
20For a description of the development of the FEA 
and an evaluation of its performance, see Robert W. Rycroft, 
"The Federal Energy Administration: A Case Study of Energy
Policy-Making," Ph.D. dissertation. The University of 
Oklahoma, 1976.
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reports described in the last chapter. Major actions 
identified that could reduce demand growth to about 2.0 per­
cent per year (close to the Ford Foundation's Technical Fix 
scenario) by 1985 included; standards for more efficient 
new autos, incentives to reduce miles travelled, incentives 
for improved thermal efficiency in existing homes and offices 
and minimal standards for new homes and offices, and switch­
ing existing power plants and industrial users from petroleum
21and natural gas to coal or coal-fired electric power.
In evaluating the implications of these actions, the 
Project Independence report noted two important policy impli­
cations of conservation measures that formed the basis for 
much of the executive-congressional debate over what conser­
vation programs are needed and how they should be implemented :
(1) conservation requires intervention and regulation in pre­
viously free market areas, and (2) it results in increased 
nonmarket costs due to more limited individual choice and 
changed lifestyles.
However, as established, the FEA was not as powerful
an organization as Nixon had proposed. Instead of giving the
agency broad authority to deal with the energy shortage.
Congress limited FEA's authority only to those powers it spe-
22cifically granted.
21U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Project Inde­
pendence, A Summary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974), p. 9.
22Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Congress and the Nation, 
Vol. IV (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977), 
p. 218.
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After assuming office when Nixon resigned, President 
Gerald Ford endorsed Nixon's proposal for the establishment 
of a massive energy research and development organization to 
lead in the development of new energy resources. In fact, 
the new President labeled legislation then before the Con­
gress to establish such an agency as his top priority energy
measure. Reflecting this commitment, he signed the Energy
23Reorganization Act of 1974 on October 11, the day after 
Congress passed it. The bill abolished the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and created an Energy Research and Develop­
ment Administration (ERDA) to handle the majority of federal 
research and development projects. A new Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) was formed to take over AEC's safety and 
regulatory responsibilities.
As originally reported from the House Government 
Operations Committee, the bill made no provisions for energy 
conservation activities. The one amendment (out of 12 sug­
gested) accepted during the House floor debate was one which 
sought to strengthen the language calling for research and 
development of measures to conserve energy. Morris K. Udall 
(D-Ariz.) offered the amendment in an effort to clearly 
define for the agency a role in encouraging conservation. 
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) wanted to further elevate the 
position of conservation in ERDA's organizational structure
^^Pub. L. 93-577.
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by dividing the responsibilities of the assistant administrator 
for environment, safety, and conservation by adding a new 
assistant administrator for energy conservation. Rosenthal 
argued that the problem of conservation was not directly 
related to environmental and safety policies and warranted an 
administrator with no other responsibilities. The amendment 
was rejected.
But that was not the end of the request. The Senate 
Government Operations Committee reported S 2744— the counter­
part of HR 11510— on June 27, 1974. The Committee made an 
extensive change in the initial proposal, emphasizing con­
servation by specifying that separate programs for energy 
conservation and environment and safety be provided. Thus, 
conservation was established as a distinct program area with 
its own assistant administrator. In Senate floor action,
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced an amendment which was 
passed by voice vote to direct the ERDA administrator to 
"publicize information on new technologies for energy conser­
vation and new energy sources as they become available for 
25general use." This was intended to provide an informa­
tional link with the public and other interested parties.
Both actions were adopted in the conference report that was 
finally approved.
24Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Continuing Energy 
Crisis in America (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1975), p. 101.
^^Ibid., pp.,102-105.
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ERDA and FEA were viewed as related agencies both 
essentially reporting to the President, both in theory under 
the control of the Energy Resources Council (ERG), also 
established on October 11. ERG was formed to ensure commu­
nication and coordination among federal agencies involved in 
energy-related activities and to develop and implement na­
tional energy policy. The Council consisted of the Secretary 
of the Interior, the director of the FEA, the ERDA Adminis­
trator, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (0MB), and other federal officials. 
According to the legislation, ERG would terminate upon crea­
tion of a permanent department for energy or natural re­
sources or within two years, whichever occurred sooner.
When compared to President Nixon's early proposals
for an energy research organization, the 1974 Reorganization
Act created an agency more oriented toward environmental
protection, nuclear safety, and energy conservation than had
26initially been intended. In addition, attempts by the 
Senate and House conferees to broaden the language of the 
bill beyond nuclear power concerns eventually resulted in 
confusion over the agency's relationship with several other 
energy organizations, principally in the areas of the envi­
ronment and conservation.
Nation, p. 219.
2 gGongressional Quarterly, Inc., Gongress and the
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As established, both FEA and ERDA had been assigned
major responsibility and authority for energy conservation
programs. However, as late as 1976 no overall management
philosophy for conservation policy was forthcoming. ERDA
had been given the "lead agency" role in this respect, but
no one in either the FEA or ERDA was quite sure how the
27responsibility for conservation should be divided. In two
major assessments of ERDA's programs and plan, the Office of
Technology Assessment identified the need for clarification
28of ERDA's mandate in conservation. The agency eventually 
responded by contending its role in conservation was to be 
that of research, development, and demonstration of poten­
tial energy efficiency improvements in the major consuming 
29sectors. FEA was to deal more with policy analysis— i.e, 
with social, economic, and institutional policy problems 
and issues, program implementation, and data needs for con­
servation.
Even so, ERDA's budgetary position as revealed in 
the fiscal 1976 statements reflected an unambitious position
27Personal communication with representatives from 
ERDA and FEA, July 1975.
28U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
An Analysis of the ERDA Plan and Program (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975); and Office of Technology 
Assessment, Comparative Analysis of the 1976 ERDA Plan and 
Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
29Austin N. Heller, address delivered at the National 
Energy Conservation Forum, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., December 2, 
1975. (Mimeographed),
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with regard to functional programs in the conservation area. 
Out of a projected $4 billion budget, conservation research 
and development accounted for only $32 million, or less than 
one percent of the total. Of the $32 million, only $3 mil­
lion (less than one-tenth of one percent of the total) was 
identified for end-use energy conservation R&D— i.e., for 
the development of new technologies which could reduce energy 
consumption in commercial and residential buildings and pro­
vide for more efficient home appliances.The important 
point here is that these specific applications had been 
spelled out as a part of the assumptions in Project Inde­
pendence's conservation strategy. Although successive ERDA 
budgets since 1975 incrementally increased conservation funds 
and the agency raised conservation R,D&D to top priority, 
the budget requests for conservation were generally criti­
cized as not reflecting "a sense of urgency to achieve
31results (saved energy)."
To some extent, ERDA's budgetary problems with re­
gard to conservation were a reflection of the agency's 
overlapping responsibility with a number of other federal 
agencies. In addition to ERDA and FEA, approximately 25
30Jerold W. Jones, "End-Use Energy Conservation 
Research and Development Program," in U.S. Energy Research 
and Development Administration Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 
1976 and Transition Period; A Brief Analysis, ed. Center 
for Energy Studies (Austin: Center for Energy Studies,
The University of Texas at Austin, 1975).
31Office of Technology Assessment, Comparative 
Analysis of the 1976 ERDA Plan, p. 145.
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other government organizations were involved in energy 
conservation activities as a result of congressional legis­
lation or executive pronouncements during the period 1973 
to 1975. Several of these agencies (e.g., HUD, DOC, and 
DOT) were identified in passing in the preceding discussion. 
Some of the conservation responsibilities initially assigned 
to these agencies have been transferred to the newly estab­
lished Department of Energy and will therefore be discussed 
more fully in later sections. However, it should be noted 
that prior to the Carter Administration's reorganization, 
programs both in existence and in the developmental stages 
within the line agencies played a dominant role.in the for­
mulation and implementation of energy policy, generally, 
and conservation policy, specifically.
In extending the FEA expiration date under provi­
sions of the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 
321976, Congress specifically mandated an executive branch 
review, and development of recommendations for reorganizing 
the federal government's energy agencies and programs. On 
March 1, 1977, the new Administration, under President 
Carter, sent to Congress legislation to create a permanent. 
Cabinet-level Department of Energy (DOE). The Department 
of Energy Organization Act (S 826) passed in 1977 consoli­
dated three entire agencies (FEA, ERDA, and the Federal
32Pub. L. 94-385. Provisions of this law are dis­
cussed below.
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Power Commission) and fragments of several others, all dealing
33with energy-related matters.
With regard to conservation, the post of Under 
Secretary for Energy Conservation was established, programs 
split between FEA and ERDA combined, authorities for build­
ing thermal efficiency standards in HUD and the voluntary 
industrial energy conservation programs in DOC were trans­
ferred to the Department, and an Office of Conservation and 
Solar Applications (CS) was formed (headed by an Assistant 
Secretary). In addition, the Secretary of Energy was given 
an advisory role in recommending goals in the auto fuel 
efficiency program in DOT. Thus, at least in statutory 
terms, energy conservation policies and programs were 
finally given an institutional home.
Then, in April the President unveiled his National 
Energy Plan (NEP)^^ in which he outlined a comprehensive 
strategy intended to achieve a significant reduction of oil 
imports by 1985. As announced earlier, conservation and 
fuel efficiency were the "cornerstone" of his P l a n . T h e
33"New Energy Department Shaping Up in Congress," 
Oil & Gas Journal 75 (June 13, 1977); 19-22; and "Energy
Reorganization," Energy Today 4 (March 1, 1977): 89-91.
^^U.S., Executive Office of the President, The 
National Energy Plan (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
Office, 1977).
Dicken Kirschten, "Conservation— The Corner­
stone of Carter's Plans for Energy," National Journal 9 
(February 26, 1977): 313-318.
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NEP contained 10 "principles" which the Administration 
deemed necessary for the formation of a "sound context for 
energy policy" and to "provide its main guidelines."^® As 
reviewed by one observer;
There is very little within the detailed 
proposals or even the goals which can qualify as 
"new"— with the exception of two of the ten prin­
ciples which are set forth to "provide a framework 
not only for present policies, but also for the 
development of future policies."
Eight of the ten principles represent gen­
eral findings already embodied in legislation cur­
rently in force . . .
Two of the principles however represent 
fundamental changes as compared with national 
energy policies and assumptions of the past— the 
assertion that (1) the Federal Government should 
take the leading role in dealing with the nation's 
energy policy comprehensively and that (2) energy 
prices should generally reflect the true replace­
ment cost of energy.
As noted previously, energy policies traditionally 
had depended on the private sector and historically had been 
based on ensuring that supplies be made available at the 
lowest possible costs and prices. To begin to change this 
basis and to meet the goals outlined in the NEP, the Admin­
istration introduced, on the same day that it released the
^®Executive Office of the President, National Energy 
Plan, pp. ix-xiii.
37Frances A. Gulick, "U.S. National Energy Policy:
The Federal Role," in Project Interdependence: U.S. and World
Energy Outlook Through 1990, eds. U.S., House, Subcommittee 
on Energy and Power and Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce; and Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, and The National Ocean Policy Study of the Com­
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 104.
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Plan, a draft of proposed legislation to the Congress. The
38National Energy Act set forth numerous incentives and 
disincentives to promote conservation in the major consuming 
sectors and to address the issue of energy prices. For 
example, the legislation included: phased increases in
gasoline taxes and a penalty tax on inefficient autos; 
rebates of gasoline taxes to consumers who purchased more 
efficient vehicles; economic inducements (taxes, investment 
credits) to encourage installation of insulation and other 
energy-saving devices in homes and buildings; systematic 
escalation of energy prices to more directly reflect the 
cost of producing new energy; and a well-financed public 
education campaign to encourage voluntary conservation.
Many of these proposals had been formulated to deal explic­
itly with problems and issues in the residential and com­
mercial, transportation, and industrial sectors which had 
proved intractable to conservation efforts in previous 
administrations. Although many of the Act's 113 
initiatives went through Congress intact, including several 
of the conservation provisions, debate concerning natural
gas price deregulation has stalled efforts to reach a con-
39sensus on the Carter energy legislation. Since much
38U.S., House, National Energy Act, Communication 
the President of the United States, House Document 95-138, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977.
39Steven Rattner, "Energy: Where Did the Crisis
Go?" New York Times, April 16, 1978.
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uncertainty still exists regarding what shape the final 
legislation will take, its conservation provisions and status 
will be discussed later in the sections which summarize the 
impacts of energy conservation policy to date and identify 
unresolved problems and issues in the consuming sectors.
The Role of Congress 
Along side these organizational and administrative 
steps to reshape U.S. energy institutions and policy, the 
93d and 94th Congresses were also active in energy matters.
In the 93d Congress alone, more than 2,000 energy-related 
bills were introduced, including several hundred conserva­
tion measures.However, few conservation bills proposed 
during 1973-1974 actually passed. Even so, two major 
energy-related activities were initiated in Congress, one 
in the House and one in the Senate, that were to eventually 
have far-reaching effects on national efforts to define 
conservation programs. First, Senate Resolution 45 adopted 
in May 1971 authorized the Senate Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee and ex-officio members of the Committee 
on Commerce and Public Works and the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy to conduct an investigation and study of 
national fuels and energy policies. Pursuant to the resolu­
tion, the "national Fuels and Energy Policy Study" included
40U.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Highlights of Energy Related Legislation in the 
93d Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 1.
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the first congressional hearings ever devoted to the role of 
energy conservation. These hearings examined the nature of 
energy demand; explored the potential for reducing demand 
through conservation measures; and considered the economic, 
political, and social consequences of conservation alterna­
tives. Summaries of reports identified in the previous 
chapter, the SRI document on consumption, and the OEP report 
on the potential for conservation, were included as background 
for the first day's hearings.Testimony emphasized the 
"untapped potential" for energy conservation in transporta­
tion, housing, and the industrial sectors. Furthermore, 
the hearings underscored the climate of opinion regarding 
conflict between the executive and Congress. Claims were 
made by several congressmen to the effect that there was
"little evidence (in 1973) of a serious commitment to energy
42conservation in the executive branch."
In response, the Senate introduced The National Fuels
and Energy Conservation Act in the belief that Congress needed
"to assure that conservation plays a central role in national 
43energy policy." The bill, which outlined a sustained
41U.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Energy Conservation, Hearings, Part 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).
^^U.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Energy Conservation and S. 2176, Hearings, Part 2 




energy savings strategy by government, passed the Senate but 
was subsequently killed in the House.
Similarly, in the House of Representatives, joint 
hearings before Subcommittees of the Committees on Govern­
ment Operations and Science and Astronautics were held from
May to July in 1973. These were also on the subject of con-
44servation and the efficient use of energy. The hearings
resulted in over 2,000 pages of testimony and focused
especially on the need to reduce energy waste by the public
and in the consuming sectors. Mike McCormack, chairman of
the Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics stated in the last day of testimony that the
hearings had been very important. He went on to suggest:
I believe they will serve as a solid base for 
drafting worthwhile legislation in the energy con­
servation area.
I want to tell you (the committee witnesses) 
that the staff is already at work on the material 
that has been presented . . .
We are preparing legislation in this area
based on the information elicited at these hearings.
But as of October 1975, aside from the reorganiza­
tion acts introduced by the President, the 55-mph speed 
limit, and a few other relatively minor pieces of legisla­
tion on the demand side of the energy system, conservation 
remained the object of much rhetoric and a stepchild of
44U.S., House, Committees on Government Operations 
and Science and Astronautics, Conservation and Efficient 
Use of Energy, Hearings, Parts 1-4 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1973).
^^Ibid., Part 4, pp. 1505-1506.
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supply-oriented proposals in Congress. Likewise, national 
energy policy legislation remained elusive. Recognition of 
this state of affairs is less important than an examination 
of its reasons. In assessing the lack of responsiveness to 
the accepted need for a comprehensive, coherent energy policy 
framework, two factors appear paramount; (1) fragmented 
jurisdiction over energy issues within the Congress, and
(2) the ongoing debate between the Congress and the Presi­
dent regarding price increases to spur conservation behavior. 
Both of these factors will be summarized below as they sig­
nificantly affected legislation passed by the 94th Congress.
Fragmented Jurisdiction. Energy issues, because 
they are inherently multifaceted, fall within the purview 
of several powerful committees in Congress. For example, 
a total of 10 Senate committees and 11 House committees are 
notably involved with energy conservation or related energy 
p r o b l e m s . I t  is well known that disputes over jurisdic­
tion among these committees, particularly on timely topics, 
is no small matter often resulting in lengthy debates and 
delays. Then, once jurisdictional disputes are resolved, 
the typical procedure is to break a single bill up into its
Currently, Senate committees are Foreign Relations; 
Interior and Insular Affairs; Armed Services; Commerce;
Public Works; Budget; Finance; Government Operations; Labor 
and Public Welfare; and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
On the House side of Congress, important energy committees 
are Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Science and Technology; 
Interior and Insular Affairs; Appropriations; Budget; Gov­
ernment Operations; Small Business; Public Works; Ways and 
Means; Banking and Currency; and Foreign Affairs.
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component parts with each part considered by a different 
committee.After being reported out of committee, coordi­
nation requirements between the House and Senate for joint 
conferences on similar bills are equally complex and time- 
consuming .
This fragmented committee system in the Congress 
proved especially problematical for dealing with energy 
issues partly because committee jurisdiction had been estab­
lished before energy became an important public policy issue, 
and because many of the initiatives from Presidents Nixon
and Ford demanded that Congress consider a variety of objec-
48tives and policy tools as a package. For example, the
Ford Administration's Energy Program was spelled out in a
single omnibus act. The Energy Independence Act of 1975,
which included some 13 interrelated titles. Congress
responded by sending the separate titles of the bill to
49four House committees and nine Senate committees. This 
sort of ad hoc consideration of energy bills resulted in 
several attempts to centralize responsibility for energy 
legislation, particularly in the House, but the existing
For elaboration on the congressional committee 
process, see Lewis A. Froman, The Congressional Process; 
Strategies, Rules and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1967).
48Thomas H. Tietenberg, Energy Planning and Policy 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 100-101.
49Elder Witt and Tom Arrandale, "Energy Policy: 
'Overestimating the Capability of Congress'?" Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, June 28, 1975, p. 1343.
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committee system proved to be too strongly entrenched to 
give way to significant reform.
Partisan Conflict over Policy Tools. The second 
impediment to congressional responsiveness to energy issues 
in the 94th Congress centered on Democratic opposition to 
the Ford plan with regard to the use of price increases to 
encourage conservation. This was not, however, a new con­
cern. The 93d Congress had closed with no agreement as to 
what to do about high and rising energy prices.Following 
the lead of the Nixon Administration, President Ford's con­
servation strategy was based on still higher energy prices:
"If energy were more expensive, his reasoning ran, produc­
ertion would be encouraged— and so would conservation."
Arguing that Congress had failed to enact tax mea­
sures or incentives sufficient to encourage long-term conser­
vation or reduce import vulnerability, the Administration 
called for additional tariffs ($3 per barrel) on imported 
oil and sought to lift federal controls holding down the 
price of domestic oil. A joint task force of Democrats, 
headed by Representative James Wright (D-Tex.) and Senator
^*^Tietenberg, Energy Planning and Policy, pp. 102-
104.
^^U.S., Senate, Highlights of Energy Related Legis­
lation in the 93d Congress, p. 24.
52Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Congress and the 
Nation, p. 233.
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John Pastors (D-R.I.), although hard pressed to formulate a 
viable alternative to the President's plan, eventually 
responded with a plan that recommended mostly conservation 
measures. It was intended to be "less damaging to the 
already weak economy and less painful for the already pressed 
c o n s u m e r . W h i l e  the Democratic energy program did contain 
measures that would have increased prices (e.g., through a 
five cents a gallon increase in the federal gasoline excise 
tax and a graduated tax on inefficient autos), a task force 
included policy measures to combat inflation and prevent 
excess profits in the oil industry.Debate over the plan 
and subsequent variations thereof, as well as opposition from 
Republicans who opted for the President's plan, resulted in 
a stalemate that prevailed both within the Congress and be­
tween the President and Congress during most of 1975.
In sum, the central factor in the deadlock was the 
Administration's "conservation-by-price" philosophy compared 
to the Democrat's reluctance to adopt measures that would 
result in higher energy prices to consumers. The comments 
of Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.) highlight this 
difference of opinion;
The President's response to our growing 
dilemma has been to impose periodic increments on 
the petroleum import tariff, an approach which only
Ŝ Ibid.
54Peter Milius, "Democrats Set Energy Plan," Wash­
ington Post, February 28, 1975.
194
places a higher price on the already unacceptably 
high price of foreign petroleum. This policy is not 
only terribly inflationary and socially inequitable, 
but ineffective in encouraging the conservation 
which is required. Unless we act decisively, the 
President's current policy . . . will be allowed to 
stand, by default, as our country's response to the 
energy crisis.
The President has stated that his tariff is 
designed to provoke Congress into action on solving 
the energy crisis. At the same time he has attacked 
our alleged inaction. The tragic effect has been to 
politicize and divide, instead of unifying and pro­
gressing together. Although this may be politically 
advantageous to the President, it is an advantage 
which has been exacted to the detriment of the 
American people.55
More specifically with regard to conservation. Repre­
sentative William S. Moorhead (D-Penn.) argued that congres­
sional inactivity stemmed from ineffective national leader­
ship:
While a great deal of lip service has been 
given to energy conservation by the administration, 
the overall Federal energy conservation effort remains 
fragmented and uncoordinated. Unfortunately, we have 
no lead agency for energy conservation. There has 
been very little effort directed at informing the 
public of the critical importance of conservation 
to the economy, to our national security, and to the 
environment. The administration has relied too 
heavily on the hope that voluntary conservation 
would result from higher energy cost and not enough 
on public education as to why conservation is impor­
tant and how it can be a ccompl i s h e d .56
Congressman Moorhead went on to state: "I am optimistic that
the proper mix of public education, research and development.
U.S., House, Representative Henry A. Waxman speak­
ing on the need for energy conservation. Congressional 
Record, July 14, 1975, p. 6781.
^^U.S., House, Representative William S. Moorhead 
speaking on the need for energy conservation, Congressional 
Record, July 14, 1975, p. 6779.
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and government regulation aimed at energy conservation will 
lead to a wiser allocation of domestic energy resources, 
decreased dependence on foreign resources, and a cleaner 
environment."
Although numerous other comments and cases could be 
brought to bear on the congressional-executive debate which 
during 1975 had essentially blocked every effort to produce 
a major energy conservation act, the important fact is the 
lack of consensus resulted both from internal congressional 
problems and fundamental conflicts over policy tools. Yet, 
the debates during the 93d and 94th Congresses were the 
foundation for a major reassessment of historical assumptions 
concerning the federal role in influencing domestic energy 
prices and consumption of energy, a reassessment that is 
still underway. Moreover, the debates reflected national 
efforts to achieve a consensus regarding the emerging role 
of conservation in the U.S. energy future.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act. A consensus
of sorts was finally reached in late 1975 with the passage
58of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). This 
act was essentially the first major attempt by Congress to 
promote conservation. Titles II and III of the legislation 
combined a number of pieces of conservation bills that had 
already passed the Senate or House earlier in the year.
^^Ibid., p. 6780. 
^Sub. L. 94-163.
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Table V-1 summarizes the federal role and major 
responsibilities delegated to the states as defined by EPCA. 
As shown, the act reflected Congress' unwillingness to use 
higher prices to reduce energy use, relying instead on vol­
untary and mandatory conservation programs. In addition, the 
legislation was intended to decentralize and share much of 
the responsibility for achieving national conservation goals 
by providing financial incentives to states to voluntarily 
develop and implement energy saving plans and programs.
The Energy Conservation and Production Act. The 
second, and most recent, congressional statement of conser­
vation policy came with the passage of the Energy Conserva­
tion and Production Act (ECPA) of 1976.^^ Although initially 
intended as a House bill to extend the life of the PEA, which 
as noted earlier has been established as a temporaru crisis 
agency with conservation responsibility, ECPA was transformed 
by the Senate into full-fledged energy policy legislation.
As depicted in Table V-2, it substantially supplemented the 
1975 EPCA with additional conservation assistance measures 
and programs. The most controversial provision was the 
requirement that HUD develop federal performance standards 
(to take effect sometime in 1981) for energy efficiency in 
all new commercial and residential buildings. Although many 
different bills in both the House and Senate during 1975 had
59Pub. L. 94-385. For an example of the optimism 
surrounding this bill's passage, see Edward Cowan, "A Start 
Toward Energy Conservation," New York Times, October 24, 1976.
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TABLE V-1
MAJOR CONSERVATION PROVISIONS OF THE ENERGY 














Authorized the President to prescribe 
national energy conservation and gas­
oline rationing plans subject to 
approval by both chambers of Cong­
ress in emergency situations.
Required that after 1977 the average 
fuel economy of passenger cars (manu­
factured or imported) by any one 
manufacturer be no less than;
18 miles per gallon in 1978
19 miles per gallon in 1979
20 miles per gallon in 1980
27.5 miles per gallon in 1985
and succeeding years.
Required labeling of cars manufac­
tured or imported after 1976 to show 
fuel economy performance.
Department of Transportation
Penalties and credits based on 
amount in which a manufacturer's 
average fleet fuel economy exceeds 
standard for any one year.
Provided for an energy testing, 
labeling, and standards program for 
major appliances.
Set efficiency targets designed to 
achieve an aggregate improvement of 
at least 20 percent in efficiency by 
1980 over 1972 products.
Federal Energy Administration
Required Federal Energy Administra­
tion to set enforceable standards for 






Authorized $150 million over three 
years (fiscal 76-78) for use by the 
Federal Energy Administration to help 
states develop and implement conser­
vation plans and programs to reduce 
their consumption by five percent 
below the expected level for 1980. 
Participation was to be on a volun­
tary basis; however, the following 
elements were mandatory in any state 
plan for the state to receive federal 
funds :
thermal standards for buildings; 
lighting efficiency standards; 
energy efficiency standards; 
energy efficiency procurement 
standards; 
transportation measures, which in­
cluded right-turn-on-red and car- 
pools.
Other Programs Directed the Federal Energy Adminis­
tration to set voluntary energy 
efficiency improvement targets for 
the 10 most energy-consumptive indus­
tries in the U.S.
Directed the President to develop 
and implement a 10-year energy con­




KEY CONSERVATION PROVISIONS OF THE ENERGY 
CONSERVATION AND PRODUCTION ACT OF 1976
Supplement to the 
Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act 
of 1975
Authorized additional appropriations 
for states participating in EPCA 
conservation programs. Contingent 
upon implementation of new mandatory 
requirements in state plan;
public education program on energy 
saving measures; effective inter­
governmental coordination of con­
servation programs; encouragement 









Established an Office of Energy 
Information and Analysis within the 
Federal Energy Administration to 
facilitate the analysis of supply and 
demand as a basis for the agency, 
Congress, and other policymakers.
Directed the Federal Energy Admin­
istration to develop proposals for 
improving electric utility rate de­
sign to be submitted to Congress.
Directed the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to develop 
federal performance standards for 
energy efficiency in all new commer­
cial and residential buildings.
Authorized the Federal Energy Admin­
istration to make grants to states 
and Indian tribes, to local govern­
ments, and to community action 
agencies in a state not participating 
in the voluntary conservation program, 
for insulation and other weatheriza­
tion investments in residences 







Directed Housing and Urban Develop­
ment to undertake a national energy 
conservation and renewable resources 
demonstration program for existing 
buildings.
Authorized Housing and Urban Develop­
ment to use grants, loans, subsidies, 
and loan guarantees to encourage the 
use of proven conservation measures.
Provided authority for the Federal 
Energy Administration to guarantee 
loans to corporations, institutions, 
governments, and other eligible 
borrowers to finance energy conser­
vation or renewable resource measures 
for industrial goals or to otherwise 
improve the efficiency of the large- 
scale use of energy.
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endorsed the development of thermal efficiency standards 
for new buildings, those Congressmen opposing such standards 
and lobbyists for the building industry had effectively 
blocked adoption of the bills. The National Association of 
Counties and the National League of Cities contended that the 
standards, which would prescribe minimum amounts of insula­
tion to be used in construction, foreshadowed the imposition 
of a national building code.^® These groups also contended 
that advances already being made by states and localities 
negated the need for federal intervention. In addition, 
groups such as the National Association of Home Builders, the 
Mortgage Bankers Assocation, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
"looked upon the . . . bill for enforceable standards as one 
that could entangle builders in more red tape and drive up 
the already high cost of h o u s i n g . Y e t ,  many in Congress 
believed that the measures were needed to ensure the imple­
mentation of the nation's emerging conservation policy.
They were strongly supported by the American Institute of 
Architects, the National Conference of State Legislators, 
and several environmental groups that had for years been 
pushing for a national conservation policy. The Sierra Club 
and the Environmental Policy Center urged Senator William
^^Luther J. Carter, "Energy Conservation: Congress




Proxmire (D-Wis.) and his colleagues on the Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee to hold the line on
62sanctions to enforce building standards.
Congress also demonstrated in 1976 its willingness 
to increase appropriations for non-nuclear energy programs. 
The lack of direction in energy conservation programs had 
been consistently reflected in ERDA's energy budget as noted 
earlier. The House Science and Technology Committee in­
creased the President's conservation budget proposals for 
1976 by almost $83 million, restoring funds cut from ERDA's 
request by the Office of Management and Budget. The boost 
in conservation funding was distributed among five of ERDA's 
conservation programs : energy storage, buildings, indus­
trial, transportation, and improved conversion efficiency 
for power plants.
The Committee also authorized $10 million for the 
establishment of an Energy Extension Service Program within 
ERDA "to provide for technical assistance, instruction, 
information dissemination and practical demonstrations in 
energy conservation opportunities."^^ The program was to
62As it turned out, the Senate compromised on the 
sanctions provision in the legislation to break a deadlock 
over imposition of the standards— i.e.. Congress deferred 
decision on the sanctions until the time when the standards 
are promulgated by Housing and Urban Development.
6 3U.S., House, Conference Report, Authorizing 
Appropriations for the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 29.
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be modeled after the Department of Agriculture's cooperative 
farm extension service to provide assistance at the local 
level. Although actual appropriations were delayed, ERDA 
began developing the program on an experimental basis, in­
volving pilot programs in 10 states.
Federal-State Sharing of 
Responsibility
Another important factor in the conservation policy 
system stems directly from efforts to implement both the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Energy Conserva­
tion and Production Act. The pattern of federal-state shar­
ing of conservation authority and responsibility has resulted 
in conflicts, especially over the formulation of policy 
objectives. In general, these conflicts revolve around 
states' claims that mandatory provisions dictated by the 
federal government do not adequately account for state- 
specific and regional differences, and that the lack of co­
hesiveness among conservation agencies at the federal level 
impedes state initiatives.
These claims have been summarized by Edward L. 
Helminski, Director of Energy Programs of the National 
Governors' Conference in a recent report:
[T]he states have expressed . . . concerns about the 
need to revamp various aspects of the Federal energy 
structure. Of particular significance to the States 
is that the present structure almost completely dis­
regards the States as a functioning unit of a 
Federal energy organization and provides almost no
204
mechanisms for State policymakers to participate in 
the energy decision-making forum.G*
Helminski suggests further that the performance of federal 
energy conservation programs has been "lackluster," and this 
can be attributed in part to the omission of institutional 
arrangements for a coordinated state-federal response.
In this country's federal system, the states histor­
ically have been called upon to implement and enforce programs 
in substantive policy areas. Usually the federal government 
has intervened by providing funds to encourage state develop­
ment of programs, typically premised on grounds that the state 
develop some specific forms of regulation for dealing with 
identified national problems.Within the context of recent 
environmental and energy problems and issues, states have 
begun to press for a more substantial policy formulation 
role.67
When FEA first began developing its program to further 
conservation goals, the agency cooperated closely with the
Edward L. Helminski, "State Perspectives on the 
Organization of thé Proposed Department of Energy," in U.S., 
House, Project Interdependence, p. 563.
6^Ibid., pp. 563-564.
6^See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, ed., The 
American System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). See also,
Charles 0. Jones, "Federal-State-Local Sharing in Air Pollu­
tion Control," Publius 4 (Winter 1974): 69-85.
67por a discussion of this trend, see Irvin L. White 
et al.. Energy from the West: Policy Analysis Report
(Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection Agency,
forthcoming), especially chapters 1 and 2.
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National Governors' Conference. In fact, the initial 
framework for sharing responsibilities was developed by the 
FEA jointly with representatives of five states. The volun­
tary federal-state program as conceived by mid-1975 relied 
heavily on the active participation of states in the early 
analysis of state energy use to determine what conservation 
goals were most applicable for each state. FEA was to pro­
vide basically technical assistance.^®
As shown earlier in Table V-1, Title III of the EPCA 
gave FEA the authority to establish guidelines for the formu­
lation and implementation of state conservation plans. 
Although the legislation reflected many of the basic con­
cepts outlined earlier in the year by FEA and the Governors' 
Conference, it was different in two basic ways. First, funds 
authorized to the states were contingent upon state accept­
ance of federally-defined conservation objectives. And 
secondly, these objectives included specific, mandatory con­
servation actions that states had to include in their plans. 
These actions were subsequently followed in 1976 by the pas­
sage of the Energy Conservation and Production Act which 
added more mandatory measures that had to be incorporated in 
state programs if they wished to participate in the federal 
program and to receive financial assistance.
68Laurence H. Martin, "The Role of Government in 
Causing Energy End Use Efficiency— An Overview," in Energy 
Use Management, Vol. II, eds. Rocco A. Fazzolare and Craig B. 
Smith (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 484.
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Since the adoption of this framework for the states' 
response, representatives of the National Governors' Confer­
ence have contended that not only did Congress fail to con­
sider many state priorities and needs, but also that many of 
the mandatory requirements would actually do little to save 
energy in some states (e.g., right-turn-on-red in sparsely 
populated rural communities).^® More generally, states sug­
gest that the current program does not allow sufficient flex­
ibility to address unique state climatic, geographic, and 
economic conditions. Both the Governors' Conference and the 
National Conference of State Legislatures have called for 
the strengthening of intergovernmental capacity in the newly 
established Department of Energy to facilitate state involve­
ment in all stages of the conservation policymaking process, 
from policy formulation to program development and imple­
mentation.^®
Confronting this political opposition, FEA and the 
Congress did not insist on immediate compliance by partici­
pating states. Of the $150 million in assistance funds 
available between 1976 and 1978, only $74.5 million had been 
disbursed by April 1978. Despite its relatively slow
Quonnie Laughlin, "Federal Energy Conservation 
Programs: A State Perspective," in U.S., House, Project
Interdependence, p. 581.
^®Helminski, "State Perspectives," in U.S., House, 
Project Interdependence, pp. 562-563; and National Con- 
ference of State Legislatures, Goals for State-Federal 
Action (Washington, D.C.; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 1977), pp. 22-23.
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start, it appears that the program is resulting in state
energy savings. With a majority of states participating,
plans show consumption reductions ranging from four percent
in Alaska to almost 10 percent in Wisconsin. The expected
energy savings by 1980 is approximately one billion barrels
of oil.^^ It is instructive to note, however, that only 15
percent of the projected savings will result from implementar
tion of the controversial mandatory conservation require- 
72ments. This suggests that states have gone considerably 
beyond the federal initiatives in an effort to demonstrate 
their capability to define state-specific conservation needs 
and retain decision-making authority in this policy area.
It also implicitly suggests that the issue of federal-state 
sharing in conservation programs is far from being removed.
The Impacts and Current Status of 
Poiicies and Programs
Although administrative problems and questions about
appropriate organizational techniques and intergovernmental
relations are important, an assessment of the social and
political context for conservation policy must come to grips
with the impacts of conservation innovations among the
public. This necessitates examining changes in public and
private sector values and behavior towards energy
Janet Raloff, "States, with Federal Help, Expect 
to Trim Energy Use 5% in 2 Years," Energy Research Reports 4 
(April 17, 1978): 4-5.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
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conservation, bringing us back to questions of appropriate 
strategies for implementing conservation within the three 
major energy consuming sectors. The remainder of this chap­
ter focuses on the impacts of existing or pending conserva­
tion policies and programs. Emphasis is placed on identify­
ing social, economic, and political barriers to conservation 
as well as identifying unresolved problems and issues. As 
in the preceding discussion, the purpose is to further under­
standing of the policy system— i.e., parties-at-interest and 
current institutional arrangements for dealing with problems 
and issues.
• Drawing on the discussion up to this point. Table V-3 
summarizes conservation programs and strategies implemented 
or pending as of early 1978. It utilizes the five categories 
of strategies identified in chapter IV. The purpose of the 
table is not to specify actual programs by name, rather to 
depict the general shape and pattern of conservation efforts 
for the three consuming sectors. A review of the table 
indicates that efficiency improvements have received the 
greatest attention within emerging conservation policy. This 
is especially the case since the distinction between effi­
ciency improvements and reducing wasteful practices is often 
tenuous. On the other hand, curtailment strategies are not 
being relied upon as feasible responses to fuel shortages. 
Given the fact that conservation as a public policy concern 
is only a few years old, the list appears impressive.
TABLE V-3
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However, as will be shown, policy results in many cases have 
not been as substantial as the measures taken would suggest.
The Residential and Commercial Sector 
Since buildings have been shown to require a tremen­
dous amount of energy to operate, it is logical that a large 
share of policy attention has been given to planning and con­
structing more energy efficient buildings and retrofitting 
existing structures. Indeed, anyone familiar with the con­
servation literature aimed at this sector recognizes there is 
no paucity of conservation ideas in buildings. Instead, the 
unresolved problems and issues center on the application of 
these strategies, on getting the architects, planners,
builders, suppliers of materials, money-lending institutions,
73and policymakers to work together. Although technical and 
economic innovations have been prescribed, institutional 
resistance r e m a i n s . T w o  cases help to clarify the nature 
of this resistance— appliance labeling and building 
standards.
First, as noted earlier, the Energy Policy and Con­
servation Act (EPCA) of 1975 requires that major household
73Norman Metzger, Energy; The Continuing Crisis 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977), p. 185.
^^See Alan Hirshberg and Richard Schoen, "Barriers 
to Widespread Utilization of Residential Solar Energy: The
Prospects for Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry," 
Policy Sciences 5 (December 1974): 453-468.
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75appliances bear labels describing their energy efficiency.
The provisions of EPCA codified voluntary programs which had 
been formulated within the Department of Commerce during 1973- 
1974. The purpose of the labeling program is to cause manu­
facturers to provide energy use information to consumers at 
the "point-of-sale" and to encourage consumers to purchase 
more energy efficient products. Extensive testing procedures, 
labeling requirements, and procedures for promulgation of 
efficiency standards have been established. Similar steps to 
educate the public with regard to its purchasing habits for 
these appliances are critical, but receive less well-defined 
attention in the act. Strategies to encourage energy saving 
purchases have been left largely to the discretion of the 
Department of Energy. If these are to be effective in chang­
ing consumer preferences and decisions, they will require 
close cooperation with industry trade associations and the 
manufacturers themselves. And since the target date for the 
standards is 1980, timing is also significant— i.e., since 
the average life time of most major appliances is 10-20 
years, it would be 1990 or 1995 before labeling programs 
produce noticeable impacts on national consumption, assuming 
full compliance.
75Consumer products covered by the act include: 
refrigerators, refrigerator-freezers, freezers, dishwashers, 
clothes dryers, water heaters, room air conditioners, home 
heating equipment (not including furnaces), television sets, 
kitchen ranges and ovens, clothes washers, humidifiers and 
dehumidifiers, central air conditioners, furnaces, and 
others as deemed appropriate by the Department of Energy.
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Secondly, R,D&D is underway to develop mandatory 
thermal performance standards for new residential and commer­
cial buildings. The Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment (HUD) was authorized in 1975 to develop the standards 
within three years. As of February 1977 HUD had not received 
the necessary funds to do so, but it does appear that stan­
dards acceptable to relevant participants may be forthcoming 
by 1979. As described earlier. Congress compromised with the 
lending institutions and building trade groups by deferring 
enforcement sanctions with respect to the standards. Full 
implementation will undoubtedly depend on whether federal
sanctions now in the law in conditional terms will be approved
76when the efficiency requirements are promulgated.
Strategies to retrofit existing structures also need 
to be considered. Insulation tax credits for homeowners and 
businesses have recently passed both the House and Senate 
and should serve as an incentive for the addition of new 
insulation, weather-stripping, storm windows and doors, and 
fuel saving devices such as electric furnace igniters 
(instead of gas pilot lights) and thermostat timers to auto­
matically regulate space conditioning in buildings. Similar 
tax credits have been proposed (and in some cases adopted by 
states) for solar space heating and solar water heating 
installations. The goal of the Carter energy plan is to 
retrofit 90 percent of American homes by 1985. At this
76Carter, "Energy Conservation," p. 748.
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point the goal falls into the category of voluntarily
reducing wasteful practices. The only direct funds that
have been appropriated are targeted to weatherizing the homes
of low-income persons. Clearly, implementation is based on
a strong private sector role in marketing the materials and
devices to save energy. But as pointed out by one source:
IT]he marketplace alone has been unable to convince 
large numbers of consumers of the advantages of true 
conservation. Too small a percentage of the popula­
tion understands that insulation is a worthwhileinvestment.77
The Administration has indicated if the 1985 retrofit goal
is not met, then legislation might be asked for that would
require a house to be retrofitted with insulation whenever
78ownership is transferred.
In addition to these incentives, a substantial R,D&D 
component has been aimed at buildings. Primary responsibility 
for this effort now lies with DOE. Program elements are 
focused on maximizing the quantity and rate at which energy 
efficient (and economically feasible) technologies can be 
transferred into the market. Part of DOE's responsibility 
in this area is to support the development of the thermal 
standards for new buildings. Again the fundamental barriers 
are public and institutional acceptance of new technologies
77W. R. Goodwin, "Energy Conservation: The Need for
a Strong Federal Program," National Journal 8 (April 3, 
1976): 456.
78U.S., Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, Impacts of the National Energy Plan: Hearings
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 28.
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or ideas. Even though the average payback period for 
energy-saving measures, for example, retrofit materials, 
may be only three or four years, that fact alone may not 
convince consumers that a higher "first-cost" is warranted.
Besides these consumer and marketplace impediments, 
existing programs in the buildings area are further con­
strained by the structure of the housing industry. A report 
to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation stated:
Taken as a whole, the industry can be 
characterized as an activity which is largely frac­
tionalized, involving many small operators and con­
sumers; undercapitalized and therefore a captive of 
national economic cycles; operating in a very power­
ful, somewhat unique and frequently difficult labor 
environment; carrying on relatively little research 
and development in comparison to other industries 
of its size; largely reinventing the specific team 
of participant actors to carry out each specific 
construction project; and, due to all these 
attributes, comprising an extremely risky section 
of the U.S. economy.80
And yet, probably the most striking feature of the construc­
tion industry is its fragmented nature. It is broken up into 
"sub-markets" which specialize in different building-types 
(e.g., residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, 
educational, health care, and other specialized buildings).
79Paul P. Craig, Joel Darmstadter, and Stephen 
Rattien, "Social and Institutional Factors in Energy Conser­
vation," in Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 1, ed. Jack M. 
Hollander (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1976),
p. 537.
80Richard Schoen, Alan Hirshberg, and Jerome Weingart, 
New Energy Technologies for Buildings: Institutional Problems
and Solutions (Cambridge, Mass.; Ballinger Publishing Co., 
1975) , p. 38.
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Furthermore, the industry is literally enmeshed in 
construction codes, building ordinances, and zoning regula­
tions which emanate from every jurisdictional level of gov­
ernment. Any deviation from the technical specifications
contained in these building codes must be approved by each
81authority with any relevant jurisdiction.
Consequently, conservation innovations are being
introduced into an environment that requires substantial
changes not only in the way things have always been done but
in the highly technical specifications as to what materials
should be used. In essence, conservation ideas and devices
increase the already risky housing ventures. Within this
risky environment agents of the construction industry are
not easily motivated to change— to implement new techniques
82or technologies where the client has not demanded them. 
Because the industry is first-cost oriented, if new products 
or techniques, such as solar water heating and space condi­
tioning, or integrated total energy systems, are to replace
those which have enjoyed widespread acceptance for some time,
83the new products must be "almost immediately competitive."
81Metzger, Energy, p. 186.
82See Richard P. Geyser, "The Need for Organized 
Building Processes," paper presented at the American Society 
of Civil Engineering Annual Meeting and National Meeting on 
Structural Engineering, Pittsburgh, Pa., September 30- 
October 4, 1968.
83Schoen, Hirshberg, and Weingart, New Energy Tech­
nologies for Buildings, p. 39.
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By and large, government's response to these 
conditions has been to encourage demonstration projects in 
the hope that new ideas, when proven, will be accepted and 
adopted by industry. During 1974-1976, the National Bureau 
of Standards, supported in part by the FEA, HUD, and ERDA, 
collaborated with the General Services Administration in the 
design and evaluation of a demonstration office building in 
Manchester, New Hampshire, and cooperated with the city of 
New York's City Board of Education (under a National Science 
Foundation grant) to develop an energy efficient public 
school building.Similar projects have been promoted and 
well-financed for solar applications. The potential for 
transferring innovations that result from these demonstra­
tions, largely planned and financed by the public sector,
85has been questioned by a number of authoritative sources.
Norman Metzger states: "I can find no examples of any
(demonstration houses) that have worked; i.e., convinced
86the industry to change its ways."
Monsanto's "House of the Future" displayed at Disney­
land during the late 1960s, where millions of people viewed 
the structure, apparently "did not impress the housing
84Department of Commerce, Energy Conservation 
Programs, pp. 4-5.
85For an excellent summary of public-private sector 
relations generally in this regard, see Mary R. Hamilton, 
"Energy Policy and Changing Public-Private Sector Relations," 
Policy Studies Journal (Summer 1978, forthcoming).
^^Metzger, Energy, p. 186.
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87industry." As summarized succinctly by Hirshberg and
Schoen, the Monsanto House:
. . . was simply an unreal demonstration in housing 
industry terms. Its structure and enclosure of 
reinforced fiberglass components did not conform to 
any building code specifications at that time nor 
were there on-site trades skilled in the use of the 
material for these purposes . . .88
With no promise of a significant, aggregated market, the 
house was viewed as an unacceptable business risk. Indeed, 
would a market materialize? Would anyone accept such an 
exotic, but unorthodox, design?
Thus, the success of conservation strategies in this 
sector will depend on more effective processes of interaction 
and integration between the public and private sectors. Given 
the fragmented nature of the housing industry, the introduc­
tion of new technologies and techniques will require long 
lead times and focused attention on implementation. Finally, 
existing conservation strategies need to better address the 
overall buildings problem, including research, development, 
innovation, implementation, and public acceptance.
The Industrial Sector 
The impacts and barriers to conservation policies 
and programs in the industrial sector are not as susceptible 
to generalization as those in the residential and commercial
®̂ Ibid.
88Hirshberg and Schoen, "Barriers to Widespread 
Utilization of Residential Solar Energy."
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sector. This is due in part to the diverstiy of industrial 
energy uses as described in chapter III. It is also because 
different industries have reacted differently to the changed 
circumstances in energy— i.e., some have moved to implement 
energy saving technologies as a result of fuel shortages 
and higher prices, and others have bolstered their own 
internal research and development programs to uncover useful 
energy saving ideas and techniques. Government programs have 
relied heavily on industry's ability to put its own house 
in order. With these caveats in mind, the discussion here 
focuses generally on the results of government strategies to 
encourage industry's self-interest in conservation. It spe­
cifically deals with conservation via two important 
initiatives— industrial cogeneration and district heating—  
and offers some conclusions concerning the effectiveness of 
the current voluntary emphasis/status of industrial programs.
Unlike the housing industry, a majority of manufac­
turing industries typically control large shares of their 
respective markets. Likewise, manufacturing processes are 
generally highly automated and therefore tied closely to 
large-scale energy use, and, in the face of rising prices, 
to increased efficiency. But efficiency is in this case
quite industry specific, depending on each industry's own
89economics, processes, and markets.
8 9 Metzger, Energy, p. 193.
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Prior to the establishment of the DOE, the National 
Bureau of Standards had been primarily responsible for sup­
porting Commerce's Voluntary Industrial Energy Conservation 
Program. The Bureau, working closely with DOC and FEA, was 
assisting industry by developing and promoting methods to 
reduce total energy use, to prevent energy losses, and to 
encourage the use of waste heat generated in industrial pro­
cesses and systems. Because of the great potential of waste 
heat utilization, and therefore fuel savings, both President 
Carter and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger are interested 
in the concept of cogeneration (the use of waste steam heat 
from industrial processes to produce byproduct electricity). 
The National Energy Plan seeks legislation to encourage this 
conservation strategy.
Obstacles to the widespread acceptance of industrial 
cogeneration are institutional and economic rather than tech­
nical. As stated in the Energy Policy Project report of the 
Ford Foundation:
In the past many industries generated their own 
electricity and steam, but the economies of scale 
combined with promotional rates (given by electric 
utilities) have enabled the utilities to capture 
most of the industrial electricity market.
The report went on to contend: "The time has now come
largely to reverse that trend, in order to save both energy
91and money for industrial consumers at current fuel prices."
90Energy Policy Project, A Time to Choose, p. 69.
91̂*Ibid.
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But uncertainty over interconnection of cogeneration systems 
with utility systems has impeded progress towards this goal. 
An industry that generates electricity by means of cogenera­
tion might wish to hook into the power grid of a local util­
ity in order to keep the load on the cogeneration system con­
stant. However, such joint efforts are quite often difficult
gounder existing utility policies and regulations. Without 
interchange and backup arrangements and commitments, on site 
generation is simply not feasible.
To spur cooperation between industrial companies and 
utilities that service them, the Carter Administration has 
called for a program to assure that industrial firms generat­
ing electricity receive fair rates from utilities for both 
the backup power they may need to buy and for the surplus 
electricity they might wish to sell. Industries utilizing 
cogeneration processes would be exempted from state and fed­
eral public utility regulations, and could use public utility 
transmission facilities to sell surplus power and buy backup 
power. In addition, an investment tax credit of 10 percent
above the existing credit would be provided for money spent
93on cogeneration equipment.
Other productive uses of waste heat which results 
from industrial proceses are district heating and integrated
92 "Saving Energy the Cogeneration Way," Business Week, 
June 6, 1977, p. 100.
93Executive Office of the President, National Energy 
Plan, p. 45.
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utility systems. Prior to the reorganization in 1977, HUD, 
with the technical support of NBS, had implemented a major 
federal program known as Modular Integrated Utility Systems 
(MIUS) to evaluate the potential for combining various func­
tions of utilities and conventional building services (e.g., 
operating a small electrical power plant which could serve 
the heating and cooling needs of a dwelling unit, a school, 
and a commercial area). Conservation in such a system is
achieved by sharing and recycling energy which is normally
94wasted by the separate facilities. Although a number of 
agencies have attempted or have on the drawing boards demon­
stration or feasibility studies, to date little progress has 
been made in gaining utility and state public utility commis­
sion support of integrated systems ideas.
A parallel situation exists with regard to district 
heating concepts (supplying heat to source via an extensive 
pipe network utilizing hot water or steam). European coun­
tries, for example, Denmark and Sweden, have found that dis­
trict heating can provide significant amounts of heat. The 
concept is attractive from a resource substitution stand­
point since the central heat source can use the fuel (oil, 
refuse, coal) that is most economical to consumers in the 
district. It can also use waste heat from existing indus­
trial plants and utilities. The concept and technology are
94Department of Commerce, Energy Conservation Pro­
grams , pp. 8-9.
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well-established, but a recent study noted that "experience
suggests it takes many years to develop or convert a major
95part of a city to the process." The same study further
pointed out that agencies in the U.S. involved in identifying
the use of district heating in other countries were doing
little to assess how the foreign experience might improve
96implementation of the concept in the U.S. It appears that 
government programs to voluntarily encourage the productive 
use of waste heat have to be augmented with positive induce­
ments or incentives for the private sector.
Other strategies being pursued in industry stem from 
the 1975 EPCA which set up voluntary conservation programs, 
now monitored by DOE, in the nation's 10 most energy- 
consumptive industries. Mandatory progress reports are re­
quired under the provisions of the program. Results of the 
program indicate that energy prices have been a major factor 
in encouraging conservation in industry. Most industries 
possess the analytical capability and the engineering exper­
tise to identify and implement potential energy saving mea­
sures. The recent shifts in sectorial demand patterns cited 
in chapter III suggest that this sector is indeed voluntarily
95U.S., General Accounting Office, U.S. Energy Con­
servation Could Benefit from Experience of Other Countries 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1978), p. 11,
^^Ibid., p. 16.
225
responding to the need to use energy more efficiently in
97manufacturing processes.
As shown above, however, there is no reason to assume
that industry will automatically pursue certain important
conservation strategies on the basis of increasing energy
prices alone. Moreover, government policy affects the price
industry pays for energy, and in the past, large industrial
users have been given lower electricity rates. Equalizing
these promotional rates is currently a primary concern of
government. The rationale for rate reform is that it could
encourage investments by industry to reduce energy require- 
98ments. In this regard DOE has taken over an FEA program 
to enable state public utility regulatory commissions to con­
duct demonstrations of various conservation-related reforms, 
such as peak load pricing, for electric utilities.
Consolidated Edison, one of the nation's largest 
electric utilities, has been experimenting with time-of-day
97For evidence to support this claim, see U.S., 
Senate, Committee on Commerce, Industry Efforts in Energy 
Conservation (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 
1974). This document provides a number of case studies which 
illustrate the degree to which energy use management has be­
come integral in many major U.S. corporations.
98For a discussion of promotional rate practices, 
examples, and their relation to conservation, see Barry I. 
Hyman, Initiatives in Energy Conservation (Washington, B.C.; 
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 37-38. See also, 
Herbert B. Cohn, "Should Utility Rate Structures Be Revised 
to Discourage Electric Use?" Public Utilities Fortnightly 93 
(April 11, 1974): 21-25; and Warren L. Deverel and Jay
Gellert, "An Examination of Price Elasticity— Utility Rate 
Structure and Conservation," Public Utilities Fortnightly 94 
(July 18, 1974); 24-27.
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pricing (reducing electric rates paid by consumers during
typically low use hours) in order to try and redistribute
99demand on the company's equipment. As demonstrated by 
reports in the press on congressional hearings with regard to 
the Carter Administration's initiatives to speed up voluntary 
utility reform by proposing minimum national standards, fed­
eral intervention into state and utility rate-setting prac­
tices is being resisted.
In general, then, mandatory conservation strategies 
for industry have remained in the background. It has been 
suggested, however, that the easy savings have already been 
captured, and further improvements will depend on more inno­
vative (and undoubtedly costly) action. Strategies which 
have received some attention from government are mandatory 
energy audits of major plants and setting of federal effi­
ciency standards for industrial equipment, such as boilers.
The Transportation Sector 
The status with regard to the implementation of trans­
portation conservation strategies parallels that of the resi­
dential and commercial sector. That is, policies and pro­
grams have been constrained by institutional difficulties 
and not by lack of ideas or technical research and
99"A Con Ed Rate Experiment," New York Times, Septem­
ber 12, 1976.
Dicken Kirschten, "Conservation— The Corner­
stone of Carter's Plans," pp. 316-317.
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d e v e l o p m e n t . Also, as in the case of buildings, state 
governments have been given a substantial role in implement­
ing national conservation objectives in this sector. Since 
most transportation problems and issues revolve around what 
to do about the automobile and gasoline consumption, the 
discussion below concentrates primarily, but not exclusively, 
on the impacts of programs aimed at this end use.
After its establishment, ERDA identified motor ve­
hicles as the primary target for conservation R,DSD. 
Similarly, the Department of Transportation has had an influ­
ential role in transportation conservation since the OPEC 
embargo. As identified earlier, other actions taken thus far 
by government have been of a regulatory nature as exemplifed 
by the Emergency Highway Conservation Act, and by the mile­
age performance standards in the Energy Policy and Conserva­
tion Act. President Carter wants to go above the 1985,
27.'5 mpg-target for autos set in the EPCA. Enforcement is 
based on civil penalties which can be invoked against auto 
manufacturers who do not meet the prescibed standards. Yet, 
a recent analysis conducted by the Congressional Budget 
Office suggests that the standards and noncompliance
Monte Canfield, Jr., and Adam E. Sieminski,
'"If You're So Smart, Why Ain't You Rich?'— An Analysis of 
Impediments to Implementing Energy Conservation in the 
United States," Public Administration Review 35 (July/ 
August 1975): 322,
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penalties in the law do not appear to be strong enough to
T02induce compliance in all future years.
The President's energy plan contained two measures 
to reinforce elements of existing programs— a "gas-guzzler" 
tax and a standby gasoline consumption tax. The gas-guzzler 
tax was to be a graduated excise tax on vehicles not meet­
ing applicable fuel economies for the specified year, with 
provisions to refund monies collected to those who purchase 
cars more efficient than the federal s t a n d a r d s . T h e  
standby tax was to become effective if gasoline consumption
exceeded federal targets by one percent or more beginning 
104in 1979. The House Ways and Means Committee dropped the 
standby tax and also weakened Carter's proposals for taxes 
on low-mileage automobiles. The Committee also killed the 
proposed rebates to purchasers of fuel-efficient autos, but 
it did approve tax penalties on the most inefficient vehicles. 
In the Senate, the gas guzzler tax was unable to survive 
hearings by the Finance C o m m i t t e e . A s  of mid-1978, 
exactly what may be included in the final conference report 
remained unclear.
102U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, 
President Carter's Energy Proposals; A Perspective (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 57.
1 0 3Executive Office of the President, National 
Energy Plan, p. 36.
^°^Ibid., p. 38.
"Resistance Wanes to the Energy Bill," Business 
Week, June 27, 1977, p. 31.
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Thus, it appears that Congress has been generally 
hesitant to impose further energy use taxes to get at the 
problem of gasoline use, relying instead on the R,D&D 
strategy and the timely introduction of fuel-efficient autos 
into the marketplace. But national experience with standards 
and enforcement in other areas, for example, air quality, 
leaves unanswered the question of whether mileage mandates 
will be met unless government takes further regulatory action 
to assure compliance, action which might very well be more 
costly in terms of additional bureaucratic load and strained 
public-private sector relations. A key concern in this 
respect is timing— i.e., the 10-year lag in automobile re­
placement indicates even if the 27.5 mpg figure were to be 
achieved in 1985, it will still be 1995 before most cars 
are achieving the standard.
States are participating in energy efficiency 
through involvement in the EPCA and ECPA conservation pro­
grams. EPCA asks states to reach a five percent reduction 
in all energy use against a projected estimate of the states 
1980 consumption. Mandatory transportation options which 
must be included in a participating states plan were de­
scribed earlier. A study of responses in the interior 
western states indicates besides a serious effort to upgrade 
public transportation and encourage carpooling, most states 
have gone beyond the act's mandatory provisions (e.g., by 
including measures such as state bikeway plans, more
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rigorous enforcement of the 55-mph speed limit, increases in 
the states' gasoline tax as a disincentive to overconsumption, 
and encouragement of lower interest rates on loans for high 
mileage a u t o s ) . E v e n  so, as recognized by the National 
Governors' Conference state efforts "have not been uniform 
and much remains to be d o n e . M o s t  states also feel that 
the existing DOE-state conservation program provides inade­
quate funding to meet specific transportation needs, espe­
cially in urban areas.
For any state, one of the basic issues in implement­
ing transportation strategies is finding the proper mix of 
inducements and mandatory measures and this depends to a 
large degree on the technical, regional, and behavioral dif­
ference in areas of the U.S. This fact is best illustrated 
by considering the energy saving carpool. Actually, the 
impact of carpooling (in fuel saved) is difficult to estimate 
because of variations in geographic locations, size of metro­
politan areas, business types, and residential densities. 
Similarly, mass transit systems, though attractive in energy 
efficiency terms, have very long lead times and high capital 
costs which may prohibit their expansion in certain loca­
tions or cities.
A. Berry Crawford, "Energy Conservation in the 
Interior Western States," paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Denver, Colorado, February 21-25, 1977, pp. 7-8.
107 "National Governors’ Conference Policy Positions, 
Energy Conservation," reprinted in U.S., House, Project 
Interdependence, p. 600.
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Aside from these examples, three other barriers appear
to be blocking effective implementation of transportation
strategies. First, the tendency to rely heavily on rising
prices of fuel to bring about conservation is misplaced.
Individuals' transportation habits are often very "inelastic"
as in the case of the commuter who would rather travel alone
in his car instead of joining an energy saving carpool
regardless of the economic savings. Price increases may
have to be too severe to be acceptable on equity grounds in
the short-term to bring about the desired results or behav- 
108ioral changes. Secondly, a whole range of ongoing govern­
mental programs actually encourage or promote overconsump­
tion, for example, the federal government through the Highway 
Trust Fund monies has subsidized highway travel by private 
vehicles, and air regulations have similarly subsidized air 
travel at the expense of other more efficient modes. Finally, 
like buildings policies, transportation strategies must be 
viewed with the context of the broad and influential private 
sector role in this area. Recent government legislation 
underscored the fact that government did not believe the auto­
mobile industry would voluntarily make binding commitments to 
smaller autos and increased fuel economy within an acceptable 
time period. The introduction of new technologies that go 
beyond what is currently technologically and economically
108Michael Boretsky, "Opportunities and Strategies 
for Energy Conservation," Technology Review 79 (July/ 
August 1977): 62.
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feasible will require close cooperation between government 
and the automobile manufacturers. And, given the importance 
of the transportation industry to the economy, changes will 
have to be carefully planned with the continued support of 
all parties-at-interest.
Summary
To recapitulate, this chapter has examined the 
organizational and legislative context for dealing with 
energy conservation problems and issues. As shown, the con­
servation policy system is characterized by multiple public 
and private sector institutions and actors, often with over­
lapping roles and responsibilities. At the federal level, 
the development of a base for conservation policy began with 
the establishment of the Federal Energy Administration, the 
Energy Research and Development Administration, and in the 
federal agencies with substantive interests in buildings, 
industry, and transportation. Congress made substantial 
strides towards codifying both the federal and state roles 
in conservation with the enactment of the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 and the Energy Conservation and 
Production Act of 1976. President Carter reorganized the 
structural framework in 1977 by incorporating most of the 
ongoing conservation programs into the Department of Energy. 
The President's National Energy Plan and supporting legis­
lative proposals attempted to expand the scope of conserva- ■ 
tion programs and strategies in each energy consuming
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sector, but not much beyond what had been proposed by 
previous administrations.
Thus, from 1973 to mid-1978, conservation progressed 
from a presidential plea (Nixon's early energy message to 
Congress) to being formally entrenched within the evolving 
apparatus for the formulation and implementation of overall 
national energy policy goals. But not without substantive 
and procedural problems.
In essence, these problems center on the choice and 
application of policy tools to implement various conserva­
tion strategies that have been identified. Partisan debate 
over the role of energy prices to reduce consumption charac­
terizes legislative relations with regard to conservation 
policy. The democratic Congress continues to favor the use 
of financial incentives, subsidies, and government regula­
tions over a market response which is viewed as possibly 
resulting in profiteering, windfall profits, and inequities 
for the lower income groups of society. In addition, con­
flicts persist between the states and the federal government 
over the role states should play in formulating policies and 
programs to reduce energy demands. Finally, public accept­
ance of the need for conservation and the lack of effective 
public and private sector cooperation to disseminate informa­
tion and implement new energy saving technologies were both 
shown to be substantial constraints cutting across all three 
major consuming sectors.
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The findings in this chapter, as well as the results 
of chapters III and IV, reflect the central substantive and 
procedural dimensions of the conservation issue system.
Part Three begins by drawing some conclusions and offering 
some observations based on these results as they relate to 
the analysis of conservation policy alternatives.
PART THREE
EVALUATION OF ENERGY CONSERVATION 
ALTERNATIVES
Part Three analyzes policy alternatives for energy 
conservation problems and issues, and offers some overall 
conclusions regarding this research and the conduct of 
applied policy analysis. Both chapters VI and VII rest on 
observations and conclusions which can be drawn from the 
preceding discussion in Part Two. It is therefore useful to 
highlight these findings prior to undertaking the analysis of 
conservation alternatives and implementing strategies.
The social and political context for dealing with 
energy conservation reflects uncertainty over definitions of 
the problems and issues, confrontation over policy strate­
gies, and conflicts in roles and responsibilities among 
multiple public and private sector institutions and actors.
As described in chapter III, the conservation problem does 
not exist as a unitary problem. It is in fact a number of 
separate but overlapping problems and issues, such as 
increasing population, social and behavioral changes, rising 
per capita affluence, increasing energy demands in the three 
major consuming sectors, immediate supply shortages, histori­
cally lower prices of energy relative to other commodities, 
technological inefficiency and waste, government and indus­
try management difficulties, and international events, all of 
which are part of "the problem." The definition of conser­
vation as a public policy issue has been influenced and 
determined largely by these substantive dimensions. That is, 
policies and programs have been formulated in a piecemeal,
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ad hoc manner to address individual elements of the problem, 
much in the same manner that energy policies, in general, 
have developed.
Chapters IV and V discussed how conservation goals 
and policy strategies were identified and communicated in 
the wake of the OPEC oil embargo. Given the scope of the 
problems and issues involved, it follows logically that per­
ceptions of "what should be done" and "by whom" have been 
equally as diverse as the dimensions of the problem. Indeed, 
it can be concluded that there is no quantitative shortage 
of conservation ideas and strategies. The major failing is 
instead the lack of alternatives which can overcome persis­
tent organizational and political difficulties.
As described in chapter V, conservation interests 
contend in a policymaking environment oriented to supplying 
energy rather than managing consumption. And until 1977, 
policymakers faced a changing institutional base as three 
different presidents redesigned the energy policy structure. 
In addition, recent congressional-executive debates over 
President Carter's National Energy Plan indicate that the 
search for politically suitable conservation alternatives 
remains divided along ideological and partisan lines. In 
general. Democrats propose mandating conservation through 
government regulations and Republicans favor using energy 
prices and the market system to adjust consumption 
behavior.
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Aside from these more general contextual findings, 
which are critical to understanding the way in which conser­
vation policies are formulated and decisions implemented, 
three additional conclusions can be drawn about the conser­
vation issue system; (1) there appears to be a limited 
range of technological options available for policymakers 
to choose from; (2) although conservation is the object of 
considerable attention, there is very little in the way of 
substantive programs around which participants in the system 
can aggregate; and (3) after five years of debate, a consen­
sus has not been achieved concerning where major resource 
allocations should be made to achieve "best" conservation 
results. In combination, these characteristics, as will be 
discussed below, help to explain why conservation policy 
alternatives have been typically short-term, incremental, 
and largely reactive rather than innovative.
First, unlike promising energy supply alternatives 
(e.g., nuclear fusion and synthetic fuels) finding ways to 
reduce energy use does not seem to offer similar technologi­
cally imaginative or captivating options. Historically, the 
energy supply system has responded to resource demands through 
successive advances in technology. Transitions from one fuel 
type to another depended largely on the introduction of new 
extraction/production techniques which were the result of 
scientific and engineering breakthroughs. For example, domes­
tic oil and gas supplies were enhanced substantially with the
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development of offshore drilling techniques. The harnessing 
of nuclear energy promised limitless electricity supplies.
And once again coal has become attractive with the introduc­
tion of better surface mining equipment, air quality control 
devices, and continuous underground mining machinery. In 
sum, "technical fix" alternatives and the prospects of 
revolutionary technological breakthroughs have driven energy 
supply policy responses.
This is not the case for conservation. As shown in 
the preceding chapters, conservation strategies for the most 
part entail basically commonplace activities, such as turn­
ing off lights, adding more insulation to homes, and turning 
thermostats up and down, activities that require relatively 
little technical innovation or R,D&D. Technical fixes have 
been prescribed for motor vehicles, appliances, and build­
ings. But beyond these, few options with a substantial 
R,D&D component have been identified. Solar applications 
and other approaches to fuel substitution, as well as research 
to increase the efficiency with which energy is produced and 
supplied, do depend on solving a number of technological 
problems, but it can be argued that these activities are 
surrogates for conservation. Because technological conser­
vation solutions have remained elusive, energy supply prob­
lems continue to hold more attraction for energy researchers. 
Basic research on new supply options is not only more promis­
ing professionally, but it is also more financially rewarding
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since the push to bring new supplies on line is backed by 
a comparatively better funded effort.
The inability to define conservation alternatives 
within the mainstream of energy R,D&D is related to the 
second conservation issue system characteristic noted above : 
the lack of substantive programs around which groups can 
aggregate. Conservation programs for the major consuming 
sectors, especially for residential and commercial and 
transportation, offer little basis for uniting relevant 
parties-at-interest to press for particular policy outcomes. 
The degree of aggregation and organization necessary to link 
conservation problems to participants and participants to 
government is weakened by the diverse nature of the problems 
and issues, the many different end uses of energy, and the 
large number of relevant actors in each sector. Whereas 
energy supply systems (e.g., oil, coal, nuclear) are linked 
by common objectives, interests, values, research needs, 
and articulated policy demands and strategies, conservation 
programs are not similarly conceived and supported. For 
example, the national program to achieve better insulated 
homes reflects a well organized, centrally-directed effort 
at the federal level in terms of formulating standards.
But beyond federal government representation, and to some 
extent state organization, it becomes more difficult to 
identify "rally points," points where individual, group, 
and institutional interaction to implement insulation pro­
grams is evident.
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Thirdly, a consensus has not been reached regarding 
where major allocations should be made for conservation. 
Participants in the system have not been able to identify 
where "best" to spend additional research monies for conser­
vation, even if the funds were to be made available. Stated 
differently, budgetary and political support from Congress 
depends on identifying what makes conservation research dis­
tinct from and as important as other kinds of research to 
solve national energy problems. Difficulties in this area 
are related to the way in which conservation becomes a bud­
getary concern within the major energy agencies. As admin­
istrative units with conservation responsibilities came 
into the picture, staffs were drawn from supply-oriented 
agencies. However, the introduction of conservation goals 
required changing the mix of energy-related appropriations. 
Program budgets had to make room for conservation requests, 
but more importantly, choices had to be made about how much 
and where to spend conservation dollars. Since long-term 
plans for dealing with resource consumption did not exist, 
the immediate choices were weighted towards straightforward 
objectives— towards program ideas already "off the 
shelf." Indeed, a review of conservation appropriations 
illustrates the fact that most of the funded programs are 
largely reformulations of options devloped from the 1972 
Office of Emergency Preparedness report.
But what of the long-term? No unified front has 
emerged to help define the direction conservation allocations
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should take. The Carter Administration contends conservation 
is its energy policy "cornerstone." Significant increases 
in funding have been requested so that the total for conser­
vation requests is now more than one billion dollars (although 
the bulk of the appropriations is for financial assistance 
programs and not direct energy end uses). Yet one billion 
dollars may not represent the scale of outlays needed if a 
long-term conservation effort is to be mounted by the private 
and public sectors.
To a great extent, these characteristics mirror the 
stage of development of the conservation issue system— i.e., 
the system has developed only recently and roles and responsi­
bilities as well as objectives are still evovling. They also 
underscore the fact that energy conservation problems and 
issues reflect both procedural and substantive concerns. 
Policies are now needed to improve the energy conservation 
policymaking process and the contents of specific policies 
and strategies. It is within this context of evolving policy, 
existing uncertainty, and policy needs that chapter VI iden­
tifies and evaluates conservation alternatives. This is 
followed in chapter VII with some overall conclusions con­
cerning this research and the conduct of applied policy 
analysis.
CHAPTER VI
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION
Introduction
The preceding chapters have pointed out the strengths 
and weaknesses of strategies being used to achieve conserva­
tion in the major consuming sectors, and have identified 
problems and issues that have arisen in implementing policies 
and programs. The discussion led to the conclusion that 
energy conservation problems and issues reflect two kinds of 
concerns : procedural and substantive. Procedural concerns
center on how policies are made, for example, on whether 
state governments and other parties-at-interest are given an 
adequate opportunity to make their interests known when deci­
sions are made about energy conservation. Substantive con­
cerns focus on the contents and anticipated impacts of con­
servation policies, for example, on the consequences of 
specific policies and implementing strategies to increase 
energy use efficiency and reduce consumption.
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Based upon this conclusion and the extended 
discussion in the preceding chapters, it seems that policy 
alternatives to deal with energy conservation problems and 
issues must address two closely related (and overlapping) 
objectives:
1. Insure adequate procedures (institutions and 
processes) for considering the values and 
interests of relevant participants and facili­
tating cooperation among parties-at-interest.
2. Reduce the growth of energy demand and increase 
the efficiency with which energy is used in the 
major consuming sectors while maintaining accept­
able lifestyles and standards.of living.
This chapter identifies, defines, evaluates, and 
compares alternatives from which policymakers might choose 
to meet these policy objectives. It begins with a categori­
zation and description of alternatives. This is followed 
by an evaluation and comparison of the costs and benefits of 
alternatives according to a specification of the criteria 
identified in chapter II.
Given the scope and purposes of this study, it is 
not feasible to conduct a detailed evaluation of specific 
alternatives for the range of problems and issues identified. 
Instead, the scope of the analysis has been narrowed by 
selecting specific alternatives and implementing strategies 
on the basis of an initial screening of: (1) options
already being considered within the conservation issue sys­
tem; and (2) alternatives formulated during the conduct of
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this research.^ The evaluation is further limited by focusing 
on alternatives aimed primarily at the residential and com­
mercial and transportation sectors. This restriction seems 
appropriate given the findings and conclusions about conser­
vation strategies being pursued within the industrial sector. 
It should be noted, however, that the generic conservation 
alternatives defined below are in many cases broadly appli­
cable across sectors.
What Are the Alternatives?
As shown in Table VI-1, policymakers may choose 
alternatives from among several categories to meet the two 
energy conservation objectives defined above. These are; 
coordinated energy conservation planning and management, 
education and exhortation, market incentives and disincen­
tives, technical fix, financial incentives and disincentives, 
and direct regulatory action. The first category, coordinated 
planning and management, reflects the need to devise more 
adequate processes and institutions for aggregating and 
accommodating conservation interests. As such, it actually 
facilitates meeting both policy objectives. That is, less 
fragmented policy leadership and direction could help meet the 
procedural goal to provide a better public administration 
system and increase cooperation among participants, as well
1For elaboration, see chapter II.
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TABLE VI-1
ENERGY CONSERVATION OBJECTIVES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Objective Category of Alternatives Specific Alternatives
Insure adequate pro­
cedures (institutions 
and processes) for 
considering the values 











tion, implementation, and 
management capacities of 
state (and local) govern­
ments
Establish coordinated 
multistate planning and 
management
Reduce the growth of 
energy demand and 




Education and exhortation Collection and dissemina­
tion of information to:
-change attitudes about 
energy use; and 
-increase support for the 
need to alter consump­
tion patterns
• Market incentives and disincentives
Price energy on the basis 
of its "replacement" cost:
-immediate deregulation of 
energy prices 
-phased deregulation of 
energy prices
Technical fix Promote research, devel­
opment, and demonstration 
of conservation technolo- gies
Expedite commercialization 
of new or potential energy 
saving technologies
Financial incentives and 
disincentives
Use tax system to change 
energy use behavior, and 
mitigate inequities among 
users
Increase loans, credits, 
and other forms of public 
financial assistance of 
discontinue financial aid 
to encourage conservation
Price controls on energy 
resources
Direct regulatory action Mandatory efficiency or 
performance based stan­
dards for selected pro­
cesses and energy end 
uses
Curtailment and rationing 
measures
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as unite relevant parties-at-interest pressing for particular 
substantive policy outcomes.
The remaining five categories in the table reflect 
the need for more effective policies to improve the effi­
ciency with which energy is currently being used in all three 
consuming sectors. Each alternative identified also includes 
procedural considerations in terms of its implementing strate­
gies; and, each represents integrative, cumulative options 
which generally cut across sectorial boundaries and deal with 
diverse energy demands.
One approach to conservation is to rely on education
and exhortation to promote public awareness of the need for
saving energy. Government at all levels, industry, and public
interest groups are currently actively involved in collecting
and disseminating information in an effort to bring about end
use energy efficiency and reduce energy waste. In spite of
existing education programs, however, substantial evidence
indicates a majority of Americans are either uninformed about
energy problems, or behave as if there were no problem even 
2when informed. For example, according to the results of 
a May 1977 Gallup survey, slightly less than half the public 
is even aware that "the United States must import oil to
2Phillip H. AbeIson, "Public Opinion and Energy Use," 
Science 197 (September 30, 1977): 1325. See also, Jeffrey S.
Milstein, "How Consumers Feel About Energy: Attitudes and
Behavior During the Winter and Spring of 1976-77," unpublished 
paper, June 1977. (Mimeographed)
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satisfy its energy demands, and only one-tenth of the public 
has an accurate idea of how much petroleum the United States 
does import."^
In addition, other recent studies indicate that 
where conservation can be achieved at a relatively modest 
price, demanding little of one's time, it appears worth the 
cost. Where it entails a greater degree of inconvenience, 
economically or socially, conservation is less acceptable.^ 
These data suggest that the use of public interest announce­
ments, public seminars and forums, energy saving slogans, 
"fireside chats" by the President, and so forth, have not 
proven to be effective ways of fostering major attitudinal 
changes with regard to the energy situation and the need.for 
conservation.
Education and exhortation are supported to a large 
degree by market incentives and disincentives. It is an 
established principle of economics that the price paid for 
a specified product should mirror what it costs to produce 
"one additional unit" or "replace" the product if the market 
is to insure efficient operation and allow maximum expres­
sion of consumer choice. This is called the marginal price 
or replacement cost. In an ideal market system producers
3Milstein, "How Consumers Feel About Energy," p. 5.
4William H. Cunningham and Sally Cook Lopreato, 
Energy Use and Conservation Incentives (New York: Praeger,
1977) , p. 67.
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would react to changing energy supply and demand conditions
and prevent problems, such as fuel shortages, from becoming
public policy issues. Stated differently;
If there were not enough petroleum to meet all
demand at current prices, there would be temporary
shortages that could lead to higher prices that in 
turn would (1) discourage some potential buyers and 
(2) encourage more potential producers.5
Price increases would follow until the fuel shortage was 
eliminated, at which time prices would stabilize. More 
importantly, if the market were operating ideally, the price 
system would adjust supply and demand before critical short­
ages develop. Thus, questions of energy supply and demand 
would be resolved by the decisions of private energy pro­
ducers and by consumers confronting higher fuel prices.
But it is clear that price systems in the real world 
are imperfect. There are numerous ways in which consumers 
receive and act on "bad" market signals, for example, when 
prices do not accurately reflect costs and benefits indi­
rectly involved in a decision ("externalities"), when there 
is a lack of competition in the production of a product, and 
when the product in question is an exhaustible resource.® 
Each of these possibilities has played an important part in 
determining the extent to which the United States is willing
®Gerard M. Brannon, Energy Taxes and Subsidies 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 3.
®For a discussion of these market defects, see 
David N. Hyman, The Economics of Governmental Activity (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 43-70.
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to rely on alternatives in this category to bring energy 
supply and demand into balance.
"Technological Fix"— to use Alvin Weinberg's term 
which refers to the possibility for circumventing social
•7problems by reducing them to technological problems — is a 
principal category of policy alternatives open to both the 
public and private sectors. As discussed in chapters IV and 
V, research, development, and demonstration (R,D&D) for con­
servation technologies is already well underway in the 
Departments of Energy, Commerce, Housing, and Urban Develop­
ment, and Transportation. Likewise, states, universities, 
and private sector organizations, such as the Electric Power 
Research Institute, American Gas Association, and the Ameri­
can Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning 
Engineers, are conducting R,D&D to identify significant areas 
for improvements in energy efficiency. These activities 
reflect the potential for applying a variety of technical 
fixes to the way energy is used in the economy, ranging from 
industrial research to identify and develop more efficient 
boilers, power generation, and manufacturing processes; to 
transportation investigations to develop more efficient 
automobile engines and designs; to research for improved 
light bulbs, insulation materials, and heating and air con­
ditioning systems.
^Alvin M. Weinberg, "Can Technology Replace Social 
Engineering? University of Chicago Magazine 59 (October 
1966): 6-10.
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It appears that without a major breakthrough in the 
next few years on the supply side of the energy system, and 
barring another severe crisis that might force the adoption 
of rationing or extreme mandatory conservation measures by 
government, improved and new conservation technologies in­
creasingly will be required to help balance supplies and
pdemands. But as noted in the introduction to this part, 
research by both the private and public sector has uncovered 
few potentially long-term technical fix solutions for energy 
end uses. And among those remedies which have been suggested 
over the past few years, most are not clearcut technological 
solutions that can be implemented without first removing 
related social and institutional bottlenecks.
Financial incentives and disincentives (e.g., using 
the tax system, subsidies, and various forms of financial 
assistance) can be and are being used to direct both pro­
ducers and consumers toward conservation objectives. Typi­
cally, alternatives within this category are based on the 
provision of some form of reward (money) offered to indi­
viduals, businesses, and states or other units of government 
for the purpose of initiating changes that might otherwise 
be unacceptable. Examples are subsidized fares for mass 
transit, financial aid for installing insulation in homes.
gThis also assumes no major changes in state-of- 
society assumptions regarding the public's behavior toward 
energy use and conservation.
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guaranteed loans for conservation investments, and grants 
to states and communities to develop voluntary conservation 
programs as specified in current legislation.
Stimulation of conservation through financial incen­
tives is favored by the Carter energy plan and legislation. 
Not surprisingly so, since studies sponsored by government 
energy agencies have consistently shown that money incen­
tives are more of an immediate motivation for conservation
Qthan exhortation and education, and are more politically 
acceptable than price increases.
The last category of policy alternatives is direct 
government regulation to require either the utilization of 
energy conserving technologies or to mandate specific con­
servation behaviors. Regulation alternatives have a well- 
established history with regard to energy supplies and • 
environmental impacts related to energy development, and 
have been used as well to control firms within monopolistic
Jeffrey S. Milstein, "Attitudes, Knowledge and 
Behavior of American Consumers Regarding Energy Conservation 
with Some Implications for Governmental Action," unpublished 
paper, October 1976. (Mimeographed)
^^Some kinds of financial incentives or disincentives 
may be construed as a type of price regulation and can there­
fore overlap with this category. However, the focus here 
is on alternatives which more directly regulate behavior. In 
other words, if one were to draw a continuum, price reulation 
would fall somewhere between incentives and behavior regula­
tion. See further, Keith E. Hamm, Ronald D. Hedlund, and 
Robert M. Stein, "Attitudes Toward Energy Conservation: 
Acceptance of Coercive Government Policies," paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science 
Association, Houston, Texas, April 12-15, 1978, p. 5.
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industries. However, attempts to regulate directly energy 
end uses (and users) to cause the efficient use of energy are 
more recent phenomena. The basic assumption underlying this 
form of policy intervention is recognition of the need to 
reduce unnecessarily wasteful technologies and practices that 
might continue given "bad" price signals from the market, or 
existing social and institutional barriers to innovation. 
Examples of such intervention are mandatory labeling require­
ments for appliances, efficiency standards for buildings, 
and gasoline economy performance standards for automobiles.
Assessment of Alternatives 
The five basic evaluation criteria identified and 
defined in chapter II will be used in this analysis. Defini­
tions and appropriate quantitative and qualitative measures 
of the criteria as they apply to energy conservation are pre­
sented in Table VI-2. As the table illustrates, applying 
these criteria raises both substantive and procedural ques­
tions. Although there is some obvious overlap among cri­
teria, questions about achieving objectives, costs, risks, 
and benefits and the distribution of costs, risks, and bene­
fits are primarily substantive, whereas questions about an 
alternative’s flexibility and implementability are primarily 
procedural. This overlap is appropriate, however, since the 




EVALUATION CRITERIA AND MEASURES FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION ALTERNATIVES
C r i t e r i a






-How much will demand be 
reduced or efficiency 
increased?
-Does the alternative avoid 
or mitigate conservation 
problems and issues?
-Is it a short-term or long­
term solution?
-Does the alternative foster 
both attitudinal compliance 
and diffuse public support?
Quantitative
-Estimate of energy savings-Duration of the solution
Qualitative
-Degree to which the option 
changes attitudes about 
conservation
-Degree to which problems 
and issues are avoided
-Effect on other national 
goals
Efficiency 
(costs, risks, and 
benefits)
-What are the economic costs 
and benefits of the alterna­
tive?
-What are the risks?





-Impact on federal revenues 
Qualitative
-Social costs (lifestyles, 
employment, standards of 
living)
-Environmental effects 




costs, risks, and 
benefits)
-What is the geographic 
distribution of costs, 
risks, and benefits, par­
ticularly among states and 
regions of the country?
-What is the distribution of 
costs, risks, and benefits 
across sectors, particu­
larly between the federal 
government and business/ 
industry, and among income 
groups?
Quantitative
-First costs to consumers
-Public investment as com­
pared to private funding
Qualitative
-States, regions which are 
benefited or deprived
-Degree to which groups 





-Does the alternative allow 
for different state and 
regional energy use 
characteristics?
-How well does.it accommo­
date social and sectorial 
differences?
-Can the alternative accom­
modate changes which might 
occur in energy consump­
tion demands and patterns 
over time?
Qualitative 
-Degree to which the 
option can be applied to 
different conditions 
-Adjustability of the 
alternative (adjustments 
to meet changing events 
and/or conditions)
Implementability 
(possibility of being 
approved)
-How difficult will it be to 
bring about required 
changes given established 
interests and existing 
institutions?
-What are the administrative 
costs?
-How strongly will partici­
pants respond?
-Are processes for making 
conservation choices 
pluralistic and open?
Quantitative-Dollar costs of adminis­
tration
Qualitative 
-Degree of consensus 




Ideally, a policymaker would like to have credible, 
reliable, and complete information for all of the measures 
specified in Table VI-2. Public policy choices are seldom 
so well-informed. And in many instances, rationality must 
ultimately yield to political bargaining and compromise. 
However, to the extent possible, the analysis of alterna­
tives seeks to answer the following questions. What are the 
costs, risks, and benefits of the selected alternatives?
How will the costs, risks, and benefits be distributed?
Is the alternative applicable and adaptable? Is it socially 
and politically feasible?
Coordinated Energy Conservation 
Planning and Management
Conflict over the roles and responsibilities of 
various participants, both public and private, and over 
access to policymaking processes is a consistent theme in 
the conservation issue system. This has been shown to be 
particularly evident regarding balancing federal and state 
interests within the Department of Energy’s state conserva­
tion program. The emerging federal role in causing end use 
energy efficiency, which now includes mandatory, inflexible 
measures to which states must adhere if they wish to receive 
financial assistance, has raised crucial questions about what 
the next step for energy conservation planning and management 
should be. For example, will state authority and responsi­
bility be completely pre-empted with states serving only as
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a means for implementing centrally-directed national goals; 
or, will states assume the key role they are currently demand­
ing in formulating future responses to conservation problems 
and issues. An evaluation of potential alternatives to deal 
with these questions rests essentially on examining the 
flexibility, implementability, and equity of different re­
sponses. This is due in part to the nature of the questions, 
but it is also because experience in coordinating energy 
demand management is limited.
As indicated in Table VI-3, better coordinated 
energy conservation planning and management includes the 
possibility for centralized federal coordination, regula­
tion, monitoring, and enforcement of national conservation 
goals. This alternative would be implemented by having the 
national government (primarily DOE) assume the lead role in 
conservation implementation. It is presumed that addi­
tional legislation would be needed to spell out specific 
conservation targets for states and economic sectors with 
appropriate regulatory measures and sanctions and penalties 
for noncompliance. Thus, this alternative requires a fur­
ther expansion of federal control and power at the expense 
of state power, much in the historical development pattern 
of air and water quality policies and programs in this 
country.
Charles 0. Jones refers to this pattern in air 
quality programs as "centrally-directed federalism." By 
this, Jones means that there has been a sharing of power
TABLE VI-3
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR COORDINATED 
ENERGY CONSERVATION PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Centrally-directed 
federal control
National legislation prescribing 
mandatory conservation targets 
for states and economic sectors 
with appropriate regulatory 
measures and sanctions and 
penalities for noncompliance
Further expansion of 
federal control and 





ities of state (and 
local) governments
Rely on legislative initiative 
at state-local level, with 
federal government sharing 
responsibility for meeting 
conservation goals through 
the provision of financial assistance and technical 
support
Requires strong state role 
in terms of administrative, 
technical, and financial 
initiative
Incrementally-improving the existing decentralized, 
fragmented system may 
require too long to imple­





multistate planning and 
management
Modify regional development 
commissions or establish new 
regional organizations to 
serve as forums for cooperative, 
coordinated conservation policy planning and administration
Long time frame for imple­
mentation
High risk because of 
innovation and adjustment 
requirements within the 
existing issue system
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A second alternative would be to build on the 
potential for initiative at the state-local level, with the 
federal government sharing responsibility for meeting con­
servation goals through the provision of financial assis­
tance and technical support. Existing state conservation 
agencies and program plans being developed under the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act would be utilized, or new state 
coordinating organizations established to pull together 
parties-at-interest and relevant state-local activities. 
This procedural alternative parallels closely the policy 
statements from states and representatives of state legis­
lative and governors' conferences— i.e., it recognizes 
state arguments that federal initiatives are often ineffec­
tive since they fail to account for differences in energy
12usage patterns among states. It also means changing cur­
rent federal practices so that state (and local) officials 
and interest groups can participate directly in making
which is directed if not dictated by the federal government. 
See Jones, "Federal-State-Local Sharing in Air Pollution 
Control," Publius 4 (Winter 1974): 70-73. Harvey Leiber
suggests that the federal government has similarly usurped 
state prerogatives in the water policy area. See Leiber, 
Federalism and Clean Waters (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath
and Co., 1975), p. 196. See also, Irvin L. White et al., 
Energy from the West: Policy Analysis Report (Washington,
D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, forthcoming),
especially chapters 5 and 6.
12See the discussion in chapter V.
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federal decisions that affect the values and interests of 
states and localities.
Because of the already substantial federal involve­
ment in energy conservation and energy policy, more generally, 
it is unlikely that a state system could deal effectively 
with the conservation problems and issues discussed earlier 
unless the federal government cooperates with the states, 
coordinating federal activities with state planning and 
program development. In this case, DOE, the Departments 
of Commerce, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Develop­
ment could serve as primary sources of research and develop­
ment information and technical support in substantive prob­
lem areas. In addition, the federal government might wish 
to consider the possibility of making financial support 
available to organized interests that wish to participate 
in conservation planning.
Finally, an intermediate alternative for conservation 
planning and management focuses on the possibility of insti­
tutionalizing a multistate approach to energy conservation 
problems and issues. Regional development commissions could 
be modified or new regional organizations established to 
serve as forums for cooperative, coordinated conservation 
policy planning and administration. For example, "Energy
13For elaboration of this point, see Western Gov­
ernors' Police Office, Balanced Growth and Economic Develop­
ment; A Western White Paper (Denver: Western Governors'
Policy Office, 1977), pp. 29-30.
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Conservation Districts," which take into account common 
energy use factors and characteristics (similarities in cli­
mate, urban and rural development, industrial and economic 
patterns), could be formed. These districts could also 
provide the structure for coordinating federal-state-local 
policymaking, advocating desirable regional conservation 
targets, and processing information and input from non­
governmental participants.
All three of the above alternatives address problems 
and issues discussed earlier concerning federal-state shar­
ing of conservation authority, as well as the need to provide 
forums in which all interested parties can be represented. 
Each option has its own costs and benefits. On the one hand, 
more pronounced national control within the issue system 
will compound already difficult questions of federal pre­
emption of states' rights to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the states' citizens. On the other hand, if 
policymakers choose to deal with administration and partici­
pation problems by relying on incrementally improving the 
existing decentralized, fragmented system, the time required 
to implement conservation goals becomes a significant con­
straint, as does the requirement for states to assume a 
stronger role in terms of financial, technical, and admin­
istrative initiative. And a regional or multistate approach 
to solving procedural problems will probably require an even 
longer time frame for implementation, with greater risk.
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since it represents a tremendous degree of innovation and 
adjustment within the existing system.
Education and Exhortation
Although administrative problems and issues about 
appropriate conservation institutions are important, public 
policy must ultimately come to grips with the adoption of 
substantive conservation ideas and innovations among the 
public. Broadly construed, this necessitates either indi­
rectly changing energy use through appeals for voluntary 
actions, or affecting energy efficiency directly by elimi­
nating certain products from the market or making ineffi­
cient devices and systems economically noncompetitive. 
Education and exhortation focus on the first kind of 
activity— i.e., alternatives in this category aim at targets 
of social change, employing what might be called "social 
fixes." The specific alternative considered below is the 
collection and dissemination of conservation information.
Social fixes with regard to information dissemina­
tion can be measures to change attidues (and behavior) and 
measures to increase public support for conservation as a 
national goal. Attitude change rests on the assumption 
that: "By altering one's attitudes toward the energy
shortage . . . individuals will engage in more energy conserv­
ing behavior, even though it may affect their lifestyle.
14Hamm, Hedlund, and Stein, "Attitudes Toward Energy
Conservation," p. 5.
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The complement to attitude change is to increase public 
support for the need to conserve energy. In this respect, 
appeals to individual and group "patriotism," "cultural 
loyalty," or "national security" form the basis for promot­
ing and encouraging conservation behavior. Saving energy 
is therefore defined as being a "collective good" and con­
servation behavior is purported to be in the best "public 
i n t e r e s t . I t  is assumed, in turn, that the ongoing 
reservoir of support for the political system can be tapped
to build public acceptance for unpopular policies, espe-
16cially during times of national crisis.
Currently, activities to increase voluntary actions
on the part of the public comprise a significant part of the
overall conservation effort. For example, President Carter
views conservation as an element within the "moral equivalent
of war" that needs to be waged to solve energy problems.
And, as a result, the Administration's National Energy Plan
depicts energy policy as patriotic, important to national
security (e.g., it will protect the nation from blackmail by
the foreign oil producing countries), and as potentially
17serving all Americans. Before Carter, Presidents Nixon
15Paul C. Stern and Eileen M. Kirkpatrick, "Energy 
Behavior," Environment 19 (December 1977); 13.
^^For elaboration, see David Easton and Jack Dennis, 
Children in the Political System (New York; McGraw-Hill, 
1969).
17Amitai Etzioni, "An Uneasy Policy in Energy,"
New York Times, January 2, 1977.
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and Ford urged the public to adopt a "conservation ethic."
In all three instances, the thrust of the appeal was to edu­
cate and exhort the public to support conservation volun­
tarily.
As shown in Table VI-4, three possible strategies 
for implementing the information collection and dissemination 
alternative are; (1) undertake a revitalized national cam­
paign (with DOE as the lead agency) aimed at specific pro­
ducts and well-defined groups to educate the public about 
energy economics; (2) require all fuel suppliers to inform 
customers of available residential and commercial conserva­
tion programs, how to obtain assistance and/or financing, 
materials, and labor to conduct conservation activities; 
and (3) establish formal energy conservation educational 
programs as components of secondary and higher education 
curricula.
The first strategy stems from findings presented in 
chapter V which suggest that the majority of barriers to 
voluntary conservation in the residential and commercial 
sector involve the dollar costs of conservation to the con­
sumer. In general, consumers have insufficient levels of 
information about the various products (appliances, tele­
visions, homes, autos) they purchase. Although existing 
labeling programs are increasing the flow of available in­
formation, many individuals often still lack the sophistica­
tion to deal with economic analyses such as those based on
TABLE VI-4
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR EDUCATION AND EXHORTATION
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Collection and 
dissemination of energy 
conservation information
Undertake a revitalized 
national conservation cam­
paign aimed at specific 
products and well-defined 
groups to educate the 
public with regard to 
energy economics
Effectiveness is uncertain
Cost-effectiveness has not 
been demonstrated
Require all fuel suppliers 
to inform customers of 
available residential and 
commercial conservation 
programs, how to obtain 
assitance and/or financ­
ing, materials, and labor 
to conduct conservation 
activities
Places the burden for con­
servation education on the 
private sector
Utilities may gain unfair 
advantage in conservation 
products market
Establish formal conserva­
tion educational programs 
as components of secondary 
and higher education 
curricula
Shifts the burden for con­





1 glifecycle cost.* An intensive national campaign supported 
by public revenues could be launched to demonstrate the 
potential dollar savings (and energy savings) available to 
individuals who make "off the shelf" technology investments.
The second strategy, like the first, links conserva­
tion information more directly to utilization. However, it 
is different in that it depends primarily on actions by 
utilities. Relying on fuel suppliers has certain obvious 
advantages over the strategy identified above. For example, 
utilities are more likely to be attuned to state/regional 
energy use characteristics and are more knowledgeable about 
the clientele they serve.
Finally, the educational curricula strategy is a 
more incremental, long-term response relying on early indi­
vidual and group development processes of learning and 
socialization to increase the legitimacy of both individual 
and public responses to energy shortages and conservation.
In a sense, this strategy parallels the course of action 
chosen for introducing the metric system in this country. 
That is, it depends principally on future generations to 
assimilate new ideas and expects little reaction from the 
present generation (even though information is made avail­
able to everyone).
18U.S., Department of Energy, "Barriers to Energy 
Conservation," unpublished paper, July 1976. (Mimeographed.) 
This report does not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, 
or policy of the Department of Energy.
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To assess the effectiveness of this information 
alternative and related implementing strategies, the policy­
maker would like to know the following: What is the proba­
bility that better information will be successful in causing 
individuals to change their consumption attitudes and 
behavior? How long will it take before the information 
results in reduced energy demand? By how much will demand 
be reduced? Are the changes permanent or short-term? In 
part, answers to these questions may be extrapolated from 
past experience.
In spite of efforts to raise public awareness about
the need to conserve energy, aggregate demand trends as
well as trends for the residential and commercial sector
19suggest that energy consumption is still increasing.
Available studies do indicate, however, that consumers have 
begun to make some adjustments in their energy usage pat­
terns. In fact, the public appears to have a better volun­
tary record than is often claimed. But analyses are needed 
which separate out the savings being achieved as a result of 
current price increases, government legislation and regula­
tion, and other factors, compared to voluntaristic responses.
19If one factors in the energy savings being captured 
in the industrial sector, and those savings resulting from 
increasing automobile efficiency, it can be argued that in 
comparison to its historical relation with the growth of the 
Gross National Product, energy consumption has slowed. But 
this measure of consumption ignores the more basic question 
of potential savings versus what is actually being saved.
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In many cases, the conservation behavior which has 
been adopted represents the easiest steps available which 
have only minimal impact on overall energy demand. For 
example, in a study of one state, 90 percent of the families 
contacted said they were making some effort to save energy. 
With the exception of retrofit activities, which can save 
substantial amounts of energy, activities most often iden­
tified were minor. Few people had purchased more efficient 
autos, increased their use of mass transit, or joined an 
energy saving carpool. Most were using electrical appli­
ances less, turning down thermostats, and turning off 
20lights. A national poll conducted in the same year shows 
similar results. Only two percent of the individuals con­
tacted said they were using public transportation, five per­
cent were participating in carpbols, and seven percent indi-
21cated they had insulated their homes. This is especially 
instructive since much of the effort (primarily by govern­
ment) over the last few years has been oriented towards 
educating the public regarding the benefits of carpooling 
and insulation.
20Ronald D. Hedlund, Keith E. Hamm, and Robert M. 
Stein, "Public Attitudes Toward Energy and Its Conservation; 
A Statewide Survey of Public Opinion" (Milwaukee;
Urban Research Center, University of Wisconsin— Milwaukee,
1977), pp. 31, 40, and 48.
21George Gallup, "Approval of Carter on Energy 
Wanes," Denver Post, September 9, 1977.
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More importantly, in some cases actual behavior has
been found to fall far behind reported behavior. Surveys
undertaken during the winter natural gas shortage in 1976
revealed that people were not always doing what they said;
At that time President Carter asked the people to 
set their daytime temperature at 65°F and night­
time temperature at 55°F. When polled by telephone, 
people said they were keeping their homes at 66°F 
during the day and 64°F at night. However, when 
pollsters went to homes carrying their own thermo­
meters, they found that the average temperatures 
were 70°(plus or minus) 2°F during the day and 
69° (plus or minus) 2°F at night.^2
This is not to deny the fact that there are some positive 
features reflected in these data. Instead, the intent is 
to suggest that any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness 
of alternatives in this category must take into account the 
divergence between attitudes and behavior. It does appear 
that a base exists upon which the effectiveness of conserva­
tion information collection and dissemination can be im­
proved. All three strategies defined earlier seek to 
strengthen communications by identifying more precisely the 
target audiences and then linking education and exhortation 
directly to measures to bring about utilization.
Evaluating the efficiency (costs, risks, and bene­
fits) of this alternative is more problematic. It is pecu­
liar that government agencies and private businesses and 
industries over the past five years have invested in
22Milstein, "How Consumers Feel About Energy," as 
cited in Abelson, "Public Opinion and Energy Use," p. 1325.
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conservation "advertising," but no comprehensive study can
be identified which analyzes the results (e.g., in cost-
effectiveness terras) of such information campaigns. This
may be explained in part by the belief that efficiency, in
its typical economic meaning, is not the major concern in
designing education programs. In other words, government
may be willing to make noneconomical short-term tradeoffs
23to reduce total energy demand. Of course, this would not 
necessarily be the case for the strategy which would rely on 
utilities to pass information on to their customers.
An estimate of the potential public investment 
required to implement this alternative can be obtained by 
considering a recent advertising campaign sponsored by ERDA 
in Denver, Colorado.This 10-week intensive campaign 
attempted to encourage residents in the area to consider 
life-cycle costs along with product costs. Television and 
radio advertising identified the long-range savings to be 
gained from the use of insulation and storm windows, for 
example. This was to be followed with tie-in advertising 
by local area merchants. The campaign cost ERDA $175,000. 
Thus, if similar projects were simultaneously conducted in 
the two largest cities in each state, the total expenditure
23Department of Energy, "Barriers to Energy Conser­
vation," p. AI-2.
"Marketing Observer," Business Week, October 17, 
1977, p. 152.
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would be $17-$18 million. Based on the total requests for
energy programs for 1979, this would represent only about
two percent of the budget.
If this program were to result in the retrofitting
of residences, the national savings in energy (and the per
capita dollar savings) could be substantial. For example,
six inches of attic insulation, which most homeowners could
install themselves, would cost about $200 in an average home
(1,600 square feet of floor space). This investment could
be paid back in approximately two years in a mild climate
area, such as Atlanta, Georgia; three years in a moderate
climate area, such as New York City; and five years in a
25cold climate, such as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.
And if one-third of the nation's homeowners undertook a
complete retrofitting, including not only attic insulation
but also storm doors and windows, and caulking and weather-
stripping for doors and windows, the energy equivalent of
2S0.5 quadrillion Btu's per year could be saved.
Several observations can be made concerning the 
potential distribution of costs and benefits and implement- 
ability of this alternative. First, the costs of informa­
tion collection and dissemination are extremely variable, 
depending on the target, the media, and techniques used to
25John M. Fowler, "Energy Conservation, Homes and 
Buildings" (Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Department of Energy- 
Technical Information Cneter, 1977), p. 2.
^^Ibid.
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reach the target audience. Secondly, because the benefit of 
of such programs accrue to society-at-large, the public 
investment required to conduct a national awareness campaign 
or to implement an education curricula should pose few prob­
lems of acceptability. Implementing the requirement that 
fuel suppliers inform customers of conservation measures, 
however, places a large share of the education and economic 
burden on the private sector. It will also require changes 
in the traditional relationship between utilities and cus­
tomers, and in utility policies (e.g., promotional pricing 
27policies). In addition, the utility company's conserva­
tion activities would have to be a part of the companies' 
total operations which raises issues concerning who would 
bear the cost for the added services. These costs would 
likely be passed on to consumers in the form of higher energy 
bills. Finally, the impacts of a massive utility program on 
small businesses (e.g., those businesses that presently sell 
conservation services) would have to be evaluated to deter­
mine the potential for conflicts of interest and unfair 
competition.
The results of this assessment of the information 
alternative can be summarized as follows. The evaluation 
confirms the high level of uncertainty associated with the 
effectiveness of education and exhortation as an approach
27U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Analysis of the Proposed National Energy Plan (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 124.
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to conservation, especially in the short- to mid-term. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the potential success 
of strategies for this alternative are dependent upon how 
well target groups are identified and to what degree first- 
costs of energy conservation technologies can be shown to be 
recoverable. The alternative requires a minimum of govern­
ment intervention into consumer decisions and is adaptable 
to changing energy needs and technologies. Although this 
assessment is limited in several instances, the limitation 
itself is a significant finding. A part of the prevailing 
debate over conservation policies and strategies is stated 
in terms of voluntary conservation versus mandatory and 
coercive initiatives. It is no small matter that there is 
a paucity of information available to clearly evaluate the 
economic costs and benefits of education alternatives.
Market Incentives and 
Disincentives
Government has been in the business of regulating
energy markets for several decades. As a result, energy
prices in this country are controlled for oil, gas, and
electricity (by both national policy and private sector 
28action). Price controls have been used to protect sup­
pliers and consumers either by raising or lowering domestic 
energy prices, depending on the availability of supplies.
28In contrast, coal costs are still set by the 
unrestrained interplay of market supply and demand.
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•This intervention and the resultant disparity among fuel
costs have led to theuargument that government policies
actually create barriers to economically rational prices
that might induce conservation investments and behavior.
That is, because full replacement costs are not charged
prices are artifically low and therefore encourage overcon- 
29sumption.
For example, regulated rates for electric utilities 
are based on "average production costs" rather than on the 
incremental cost of adding new electricity generating capa­
city. It is argued by some that average-cost pricing has 
"created a continuous bias toward over investment in new 
f a c i l i t i e s . I n  turn, electricity demand has been higher 
than it might have been because paying the "average" cost of 
a unit of electricity is more economically attractive than 
investing in conservation that could eliminate the require­
ment for that unit of energy. Oil and natural gas policies 
are said to parallel this situation. Past policies have 
relied on price ceilings which are construed by some to be 
below replacement costs, once again discouraging conservation 
by shielding consumers from the full cost of the fuel.
29Herman Kahn, "A Review of a Time to Choose," in 
No Time to Confuse, ed. Institute for Contemporary Studies 
(San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1975),
p. 143.
^^Office of Technology Assessment, Analysis of the 
Proposed National Energy Plan, p. 85.
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These barriers to conservation are further exacerbated 
by utility rate structures, such as average cost pricing and 
declining block rates, which reward the most energy consump­
tive consumers by charging less. In other words, those who 
use the least amount of fuel or electricity commonly pay the 
highest per unit price.
Likewise, existing price controls are said to inhibit
the profits necessary for energy companies to assume new
investment risks and increase domestic exploration for 
31supplies. And it is also argued that policies which main­
tain the price of fuels below replacement costs inhibit the 
introduction of alternative energy technologies (e.g., solar 
and synthetic fuels) which, though not competitive at cur­
rent prices, might compete with existing fuels if replace-
32ment cost pricing were applied.
In general, to resolve these difficulties it is sug­
gested by some industry leaders, oil companies, economists, 
and policymakers that the U.S. should return to a "free 
market economy" by deregulating energy prices and relying on 
evolving market conditions to adjust consumer and producer 
behavior.
^^See Stan Benjamin, "Oil Companies Say Income Too 
Low," Norman Transcript, January 12, 1978.
32Office of Technology Assessment, Analysis of the 
Proposed National Energy Plan, p. 84.
33For a discussion of this alternative, see American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, "U.S. Energy 
Policy; Which Direction?" (Washington, D.C.: American
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Two strategies, shown in Table VI-5, for implementing 
this alternative are currently under consideration by the 
Congress. The first would move towards replacement cost 
pricing by immediate and complete deregulation of domestic 
oil and natural gas prices with prices to be determined by 
the interplay of supply and demand (in essence, the world 
price of oil); and, the second calls for a phased or gradual 
decontrol of energy prices with intervention in the form of 
price ceilings and tax measures. The long-term goal of both 
is basically the same— to correct the artifically low prices 
of energy— and both require modification of current legisla­
tion and regulatory practices for fuels and electricity. 
Critical outcome differences are related to the timing, or 
rate of adjustment towards market conditions, and the degree 
of government intervention to protect consumers confronting 
higher fuel prices.
Immediate and complete deregulation would allow 
energy prices to be determined by the OPEC oil price levels. 
It is expected that this strategy would result in higher 
revenues to energy producers and higher prices to consumers. 
The accompanying demand expectation is that consumption 
would effectively be reduced. However, the results of econ­
ometric analyses to predict the demand changes following from 
higher fuel prices, as well as the lag time involved, are
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, AEI Forums 
Roundtable, June 27, 1977), p. 4.
TABLE VI-5
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR MARKET INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Price energy on the basis 
of its "replacement" cost
Complete deregulation of 
domestic oil and natural 
gas prices with price to 
be determined by interplay 
of supply and demand
Uncertain consumer response
Potential equity problems 
of a move to free market
Phased decontrol of 
energy prices Tradeoff between short-term economic considerations and 
long-term energy policy 
goals
Creates potential for with­
holding reserves rather 





m i x e d . A n d  the impacts of higher prices on industry profits 
and capital financing requirements to increase production are 
equally uncertain, raising issues of potential "windfall pro­
fit" and related equity questions. As noted by one source:
[01ur whole historical experience has been one of 
low or declining real energy prices. We must there­
fore depend on rather abstract statistical analyses 
to tell us what might be energy users’ response to 
rising prices. The tentative message spelled out by 
a number of such studies (particularly in electric 
power consumption) is that over the long term prices 
might indeed constitute a demand-restraining influ­
ence, though one about which we cannot at the present
time speak with a great deal of certainty or
authority.35
Thus, immediate price escalation would have to be imposed
without a clear understanding of the magnitude of effects.
34For example, the short-term "elasticity" (the 
ratio of percentage change in consumption to percentage 
change in price) for petroleum has been estimated at approx­
imately -0.15. This means a 50 percent price increase 
would be needed to achieve a corresponding reduction of only 
7.5 percent in consumption. And the lag time for price 
responses in electricity demand, for example, has been 
estimated at 8 years for 90 percent of the response to 
take place. Paul P. Craig, Joel Darmstadter, and Stephen 
Rattien, "Social and Institutional Factors in Energy Con­
servation," in Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 1, ed. Jack M. 
Hollander (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Review, Inc., 1976),
p. 547. Another study found that the effects of markedly 
higher fossil fuel prices, when translated into higher 
electricity prices, are likely to be small and will not 
impact demand until after a "substantial period."
However, effects would be seen in utility moves to sub­
stitute lower priced fuels. See James M. Griffin, "The 
Effects of Higher Prices on Electricity Consumption,"
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 
(Autumn 1974): 515-539.
35Joel Darmstadter, "Limiting the Demand for Energy: 
Possible? Probable?" Environmental Affairs 2 (Spring 1973): 
728.
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This uncertainty, further evidenced in current 
legislative debate over price controls and taxes, has con­
fused both policymakers and the public. Lacking convincing 
proof either for or against markedly higher prices, there 
has been no direct move to end immediately price controls on 
oil and gas. Although divided, congressional opinion seems 
to favor gradual transition to replacement cost pricing, 
using government regulation and the tax system to mitigate 
adverse distributional impacts.
Implementing phased decontrol allows the use of the 
economic efficiency criterion for making many energy use 
decisions, but protects consumers and certain regions of the 
country from sharp and inequitable price increases. By 
decontrolling some, but not all, domestic crude oil produc­
tion, prices could gradually rise to world prices. Taxes, 
rebates, and price ceilings would be used to protect the 
economy from potential inflationary and unemployment conse­
quences. For natural gas, price ceilings would also be main­
tained for a specified period. Tariff adjustments and rate 
restructuring to cause electric utility pricing practices to 
reflect more accurately the cost of services would be re­
quired. However, due to the unique regional characteristics 
of electricity demand, implementation of new rate structures 
would be more adoptable and flexible if accomplished locally
36Steven Rattner, Energy; Where Did the Crisis Go?" 
New York Times, April 16, 1978.
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or regionally through appropriate legislation (with the
37exception of those utilities under DOE control).
Phased decontrol includes many of the same costs 
identified for immediate decontrol— i.e., potential windfall 
profits, equity problems, and uncertainty in information. 
Moreover, this strategy requires continued government inter­
vention (for better or worse) into market mechanisms for 
some time. Increasingly, this intervention is being chal­
lenged by the private sector.
A final consideration brings the discussion back to 
the effectiveness of the replacement cost pricing alterna­
tive. • Some consumer groups, such as Energy Action, argue
38that energy prices are already too high. Here again the 
information is mixed, but this type of argument raises the 
following questions for policymakers : Will further price
increases result in additional energy savings if prices are 
perceived by some as already high? Or, do present consump­
tion levels represent the "best" response price can induce 
alone? If not, how high must prices go before unchecked 
market mechanisms are no longer acceptable to the public?
. In this same vein, another view holds that if all 
the externalities associated with energy resource
37Laurence H. Martin, "The Role of Government in 
Causing Energy End Use Efficiency'— An Overview, in Energy 
Use Management, Vol. II, eds. Rocco A. Fazzolare and 
Craig B. Smith (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 488.
38Benjamin, "Oil Companies Say Income Too Low."
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development and use (e.g., environmental damage and depletion
of the store of resources available for future generations)
were factored into energy costs, then replacement-cost prices
39would themselves be too low. Advocates of this position 
suggest that "permanent replacement costs," which include 
the impacts of such externalities, should be the long-term 
goal for pricing policies in this country. If this becomes 
the criterion, energy prices would be based on the require­
ments for providing energy obtained from a renewable and 
environmentally benign source, such as the sun, and would 
rise to even higher levels.
• In sum, this assessment has dealt principally with 
the effectiveness and equity outcomes of pricing energy on 
the basis of its replacement costs. Both immediate decon­
trol and gradual decontrol of energy prices may result in an 
unacceptable distribution of costs and benefits. Moreover, 
the magnitude of these impacts are largely unknown because 
of inexperience in predicting the demand-restraining effects 
of higher fuel prices and the lack of consensus as to how 
high prices should be allowed to rise. Based on these find­
ings, it can be concluded that alternatives which rely on 
price as the primary tool to accomplish energy conservation 
seem somewhat misdirected. However, it is equally apparent 
that energy prices are going to increase, moving towards
39Office of Technology Assessment, Analysis of the 
Proposed National Energy Plan, p. 87.
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replacement-cost levels, and for the present, these levels 
are not going to be the result of either direct private 
involvement or straightforward public policymaking.
Technical Fix
Compared to social fixes which seek primarily to 
change attitudes about energy use, or reliance on prices to 
adjust demands, technical fixes aim at developing and intro­
ducing into the market "off the shelf" (existing) and new 
energy conserving technologies. Alternatives in the cate­
gory can be further divided into two distinct types: first,
those which directly save energy at the point of end use 
(e.g., in buildings, motor vehicles, and industrial 
machinery); and second, those which save energy indirectly 
as aresuit of improved energy production and conversion 
(e.g., more efficient technologies to convert fossil fuels 
to electricity).
Because technical fix alternatives for conservation 
cover such a broad spectrum, the evaluation here focuses 
only on the development and commercialization of technologi­
cal opportunities for energy end uses. The assessment is 
further limited in that it broadly delineates the costs, 
risks, and benefits of choosing technical fix options as a 
path to achieve conservation results. In part, this last 
limitation reflects the current state of the art and the 
available evaluative information concerning existing
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conservation research,development/ and demonstration (R,D&D) 
activities.
As shown in Table VI-6, two specific alternatives 
and implementing strategies have been identified. These are: 
(1) promote R,D&D of conservation end use technologies 
through increased federal funding; and (2) expedite commer­
cialization of new or potential energy saving technologies 
by increasing joint public-private sector ventures.
Both alternatives attempt to mitigate the major con­
servation R/D&D problems and issues identified in the intro­
duction to this part of the research. By increasing public 
investments for end use conservation research, it may be 
possible to motivate the scientific research community to 
engage in the search for longer-term efficiency improvements 
in energy products and processes. This alternative is fur­
ther emphasized since conservation expenditures and programs 
have to date exhibited a marked preoccupation with "off the 
shelf" and relatively well-known techniques— i.e., technolo­
gies which require reapplication or redevelopment rather 
than invention or theoretical research and development.
The second alternative and related implementing 
strategy is underpinned by the assumption that substantive
40For example, a recent evaluation of federal conser­
vation activities, conducted by the General Accounting Office, 
did not include R,D&D for conservation in its review. See 
U.S., General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress, The 
Federal Government Should Establish and Meet Energy Conserva- 
tion Goals (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1978).
TABLE VI-6
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR TECHNICAL FIX
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Promote research, devel­
opment, and demonstration 
of conservation tech­
nologies
Increase federal (DOE) 
funding of energy end use 
conservation R,D&D
Provide incentives for 
expanded private sector 
conservation R,D&D
Uncertainty with regard to 
the potential for iden-' 
tifying new, significant 
technical fixes
Expedite commercializa­
tion of new or potential 
energy saving technolo­
gies
More effectively link gov­
ernment conservation 
R,D&D to commercialization
Increase subsidies for 
joint public-private 
sector ventures
Appropriate federal role 
in development and com­





programs for conservation need to be built around 
technologies as well as social fixes. In other words, once 
proven, conservation technologies can be used in conjunc­
tion with other policy alternatives. For example, efficient 
items can be required as a part of federal-state-local pur­
chasing and procurement policies, or regulations established 
to force inefficient items out of the market. For this to 
occur, however, conservation technologies must reach commer­
cialization and be competitive with their counterparts.
One strategy for removing barriers to marketability 
is for the public and private sectors to share the initial 
risk. Actions can range from government removing barriers 
to private sector development and commercialization to gov­
ernment providing subsidies, or other incentives, for pro­
ducers until enough product demand is created to achieve 
necessary economies of scale. The basic point that needs to 
be made here is that the private sector is best suited to 
demonstrate and market existing and new technologies, but 
may not do so unless additional guarantees and supports are 
provided.
Thus, both technical fix alternatives considered 
here require increased public and private sector investment 
in conservation R,D&D and commercialization programs. 
Although the first option requires no new legislation on the 
federal side, initiatives could be implemented to encourage 
expanded private sector research and development. For
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example, electric utilities could be encouraged to continue 
(and increase) funding of R,D&D activities in the energy use 
area. In this case, state regulatory bodies and DOE could 
stipulate that funding for private research be incorporated 
into the rate base and/or expenses for determining elec­
tricity rate levels.Legislation might also provide that 
research expenditures be considered as fully tax deductible 
and not construed as "promotional" expenditures.
Likewise, commercialization needs to be bolstered 
for both existing and new conservation technologies. Cur­
rently DOE expects those products with low risk to be intro­
duced by the private sector based on an evaluation of normal 
market and profit potential. Public revenues (DOE appropria­
tions) axe to be utilized essentially for more risky techno1-
Iogies. More importantly, as presently conceived, commercial­
ization programs within the federal government are overly 
focused on the need to support new, high risk energy supply 
techniques such as synthetic fuels and solar. Subsidies, 
other incentives, and increased joint public-private ventures 
are needed to tie the two approaches together because new 
supply technologies cannot be considered apart from their 
end use applications.
To evaluate these alternatives properly requires 
impact analyses of existing R,D&D efforts, specification of
41Rate base treatment of R,D&D expenditures is 
presently on a case-by-case basis.
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long-term projects, conservation technologies by sector, 
research plans, plans for demonstration and commercializa­
tion both inside and outside government— including manpower 
requirements, effects on capital availability, and related 
kinds of information. Such analyses must be left to subse­
quent research, especially until that time when DOE more 
precisely defines the role that government is to assume in 
conservation development and commercialization. For the 
purposes of this study, however, several evaluative conclu­
sions about the alternatives can be drawn based upon knowl­
edge of technical fixes more generally.
It is widely accepted that in terms of their effec­
tiveness, new technologies typically lead to a permanent
42reduction in energy use. Once introduced on a competitive, 
commercial scale, energy efficient technologies and processes 
have long-lasting, demand-restraining effects. This contrasts 
with non-market, behaviorally-oriented alternatives which may
have few lasting impacts once the inducement or incentive is
43removed. In addition, increasing the efficiency with which 
energy is used by improving products and processes can result 
in reduced demand with few major inconveniences or lifestyle 
changes. This does not mean technical conservation solutions 
do not require social modifications and adaptations; rather
42U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Energy 
Policy Alternatives (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing 
Office, 1977), p. 32.
43See the discussion below of financial incentives 
and disincentives.
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the key consideration is the degree of inconvenience. The 
inconvenience of driving smaller, more efficient autos the 
same distance with less fuel is not as great as reducing 
the number of miles travelled by direct intervention in the 
form of rationing or curtailment.
Some of the savings from technological improvements 
can be gained from widespread application of existing tech­
niques and products. Table VI-7 identifies the potential 
savings which might be captured for the residential and com­
mercial sector if seven currently existing technologies or 
technical concepts were adopted by the public. As illus­
trated in the table, if beginning in 1975 these improvements 
had fully penetrated the market, by 1980 energy savings 
would be approaching four and one-half quadrillion Btu's 
per year. Similarly, as depicted in Table VI-8, industrial 
sector savings from six existing technologies and related 
applications of conservation concepts could approach 12 
quadrillion Btu's per year by 1980.
Although a number of the technologies identified in 
Table VI-8 have been adopted by industry, most of those 
identified for the residential and commercial sector remain 
as potential savings. One exception is the use of heat 
pumps. In 1975, 46 percent of the new homes in the U.S. 
were electrically heated— of which 50 percent utilized heat 
pumps. According to a recent General Accounting Office 
study, this space conditioning technology has increased its
TABLE VI-7
POTENTIAL ENERGY SAVINGS FROM SELECTED CONSERVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Technology or Concept Target Use Scope Savings/Year
Electric ignition systems 
to replace gas pilot 
lights




All residential gas 
appliances in use in 
1980
.070
Electric heat pumps in 
electrically heated homes 
and businesses
Space heating All electrically heated 
residential/commercial 
buildings built after 
1975
.900
Improvements in heating, 
ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) in 
commercial buildings
Space heating and 
air conditioning
All commercial buildings 
in 1980 1.840
Use of automated controls to provide automatic night­
time and independent room 
temperature control
Space heating and air conditioning All homes in 1980 built after 1975 .220
Employ solar energy for 
use in residential/ 
commercial buildings
Space heating, air 
conditioning, hot water heating
5% of residential/ 






Technology of Concept Target Use Scope Savings/Year
Energy conserving 
building design and 
materials concepts
Space heating and 
air conditioning
All residential build­
ings build after 1975
.060
More efficient air 
conditioning equipment 
for room air conditioners 
and central air condi­
tioning systems
Air conditioning All air conditioning 




SOURCE: Braddock, Dunn and McDonald, Inc., First Interim Technical Status
Report, Study of Alternative Strategies and Methods of Conserving Energy (Vienna,Va.: 





POTENTIAL ENERGY SAVINGS FROM SELECTED CONSERVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Technology 




Insulation of skid 
rails in heat treating 
furnaces
Direct heat applica­tions 50% of heat treating furnaces in metals fab­
rication in steel 
industry in 1980
.070
Use of recuperators to 
preheat incoming com­
bustion air using the 
heat of flue gases
Direct heat applica­
tions and process 
steam
All direct heat and 
process steam in indus­
try in 1980 7.50
On-line computer con­
trol of combusion 
equipment
Process steam and 
direct heat All purpose steam and direct heat applica­
tions in 1980
1.30
Burn municipal and 
industrial wastes as 
fuel for electric 
power generation
All electric power 






Process steam All process steam uses 
in industry in 1980 1.550
Improve efficiency of 
systems for direct 
heat applications
Direct heat 




SOURCE: Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald, Inc., First Interim Technical Status
Report, Study of Alternative Strategies and Methods oF~Conserving Energy (Vienna, Va. 
Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald, Inc., 1974), pp. L-1 to L-8.
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share of total home heating and cooling sales from 6.5 percent
44in 1974 to about 15 percent in 1976. These data are them­
selves significant, but the more important consideration is 
the reason for the growing acceptance of heat pumps. A large 
part of this acceptance appears due to recent R,D&D and com­
mercialization work to increase both the reliability and 
economic position of heat pumps. In contrast, where conser­
vation technologies have not been applied, the barriers
usually cited are the lack of documentation of energy savings
45and payback periods, or excessive payback periods.
Technical fixes as a category exhibit certain other 
advantages, especially with regard to national policy goals. 
First, reduced consumption typically means less environmental 
pollution. Table VI-9 shows that a $1 million investment in 
any of three technologies could result in substantial reduc­
tion of pollutant emissions per day. Similar benefits can 
be gained from engineering improvements, weight reductions, 
and switching to light-weight diesel and certain stratified 
charge engines for motor v e h i c l e s . T h e  extent of
^^General Accounting Office, Federal Government Shou 
Should Establish and Meet Energy Conservation Goals, p. 60.
^^For buildings, most managers or homeowners will 
not make capital investments unless they can be recovered 
within three years. Ibid., p. 66.
46John Davidson et al., "Energy Needs for Pollu­
tion Control," in The Energy Conservation Papers, ed.
Robert H. Williams (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publish­
ing Co., 1975), pp. 312-316.
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TABLE VI-9
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF END USE CONSERVATION 






At end use sites:
Particulates 153
Sulfur dioxide 6
Nitrogen oxide 50 6,000
Carbon monoxide 44 170
Hydrocarbons 48 10
At production sites:
Particulates 16 8 25
Sulfur dioxide 330 20 610
Nitrogen oxide 230 78 240
Carbon monoxide 13 3 13
Hydrocarbons 4 46 4
Land disruption 1 acre/ 1 acre/ 47 acres/
day day . day
SOURCE: U.S., Council on Environmental Quality,
Environment and Conservation in Energy Research and Develop­
ment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976),
p. 47.
‘̂ Emissions associated with coal-synthetic fuels pro­
duction and use which could be avoided by an application of 
$1 million worth of each kind of more efficient end use 
device specified in table.
^The annual cycle energy system (ACES) uses a heat 
pump to transfer heat from an insulated water tank to a resi­
dence in the winter. As the heat if withdrawn, the water 
freezes. In the summer, the heat pump is reversed and the 
ice is thawed to provide air conditioning. The system is 
being developed by DOE and is expected to reduce the amount 
of energy used in electric heating and air conditioning by 
approximately 50 percent.
^The Stirling cycle automobile engine uses external 
heat to drive an internal working fluid. Since combustion 
occurs externally, as opposed to existing internal combustion 
engines, emissions could be controlled more easily. An ad­
vanced Stirling cycle engine may reduce fuel use by about 
20 or 30 percent, depending on auto size, design, and use.
^Heat recuperators utilize the wasted heat that indus­
trial furnaces release into the atmosphere. Recuperators 
are expected to reduce fuel use by as much as 80 percent.
293
environmental benefits gained varies, of course, with each 
technology, but the advantage holds generally whenever end 
use consumption is reduced.
Secondly, a more efficient stock of technical goods 
and services means reduced oil imports, a major objective 
within the scope of national energy policy alternatives.
The benefits of reduced consumption, less environ­
mental pollution, and enhanced national security accrue to 
individuals and to society-at-large. At the same time, 
however, the reapplication of existing technologies or the 
purchase of new conserving products means increased first- 
costs to consumers. Some low-income groups could be effec­
tively cut off from enjoying the benefits of these tech­
nologies, and some technologies may be more applicable to 
certain regions of the country than others. For example, 
the increased public investment in solar heating and cooling 
may not provide returns for cold climate regions until much 
more efficient devices are developed. As will be discussed 
elsewhere, these costs and distributional impacts of new 
technologies can be "softened" through the use of a range 
of financial incentives and direct aid.
The efficiency outcomes of increasing public 
revenues for conservation development and commercialization 
are not as well understood as the effectiveness and distri­
bution of technical fix effects. Taking a technological 
view of conservation, or for that matter any other aspect of
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energy policy,may result in overinvestment in R,DSD at the
expense of other national needs. How much of the energy
research budget should go for conservation was shown in the
preceding chapters to be a controversial issue. Lacking a
policy for quickly redeploying research programs in crisis
situations, government efforts to commit public revenues to
conservation have taken place incrementally.^^ Research
programs were initially small scale, diffuse in character,
and largely non-developmental. The inertia that built up
around early "off the shelf" programs has contineud to
inhibit the capability of conservation researchers and
agencies to "think b i g . F o r  example, even though federal
allocations for conservation have grown from an estimated
49$39 million in 1974, to a DOE request for $386 million for 
1979,^^ comparison of these figures with the overall energy
47For a discussion of the difficulties in making 
R/D&D shifts as new priorities arise, see W. Henry Lambright, 
Governing Science and Technology (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 19'7é), pp. 163-181.
^®As head of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), 
Alvin Weinberg's criteria for new ORNL projects were that 
they be "big, expensive, strongly in the national interest 
. . . and not ready for commercial exploitation." Alvin 
Weinberg, "Problem of Missions," speech before the Institute 
for Scientists in Research and Development Laboratories,
March 20, 1961. As cited in Lambright, Governing Science 
and Technology, p. 176.
49U.S., Federal Council for Science and Technology, 
Report on the Federal RSD Program FY 1976 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 100.
^^Willis H. Shapley and Don I. Phillips, Research & 
Development AAAS Report III, R&D in the Federal Budget:
FY 1979, R&D, Industry, & the Economy (Washington, D.C.; 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1978), 
p. 96.
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budget is more instructive. Whereas the 1979 request for 
conservation represents only eight percent of the almost 
five billion dollar R,D&D budget within DOE, energy supply 
research and technology development claims over half, and 
nuclear energy almost one-fourth of the total request.
As important as the question of how these funds are 
being distributed is whether or not choosing an alternative 
and strategy to increase public investment in end use R,D&D 
could provide sufficient returns to warrant the investment. 
Experience to date suggests that conservation may be absorb­
ing all of the money it could possibly expend at this time.^^ 
In part, this is based on the inability to identify substan­
tive proposals for basic research. Thus, a larger program 
for conservation development and commercialization could 
pose a high degree of capital risk. On the other hand, the 
widespread use of new technologies offers the potential for 
significant energy savings, especially in the long-term.
Finally, one of the most important benefits asso­
ciated with alternatives in this category is the degree to 
which increased energy system efficiency preserves options 
for the future. Conservation technologies buy time for the
U.S., Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, ERDA Long-Range Plan and Program, Hearings (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 78-
81. It could be argued that although the risks may be high, 
they are probably no greater than those being taken on the 
supply side of the energy system (e.g., in the cases of 
synthetic fuels, nuclear fusion, and solar).
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5?development of new supplies. “ The long lead times now 
needed to bring most new supplies on line make technical 
fixes to reduce consumption more attractive.
To summarize briefly, technical fix alternatives 
once adopted provide for permanent reductions in energy use 
and result in fewer major lifestyle changes than other policy 
actions described thus far. Reduced demand in turn is 
advantageous with regard to national environmental and energy 
policy goals. Thus, the benefits stemming from increased 
R,D&D and commercialization appear to outweigh the costs.
The alternatives described here attempt to distribute the 
costs, risks , and benefits across both the federal govern­
ment and private sectors. However, the potential cost- 
effectiveness of increased public investments for conserva­
tion has yet to be demonstrated. It could be argued that for 
this category of alternatives, economic costs are not neces­
sarily the "best" criterion for evaluating choices given the 
uncertainty on the supply side of the energy system and the 
need to increase the acceptance of conservation technologies.
Financial Incentives and 
Disincentives
As discussed in chapter V, actions taken by Congress 
and government energy agencies have already resulted in wide 
ranging programs using financial assistance measures to
52U.S., Council on Environmental Quality, Environment 
and Conservation in Energy Research and Development (Wash- 
Ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 21.
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encourage conservation. As a result, the focus here will 
be on other specific alternatives within this category which 
might be implemented in conjunction with financial aid incen­
tives.
As shown in Table VI-10, alternatives may directly 
intervene in the market by utilizing taxes to adjust fuel or 
product prices. In opposition to tax incentives, imposed 
measures may serve as a disincentive or penalty for specific 
fuel uses. Or, the disincentive could be of a more general 
nature, such as a Btu-tax on all nonrenewable resources. 
Likewise, funds that are made available to states or locali­
ties can be withheld to encourage the adoption of specific 
conservation activities, as in the case of federal legisla­
tion which would have denied Highway Trust Fund revenues to 
states that did not choose to enact the 55 mph speed limit.
In choosing an alternative from this category, a 
policymaker must be concerned with whether or not the alter­
native is sufficient to bring about the desired reduction in 
energy demand, and whether motivation remains to continue 
the desired conservation activity once the incentive or 
disincentive is removed.
There are a variety of implementing strategies for 
the "tax system" alternative, as depicted in Table VI-10.
A general federal energy tax that relates to energy content, 
such as the Btu's in each energy form, could be applied to 
all nonrenewable resources (coal, oil, gas, and uranium).
TABLE VI-10
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Use tax system to change 
energy use behavior and 
mitigate inequities among 
users
Adopt a general federal 
energy (or Btu) tax for all 
non-renewable resources 
applied at point of extrac­
tion (wellhead or mine- 
mouth)
Would require significant 
increases in energy prices 
to be effective and entail 
program of rebates to re­
distribute the collected 
revenues.
Establish federal consump­
tion taxes and rebates on 
basis of energy effi­
ciency
Increased costs fall only 
on new devices and pro­
ducts
Time required to be 
effective
Increase loans, credits, 
and other forms of 
financial assistance or 
discontinue financial 
aid to encourage con­
servation
Require energy conserva­
tion planning at the state- 
local government level as 









For this strategy, policymakers would have to select a 
point in the energy supply and demand process at which the 
tax would be imposed. It could be levied at the point of 
extraction (wellhead or minemouth), when the resource is 
purchased as fuel, or when energy using equipment is pur­
chased. Applied at any of these points, a general tax would 
be highly implementable and essentially self-regulating.
Yet several recent analyses have determined that the general
Btu tax approach is an inefficient way to increase energy 
53prices. Not only would the tax have to be high enough to 
double the price of gasoline and home heating oil, for 
example, but unless it was coupled with an extensive program 
of tax rebates to redistribute collected revenues, it could 
lead to serious economic hardships for low-income families. 
Thus, the self-regulating advantage normally attributed to a 
tax alternative would be compromised by probable government 
intervention to deal with equity problems. It is also sug­
gested by some that a tax-induced reduction of demand would
53For a detailed treatment of this conclusion, see 
Brannon, Energy Taxes and Subsidies, pp. 133-136; and Brannon, 
"Tax Policies to Modify Energy Consumption Patterns," in 
Studies in Energy Tax Policy, ed. Brannon (Cambridge, Mass.; 
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 323-342. For disagree­
ment with these findings, see Luther J. Carter, "Energy 
Policy: Independence by 1985 May Be Unreachable Without Btu
Tax," Science 191 (February 13, 1976); 546-548; and Don G.
Scroggin, "Energy Conservation in the U.S.: A National Policy
to Reduce Energy Waste May Be the Only Way to Preserve Eco­
nomic Well-Being," Yale Scientific 51 (April 1977): 9-13.
54Carter, "Energy Policy," p. 546.
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be counterproductive for the need to increase supplies— i.e., 
the tax revenues gained would not create profits and incen­
tives for increased production; instead, they would be redis­
tributed to the public.
These arguments should not be construed as negating 
an important finding in the studies cited above, that there 
may be a need for some type of selective fuel taxes to deal 
with specific fuel uses. As an alternative implementing 
strategy, differential fuel taxes could be established by 
imposing a set of rates based on the relative scarcity of 
fuels. This would allow a more rapid allocation of the 
relative costs involved in the production of energy from each 
of the different r e s o u r c e s . I t  would also allow greater 
flexibility by permitting a more direct focus on selected 
types of energy consumers. Regressive impacts could be 
handled through tax exemptions rather than rebates.
For our purposes, however, the implementing strategy 
which provides more of a direct link to energy consumption 
problems and issues, is to use the tax system to change the 
price of an energy-using investment. That is, instead of 
taxing energy use itself, the tax would be levied at the 
point of purchase on things like automobiles, furnaces.
55Some sort of "plowback" provision could be adopted 
to insure that incentive revenues were made available to 
energy companies.
^^Marquis R. Seidel, Steven E. Plotkin, and Robert 0. 
Reck, Energy Conservation Strategies (Washington, D.C.:
U.S., Environmental Protection Agency, 1973), p. 34.
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appliances, hot water heaters, and industrial equipment. 
Given the earlier assessment of market incentives and disin­
centives where it was found that some consumers may not be 
influenced by moderate price increases, this approach seems 
to approximate "best" the role that energy prices play in 
energy use decisions. Indeed, one study notes that it is 
difficult to identify a relationship between price changes 
and the amount of energy consumed unless the existing stock 
of equipment (e.g., appliances, automobiles, boilers) call­
ing for a specific fuel or energy input is included in the 
57analysis. This leads to the conclusion that price may be 
more of an inducement to limit the purchase of inefficient 
energy-consuming devices than it is a limit on consumption 
for devices already owned. Essentially, this means the 
consumer might be willing to "ignore the implications of 
the continuing energy bill he might incur, but would respond
COto a higher tax on his appliance at the time of purchase."
A second outcome of this strategy has both positive 
and negative equity implications. It is most likely that 
the tax would fall only on new investment choices. On the 
one hand, it would represent an unfair burden on that
57See Edward W. Erickson, Robert M. Spann, and 
Robert Ciliano, "Substitution and Usage in Energy Demand,
An Econometric Estimate of Long Run and Short Run Effects," 
in Energy Modeling, ed. Milton F. Searl (Washington, D.C.: 
Resources for the Future, 1973), pp. 190-208.
58Siedel, Plotkin, and Reck, Energy Conservation 
Strategies, p. 35.
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segment of the population (or commercial and industrial 
groups) contemplating equipment purchases now or in the near 
future. On the other hand, it reduces the hardship that 
might be incurred by those owning inefficient items if a 
general energy tax were the choice.
Lastly, a tax of this sort could be applied as an 
excise tax based on the energy efficiency of the item in 
question. The result would be to influence investment 
choices towards specific energy-efficient devices.
The "gas-guzzler" provisions of President Carter's 
National Energy Plan provide an example of how the tax sys­
tem might be used in conjunction with several other alterna­
tives and demonstrates potential outcomes from such alterna­
tives. As discussed in chapter V, the administration 
recommended the imposition of a set of graduated excise 
taxes and rebates based on the fuel-economy of new cars.
The tax was to be supported by three additional measures :
(1) direct government regulation in the form of price con­
trols and an "equalization tax" for crude oil that would 
effectively bring domestic oil prices up to the world price 
by 1980 and increase them at the rate of inflation there­
after; (2) a standby gasoline tax of up to 50 cents per gal­
lon, imposed in five cent increments beginning in 1979 if 
gasoline consumption levels exceeded predetermined targets; 
and (3) the already existing fuel efficiency standards man­
dated by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.
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Of the three new proposals, the gas-guzzler excise taxes
were estimated to have the largest potential effect on fuel
consumption, reducing automobile gasoline consumption by
10,000 barrels per day in 1978, 15,000 barrels per day in
1980, 215,000 barrels per day in 1985, and reaching 450,000
59barrels per day by 1990. Although the 1985 and 1990 
figures are impressive, these data point out one of the basic 
problems in relying on taxes to influence consumer choices—  
i.e., the number of years required before the tax has an 
appreciable effect on consumption. Just as in the case of 
education and exhortation, the acceptability of the time lag 
involved is a critical factor influencing tax system choices 
for conservation purposes.
A final consideration within this category of alter­
natives is the role of government financial assistance as a 
lever to require specific conservation activities or programs. 
As noted earlier, the emphasis here is on the possibility of 
withholding revenues from states and localities as a means 
of encouraging conservation within the scope of ongoing gov­
ernment energy-environment activiites. Public revenues in 
the form of grants and revenue sharing funds represent in­
come transfers from the public to government. If it can be 
argued that conservation is a public policy goal in the
59U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, 
President Carter's Energy Proposals; A Perspective (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 65.
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public interest, then investments by government should 
reflect this objective.
An example of how this alternative could be imple­
mented is through the extensive framework of federal plan­
ning assistance currently available to states and localities. 
For example, the government exercises substantial land use 
control powers over states and localities, largely through 
Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954, which provides 
assistance to local governments for planning purposes. The 
principal source of federal financial support for this pro­
gram is the Department of Housing and Urban Development's 
(HUD) 701 grants program. Section 701 requires grant recip­
ients to carry out an ongoing "comprehensive planning pro­
cess" that contains mutually consistent housing and land use 
elements in line with national growth policy objectives. 
Planning for national conservation goals could be included 
in this and other community facility or service programs, 
and the release of funds contingent upon the development of 
a "conservation plan." The primary outcome of such a strat­
egy would be to require conservation planning whereas exist­
ing legislation allows states to choose not to participate 
in the national State Energy Conservation Program. 
Procedurally, this might be more implementable and flexible 
than would the adoption of mandatory state programs through 
direct government regulation.
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As discussed earlier, comprehensive planning can be 
a primary alternative for developing conservation because 
it supports coordination of private and public sector deci­
sions. It could also coerce planners and public officials 
to use land use controls to promote maximum energy savings.
The "plan" could show how housing and residential develop­
ment and transportation systems interact, which in turn can 
induce growth and development patterns that facilitate the
use of public transportation systems and other energy con-
 ̂ 60 serving concepts.
The above assessment can be summarized as follows.
Any attempt to use the tax system to change consumption 
behavior requires consideration of numerous potential side- 
effects or distributional outcomes. For the general energy 
tax, distributional impacts may be politically unacceptable, 
counterproductive, and require substantial government inter­
vention to correct inequities. Collecting and redistributing 
revenues from such taxes will impose high administrative 
costs on the public. Approaching energy conservation by taxing 
end uses does not appear to be as efficient as taxing invest­
ments for energy-using devices. And both financial incentives 
and disincentives depend on continued support to be effec­
tive .
Corbin Crews Harwood, "Planning for Energy 
Conservation," ECP Report (Newsletter of the Energy Conser­
vation Project, Environmental Law Institute), No. 5, March, 
1976, p. 2.
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Although experience in applying alternatives in this
category to conservation is only now beginning to accumulate,
there is enough evidence to suggest that the effects of
incentives maybe "short-lived."^^ Furthermore, incentives
may lead to overdependence on external motivation, acting as
barriers to the development of long-term behavioral changes
which are necessary to produce effective voluntary demand- 
62restraint. These conclusions have led to considerations 
of the possibility of expanding direct government regulation 
to change energy consumption patterns and behavior.
Direct Regulatory Action 
Historically, direct market intervention which relies 
on governmental regulation has been used to promote or 
attempt to initiate a prescribed type of citizen or private 
sector behavior. As discussed in chapter V, regulatory 
actions to restrict energy use or energy using products are 
in an early formative stage, reflecting varied degrees of 
direct and indirect coercion. Even so, one of the most 
clearly discernible trends in the conservation issue system 
is the increasing attention being given to possible regula­
tory policies to cause more efficient end uses of energy.
See R. M. Foxx and D. F. Hake, "Gasoline Conserva­
tion: A Procedure for Measuring and Reducing the Driving of
College Students," Journal of Applied Behavioral Analysis 10 
(Spring 1977): 61-741
62stern and Kirkpatrick, "Energy Behavior," pp. 11-
1 2 ,
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As indicated in Table VI-11, two specific alternatives 
for direct regulatory action are: (1) mandatory efficiency
or performance based standards for selected processes and 
energy end uses, and (2) curtailment and rationing policies. 
Both specific alternatives can be implemented at all levels 
of government in the form of legal requirements or prohibi­
tions. In fact, some actions have already been proposed or 
enacted.
The discussion below begins with a brief description 
and assessment of mandatory programs and curtailment and 
rationing measures, including identification of implementing 
strategies that either can be or are being pursued. Follow­
ing this, the remainder of the evaluation focuses on direct 
regulation by means of efficiency or performance based 
standards. The rationale for this approach is based on 
earlier findings which indicate that government activities 
within this category currently emphasize energy efficiency 
standards or variations thereof. Examples of specific 
strategies include the development of building codes that 
rely on stricter thermal performance standards, regulations 
requiring vehicles to meet specified fuel economy standards, 
and efficiency labels (eventually leading to standards) for 
certain energy-consuming appliances.
Strategies to implement mandatory conservation pro­
grams to restrict energy use by consumers overlap to some 
extent with the imposition of efficiency standards. The
TABLE VI-11
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR DIRECT REGULATORY ACTION
Specific Alternatives Implementing Strategies Constraints
Mandatory federal effi­
ciency or performance 
based standards for 
selected processes and 
energy end uses
Federal legislation and 
regulations to gradually 
eliminate inefficient pro­
ducts and buildings (effi­
ciency standards already 
established for automo­
biles; under consideration 
for new buildings and cer­
tain appliances)
Resistance by private 
sector to increased govern­
ment intervention and con­
trol
May be too inflexible to accommodate regional/state 
variations, and difficult 
to administer
Adopt mandatory state- 
local government energy 
demand management pro­
grams (federal program 
already established)
Places initiative at state 
level, including require­
ment for conservation plan­
ning
Curtailment and rationing 
policies
Federal and state legis­
lation with stringent 
regulations to meet 
emergency situations
Viewed as not needed except 





important distinction is that mandatory programs, such as 
the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), as a more 
subtle form of government regulation aimed at specific 
groups of energy users. The FEMP, applicable to federal 
employees and facilities of the 16 most energy-consumptive 
departments and agencies,provides the example for the 
strategy suggested in Table VI-11 that state-local govern­
ments adopt similar mandatory demand management programs. 
FEMP includes regulations for federal building operations, 
transportation, and employee activities (e.g., requirements 
for reducing illumination levels, prescribed temperature 
settings, requirements for buying and leasing smaller, more
efficient cars for employee use, and conducting employee
64energy awareness programs during working hours.)
States and local governments could adopt and imple­
ment these same types of regulations and requirements for 
all their public facilities and employees. As a measure of 
the energy conserving potential of such programs, the 16 
federal agencies recorded energy savings from six to 25 per­
cent during 1974 (compared to the baseline for 1973).
The agencies included in the FEMP are: the Depart­
ments of Transportation; Defense; Labor; Interior; Agricul­
ture; Commerce; Health, Education and Welfare; Treasury; 
Housing and Urban Development; State; Justice; and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; General Ser­
vices Administration; Veterans Administration; Department of 
Energy; and the Environmental Protection Agency.
64See, U.S., Federal Energy Administration, Environ­
ment Federal Energy Management Program, First Annual Report, 
Fiscal Year 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974).
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Anticipated consumption was reduced by .53 quadrillion Btu's, 
or the equivalent of 90.5 million barrels of oil.^^ Based 
on current crude oil prices, an energy reduction of this 
magnitude would save over one billion dollars, money which 
could be credited against the national trade deficit.
Although savings would vary by state and community, this 
example indicates the potential effectiveness of mandatory 
measures. Since most of the measures require little if any 
outlay of funds, except for administrative purposes to estab­
lish, implement, and monitor the program, the new returns to 
governments in reduced energy bills should be positive.
To be flexible and responsive to different state- 
local characteristics, the initiative for the programs must 
come from the state and local level. Furthermore, to co­
ordinate and direct the programs effectively will require 
the formulation of a conservation or demand management plan 
for the relevant agencies. If states and communities do not 
choose this course, it is likely that the legislative pro­
visions of the Energy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA) 
and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) which 
require the implementation of mandatory programs relating to 
energy use (if a state voluntarily chooses to participate) 
will no longer be optional— i.e., the federal government 
will direct states to adopt the existing federal guidelines.
"Agencies Slash Energy Use," The Sunday Oklahoman, 
February 7, 1975. This equals about one percent of the total 
national energy requirement in 1974.
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The curtailment and rationing alternative has 
received much attention (most during the height of the OPEC 
embargo,) but very little deliberate action. Both poli­
cies can be used to deal with potentially severe inequities 
and inefficiencies during emergency situations. However, 
because fuel shortages are a recent phenomena in this 
country, curtailment and rationing are acceptable, on social 
and political grounds, only in periods of visible crisis.
That is, under normal conditions the two are not viewed as 
elements of a long-term rational energy policy. Instead, 
such emergency measures are generally perceived as represent­
ing the failure of past policy (or the lack of a policy).
Thus far the only substantive results of federal 
government activities in this policy area are the "emergency" 
or "standby" measures contained in the ECPA. These allow 
the President to take various actions to reduce demand and 
allocate available supplies in the event of critical fuel 
shortages. Most states and some cities have now dormant 
emergency type laws which contain detailed regulations 
describing how fuels would be allocated and used if events
"Rationing Experts Needed," Norman Transcript, 
November 13, 1973.
David J. Rose, "Energy Policy in the U.S.," 
Scientific American 230 (January 1974). Reprinted in U.S., 
Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Energy 
Policy Papers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1974), p. 71.
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68so dictate. The Los Angeles City Energy Curtailment Plan 
provides an instructive example of how directive regula­
tions may be prescribed and implemented. This plan is 
broadly formulated and has been used by the federal govern­
ment and other states in connection with the development of 
their programs.
For the present, it appears that rationing and cur­
tailment will remain as backup regulatory alternatives. Yet, 
a recent study noted if "other more gradual fuel conserva­
tion programs and legislation fail to control the existing 
energy problems, it is quite likely (state) 'emergency 
measures* will be activated and used on a long-term if not 
permanent b a s i s . T h u s ,  at least contingency plans for 
these alternatives are needed at all levels of government.
Direct regulation by means of federal efficiency 
standards represents an approach similar to but less coer­
cive than curtailment and rationing. It is similar in the 
sense that the end results are essentially the same— i.e., 
the prohibition of certain inefficiencies and waste in the 
way energy is consumed. As noted above, the remainder of
^^Martin, "Role of Government in Causing Energy 
End Use Efficiency," p. 483.
^^See, U.S., Senate, Government Operations Committee, 
Current Energy Shortages Oversight Series, Staff Study of 
Impact of Energy Shortages on Los Angeles (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1974).
70Martin, "Role of Government in Causing Energy End 
Use Efficiency," p. 483.
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this discussion is concerned with the costs, risks, and
benefits associated with the adoption of federal legislation
and regulations to mandate product and process efficiencies.
This approach has already been implemented for automobiles;
and, in the case of buildings, HUD has been charged with the
responsibility to formulate national building standards by
1981. Likewise, what began as voluntary labeling programs
for certain residential and commercial appliances are likely
to be replaced by mandatory efficiency standards. In all
three instances— automobiles, buildings, and appliances—
regulations will be (or have been) promulgated to force
manufacturers to increase the energy efficiencies of their
products. The intended outcomes are a lower level of
national energy consumption and the gradual elimination of
inefficient products from the market.
The potential or actual effectiveness of efficiency
standards in reducing sectorial and national energy demand
is generally understood and accepted. In other words, it
follows that increasing the energy efficiency of a product
71will reduce per unit, and ultimately, total consumption.
For example, the 1965 Federal Housing Authority (FHA) mini­
mum performance standards, applicable to all federally- 
insured residences, permitted heat losses of up to 50 Btu's 
per day for an average-sized (1,600 square-feet) house, or
71Denis Hayes, "Conservation as a Major Energy 
Source," New York Times, March 21, 1976.
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almost two million Btu's per day. Stricter standards were
adopted first in 1971 and again in 1976. If all of the
15.4 million residences projected for construction between
1972 and 1982 conformed at least to the 1971 standards,
rather than the 1965 standards, the total energy savings
would be approximately three quadrillion Btu's per year—
about 10 percent of the expected 1982 total residential
72space heating and cooling requirement. Even greater sav­
ings are projected when the 1976 FHA standards and the DOE 
appliance efficiency targets are implemented for all new 
buildings.
Because efficiency standards were not to become 
effective until 1978, changes in transportation energy de­
mand are also based on projections. However, these estimates 
are supported by other data which indicate the introduction 
of more efficient automobiles is beginning to have a favor­
able impact on gasoline consumption.^^ Several aggregate
72These data are from Fowler, "Energy Conservation, 
Homes and Buildings," p. 2.
73The 1976 FHA minimum property standards are believed 
to represent a good proxy for federal building standards now 
being developed by HUD as a result of the 1975 EPCA. For 
estimates of potential savings based on the implementation 
of these standards and appliance efficiency targets, see 
James B. Kurish and Eric Hirst, Residential Energy Use Models 
for the Nine U.S. Census Divisions (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, 1977).
74At this time it is not possible to separate out 
interactive effects such as the level of national economic 
activity, higher fuel prices, spot fuel shortages, and in­
creased consumer awareness of conservation that may affect 
driving habits.
315
trends indicate that better vehicle efficiencies are 
reducing historical consumption levels for automobiles. As 
illustrated in Table VI-12, while total passenger car gaso­
line consumption increased by about nine percent from 1972 
to 1976, per car consumption declined by about 3.6 percent. 
Preliminary data for 1977 indicate that a lower rate of 
increase in automobile fuel usage occurred in 1977, and is
believed to be in part a result of increases in the fuel
75efficiency of the automobile fleet.
The degree to which this alternative will continue 
to have positive effects on automobile fuel consumption has 
been estimated as follows. Under present EPCA fuel economy 
standards for new cars, in spite of an expected 32 percent 
growth in vehicle-miles travelled between 1977 and 1985, 
total auto fuel consumption is expected to change only 
slightly:
As vehicles with improved fuel efficiency are phased 
in, the historic pattern of annually increasing auto­
motive fuel use is expected to reverse itself. Auto 
fuel consumption is expected to peak in 1978 at 
about 5.4 percent above the 1976 level, then fall to 
about 0.7 percent above the 1976 level in 1985, and 
to begin to increase again in the late 1 9 8 0s.76
This slight growth and eventual decrease in fuel usage between
1977 and 1985 is attributable primarily to fuel economy
^^General Accounting Office, Federal Government Should 
Establish and Meet Energy Conservation Goals, p. 19.
76Congressional Budget Office, President Carter's 
Energy Proposals, p. 63. Projections based on the following 
averages for fleet fuel economy of new cars: 18.3 mpg in
1978, 20.5 mpg in 1980, and 23.3 in 1985.
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TABLE VI-12 
ANNUAL GASOLINE CONSUMPTION, 1972-1976
Gasoline Consumption










755 763 704 712 728
SOURCE; U.S., General Accounting Office, Report to 
the Congress, The Federal Government Should Establish and 
Meet Energy Conservation Goals (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1978), p. 13.
^General Accounting Office estimates based on
Department of Transportation data.
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improvements resulting from the mandatory provisions of 
the EPCA. If higher (higher than those in the EPCA) average 
fuel economy standards recently established by the Secretary
of Transportation are met, the fuel savings will be even
77greater.
Besides the projected national conservation gains, 
the increase in new car fuel economy and building and 
appliance efficiency results in two additional distinct 
benefits. First, efficiency or performance based standards 
as a class of alternatives can be formulated to produce rela­
tively immediate effects on manufacturers once technologically 
and economically feasible targets have been determined. How 
quickly the more efficient devices saturate the market 
depends, of course, on the average replacement time asso­
ciated with different products. For example, it may take as 
long as 20 years for some home appliances and 10 years for 
automobiles before the full potential of each is realized in 
reduced sectorial energy demand. But the length of these 
time frames is probably less than what it would be based 
only on normal market reaction to conservation objectives.
Secondly, as the stock of technical equipment is 
improved, and greater energy efficiencies achieved, the 
overall cost to use energy-consuming goods is reduced—  
i.e., the same distance can be travelled, homes heated and
Federal Register 42 (June 1977); 33549. EPCA
standards have been revised to: 20.0 mpg by 1980, and
27.5 mpg by 1985.
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cooled, with less fuel. Thus, per capita expenditures will 
decline (relative to increasing fuel prices) as the same 
amount of "work" is accomplished more efficiently. The 
questions which cannot be answered at this time are: Will
increased efficiency eventually be offset by future in­
creases in usage? Or, will money saved be spent on more
78energy-intensive goods and services?
The dollar savings which accrue to individuals as a 
result of mandatory efficiency improvements are offset to 
some extent by higher first-costs of improved products. 
Prescriptive standards will raise the initial price of new 
residences and appliances, as they have already done in the 
case of automobiles. This stems from the costs incurred by 
manufacturers to attain higher efficiencies, costs which 
are typically passed on to customers. Even though some of 
these costs are associated with externalities that might 
appropriately be internalized, it is largely up to the newly- 
regulated industry to determine how much of the costs asso­
ciated with government intervention must be borne by con- 
79consumers. These increased costs may be recoverable over 
the normal operating lifetime of an automobile, building, or 
appliance, but the higher first-costs may tend initially to
78For a discussion of these questions, see Bruce 
Hannon, "Energy Conservation and the Consumer," Science 189 
(July 11, 1975): 95-102.
79Mark V. Nadel, Corporations and Political 
Accountability (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co.,
1976), p. 187.
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favor some consumers over others, for example, middle- to 
high-income groups over low-income groups. The potential 
unequal distribution of this conservation benefit has been 
addressed for buildings (as discussed in chapter V) through 
existing financial assistance programs to help low-income 
groups. Similar programs may be needed for other energy- 
efficient products as well. Some banks are already giving 
lower interest rates to individuals who purchase more effi­
cient automobiles or want home loans to install new insula-
80tion or other energy saving devices.
Another more difficult outcome to deal with is the 
potential adverse effects of government actions to remove 
inefficient products from the market. Mandatory standards 
will infringe on both consumer preferences and private sec­
tor product choices. Indeed, energy decision-makers, who 
must decide which methods are most effective and which pro­
ducts and processes are inefficient, might eventually play 
a significant role in defining the characteristics of con­
sumer goods prohibited or allowed. For example, the 
implicit assumption behind auto efficiency standards is to 
coerce consumers into smaller, more efficient autos.
Efficiency standards to achieve conservation also 
pose some distinct disadvantages in terms of implementation 
requirements and flexibility. Compared to market approaches
80Jane Cracraft, "Bank Saves Energy, Money," Denver
Post, March 8, 1978.
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to technical innovation in any of the areas discussed 
above, mandatory requirements, administered and enforced by 
government, pose relatively high information and administra­
tive costs. Some of the economic costs for research, dev­
elopment, and demonstration normally borne by the automobile 
industry, construction industry, and related manufacturers 
are shifted to government. The Departments of Energy, 
Transportation, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development 
must not only formulate, fund, and enforce mandated programs, 
but these agencies must also revise and update the standards 
for the products and services based on ongoing analyses of 
private sector progress, each year's projected and real 
energy savings, and changing technologically feasible tar­
gets. In other words, as new conservation technologies
become available, the appropriate agencies must make and
81enforce new rules. Thus, mandatory programs lead to in­
creased public investments and bureaucratic intervention 
into the economy.
In addition, regulatory alternatives are by defini­
tion an inflexible approach to dealing with specific prob­
lems and issues. Such regulatory standards as those
discussed here are perceived by many to be too insensitive
82to local, state, and regional variations in energy use.
81Scroggins, "Energy Conservation in the U.S.," p. 11.
82A. Barry Crawford, "Energy Conservation in the In­
terior Western States," paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Denver, Colo., 1977, p. 10.
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The complexity of establishing workable public and private 
sector arrangements, the highly technical nature of the prob­
lems and issues that can arise, the need to assemble together 
participants from diffuse markets and role$,all combine to 
make it difficult to prescribe one set of rules that can 
deal with every product and every manufacturer. Further­
more, with the passage of time, conservation standards once 
set can become counterproductive— i.e., the standards be­
come the norm. Instead of forcing technological development,
standards may arrest it and produce barriers to further
83innovation and change. This potential outcome is best 
illustrated by considering the problem of energy conversion 
processes and air quality control. When Congress passed the 
Clean Air Act of 1970, it was construed to be a "technology 
forcing" bill. The air quality standards established by the 
Environmental Protection Agency were expected to result in 
the deployment of the "best available control technology" to 
reduce the emission levels of certain air pollutants.
However, because technical risk and cost-effectiveness issues 
surrounded available clean-up technologies, industry reacted 
initially by adopting in some cases air quality control mea­
sures or techniques that did not reflect the technology 
forcing "spirit" of the legislation. The resulting impasse
83Richard Schoen, Alan S. Hirshberg, and Jerome M. 
Weingart, New Energy Technologies for Buildings (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), p. 57.
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over the standards and how they were to be implemented in 
part led to amendments to the 1970 law to clarify the tech­
nical requirements.®^
The basic point that needs to be made here is 
actually broader than the above example. Direct regulatory 
action besides imposing costs on the private sector in terms 
of increased bureaucratic intervention by government, can 
result in second-order unanticipated problems and issues. 
Private sector resistance to interference, even where tech­
nological and economic feasibility have been demonstrated, 
can cause delays in implementing prescribed standards (as 
has already occurred for the 1978 automobile fuel economy 
requirements). Similar reactions are expected if and when
the federal government promulgates the national building
85standards being developed by HUD. Finally, there is the 
perennial problem of the regulatory agency itself becoming 
the captive of or dominated by the industry it is supposed 
to r e g u l a t e . A n y  one of these factors can reduce the 
effectiveness of legislation for direct regulation of an 
energy use.
84For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see 
Irvin L. White et al.. Energy from the West; Policy Analysis 
Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Environmental Protection
Agency, forthcoming), chapter 6.
85Schoen, Hirshberg, and Weingart, New Energy 
Technologies for Buildings, p. 51.
86See James Q. Wilson, "The Dead Hand of Regulation," 
The Public Interest 25 (Fall 1971): 39-58.
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To summarize briefly, curtailment and rationing 
appear politically and socially acceptable only in periods 
of visible crisis or emergency. However, lingering energy 
policy problems have raised their legitimacy as necessary 
components of contingency planning at every level of govern­
ment.
Alternatives that rely on other forms of direct 
regulatory action, such as mandatory conservation programs 
and efficiency standards for inefficient energy consuming 
items, have been shown to exhibit a favorable potential for 
reducing energy consumption. They also have the distinct 
advantage that they can be formulated to produce immediate 
effects on manufacturers, assuming the necessary information 
base exists upon which standards may be based. Once formu­
lated, the effectiveness of labeling and efficiency stan­
dards depends largely on public and private sector coopera­
tion to meet the designated conservation targets.
Implementation requirements are high in both informa­
tion and administrative costs, particulary since some of the 
costs and risks normally borne by the private sector are 
shifted to government and the public. Mandatory regulation 
of end use is also viewed by some as too inflexible to 
accommodate local, state, and regional energy use variations. 
Furthermore, the discernible trend from voluntary government 
programs to mandatory prescription raises questions about 
the long-term consequences on individual preferences.
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particularly concerning the role of energy decision-makers 
to prohibit or allow certain goods and services over some 
others.
Findings and Comparison 
of Alternatives
As noted earlier, the evaluation step in this 
research provides a framework within which alternative 
policies and implementing strategies can be compared. More 
specifically, the five substantive categories of alterna­
tives primarily reflect tradeoffs in formulating and imple­
menting public policies to reduce energy demand and increase 
energy use efficiency, whereas the procedural category 
addresses different approaches for improving the existing 
decentralized, fragmented policymaking process for conserva­
tion. Together these six categories underscore the need to 
find a mix of inducements, technical fixes, regulations, 
and institutional arrangements to deal with conservation 
problems and issues.
In general, it was concluded that increased federal 
planning and management of conservation authority will 
exacerbate already difficult issues of federal intervention 
into state energy policies and programs. On the other hand, 
reliance on incremental improvements to the existing decen­
tralized, fragmented policy system, or the establishment of 
a regional or multi-state approach to problems and issues, 
may require an unacceptably long time frame to implement
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national conservation goals. The requirement that states 
assume a more pronounced policy formulation role will like­
wise stress their financial, technical, and administrative 
institutions. Even so, improving the existing issue system 
by relying on state-local initiative is more acceptable and 
implementable than other options. This acceptability must 
be weighed by policymakers against tradeoffs in effective­
ness and the time required to achieve substantive conserva­
tion objectives.
The substantive alternatives and strategies con­
sidered above were also found to pose different costs, risks, 
and benefits in terms of the general values at stake— i.e., 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, flexibility, and imple- 
raentability. It should be noted that many, tradeoffs are 
involved, and the comparison undertaken below does not lead 
to a clear or "best" choice. Instead, this summary is 
intended to highlight the consequences of a particular choice 
and help to inform policymakers about what the relative 
advantages and disadvantages among choices are.
Regarding how well alternatives achieve the goal of 
reduced demand and increased efficiency, direct regulation 
by means of mandatory programs can produce more immediate 
demand-restraining effects than information collection and 
dissemination or financial assistance in the form of incen­
tives. In part this is because of the uncertainty associated 
with information and incentive programs unless target groups
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are clearly identified, information is linked to utilization, 
and first-costs of conservation activities are shown to be 
recoverable. It is also because alternatives in the two 
categories rely heavily on voluntaristic reactions. Rising 
energy prices resulting from immediate or phased deregula­
tion of oil and gas will also reduce demand and encourage 
technical efficiency, but there is no consensus as to how 
high prices must rise or in terms of the potential effects 
on consumers. That is, although some practices and behavior 
changes may eventually follow from inducements and higher 
energy prices, this assessment indicates that the hard com­
parative questions concerning the effectiveness of alterna­
tives are when and at what price to society. Thus, policy­
makers need to consider tradeoffs among energy conservation, 
economic goals, and individual welfare.
The potential of alternatives to avoid or mitigate 
conservation problems and issues was found to be closely 
tied to questions of timing and duration. Education cam­
paigns and financial incentives require continued support 
and exhortation. Since they depend on attitudinal and behav­
ioral changes, the time required for public acceptance and 
support may ultimately shift the burden for conservation 
onto future generations. Better immediate and permanent 
effects can be achieved through direct regulatory action by 
promulgating efficiency and performance based standards for 
energy using goods. In addition, increasing end use
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efficiency will buy time for the development of a longer-term 
rational energy supply policy. However, alternatives found 
to be potentially effective in the short- to mid-term can lead 
to adverse second and higher order effect. For example, 
direct regulation poses social and political acceptability 
issues? technical fixes do not attempt to deal with the 
root causes of overconsumption and waste; and immediate 
deregulation clearly has equity consequences.
The efficiency of the various alternatives and 
strategies can be compared in terms of economic costs and 
cost-effectiveness, risks, and environmental effects. 
Information collection and dissemination strategies have 
not been shown to be cost-effective, but as discussed 
earlier, will require only a small percentage of the overall 
national energy budget. Similarly, uncertainty exists with 
regard to increasing public investments to promote R,D&D 
and expedite commercialization of new energy saving tech­
nologies. R,D&D for conservation is generally not as . 
economically-intensive as supply options, however, the poten­
tial risks for the public sector are great since the market­
ability of new or potential conservation technologies has 
not been proven. It has been suggested that until more 
promising substantive proposals for basic conservation 
research are identified, the current level of expenditures 
C$386 million) may be all that the policy area can absorb.
Less questionable and more comparable are the 
environmental benefits that may be gained by lowered
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consumption attributable to any one of the identified 
conservation alternatives. In sum, conservation reduces 
environmental damage, for example, by decreasing air pollu­
tion resulting from energy use and reducing land disturbance 
associated with related energy supply development to meet a 
high rate of demand.
How the costs, risks, and benefits of alternative 
policies will be shared was determined to be one of the more 
critical components in this assessment, especially in terms 
of the relative burden borne by the public and private 
sectors. For example, technical fix and regulatory options 
will increase private sector costs with most of the costs 
passed on to consumers in higher first-costs for energy goods 
and services. Consequently, efficiency standards and the 
availability of a more efficient stock of technologies favor 
middle- to high-income energy consumers over others. Con­
sumption taxes, a general energy tax, or deregulation, if 
combined with programs of tax rebates, can mitigate to some 
degree the impacts associated with these alternatives but 
will raise the costs of conservation for government and 
lower profits to energy industries.
The critical point to be weighed here is the lack 
of information concerning the magnitude of impacts (e.g., 
unemployment, inflationary effects, and standard of living 
changes) associated with most mandatory alternatives and 
strategies. This is especially the case for immediate
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deregulation of prices due to inexperience in predicting the 
demand consequences of higher fuel prices.
There are also equity risks associated with other 
options. Forced reduction of energy use through reliance on 
government induced efficiency standards will affect both 
private sector and consumer preferences and decision-making 
because certain goods and practices will be prohibited. 
Likewise/ the social and political costs, as well as effects 
on other national policy goals, of using the tax system to 
modify consumption habits need to be carefully considered.
Finally, because all conservation opportunities help 
to keep supply options open and reduce environmental damage, 
future generations stand to benefit more than present gener­
ations. In a more immediate sense, however, society-at- 
large is a primary beneficiary from information collection 
and dissemination, financial incentives, and better coordi­
nated conservation planning and management. And improving 
conservation technologies appears to be the most equitable 
means of distributing benefits to everyone. Benefits from 
immediate or phased deregulation will accrue mostly to the 
private sector unless government intervenes to prevent wind­
fall profits.
Some alternatives were shown to be more flexible 
(adaptable and adjustable) to local and regional variation 
and changes over time than others. Education programs, 
especially information provided by fuel suppliers, and
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some technical fix alternatives appear by far to be the 
most capable of accommodating different energy use needs 
and consumption patterns. Likewise, financial incentives 
and disincentives allow discretionary decisions by energy 
policymakers to deal with a range of problems and issues 
and time-related adjustments. Of all the options considered, 
direct regulatory action in the form of performance based 
standards is the least flexible approach to conservation end 
uses. Indeed, regulatory alternatives can become counter­
productive in that, once defined, standards act as barriers 
to further innovation. Of course this aspect of regulation 
to achieve conservation must be weighed against distinct 
effectiveness advantages.
In terms of their implementability, the most accept­
able substantive alternatives are those which improve the 
economics of conservation, including financial inducements 
(rewards) and new tehcnologies which can be demonstrated to 
have a relatively short payback period (three to five years). 
Also, specific alternatives requiring the least government 
intervention are generally deemed preferable. Any effort to 
expand direct regulation of end uses is expected to be re­
sisted by private sector interests. And because policy­
makers and the public are unsure about the need for higher 
energy prices, immediate deregulation appears to be politi­
cally unacceptable for the present.
Beyond these general comparative remarks, informa­
tion on implementation is limited, particularly concerning
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the ease and costs of administration. This state of affairs 
is expected to persist until more experience is gained 
regarding efforts to manage energy demand.
The overall assessment of alternatives and imple­
menting strategies is summarized in Table VI-13, according 
to the specified evaluative criteria, measures, and find­
ings. Two final points need to be made about the evalua­
tion. First, because efforts to manage energy demand 
represent a new social and scientific concern in this 
country, the analysis highlights a number of information 
needs with regard to the current state-of-the-art (e.g., a 
major inadequacy is the lack of economic cost and benefit 
data for several of the specific alternatives). These will 
be further addressed in the next chapter. Secondly, in some 
instances the measures in the table apply more directly to 
some alternatives and not others. Where this occurs, the 








-Bow well do alterna­
tives achieve the 
substantive policy 
objectives of reduced 
demand and increased 
efficiency; avoid or 
mitigate conserva­
tion problems and 




Highest degree of uncertainty associated 
with voluntary alternatives. For example, 
information collection and dissemination 
strategies are ineffective unless target 
groups are clearly identified, information 
is linked to utilization, and first-costs 
of conservation are shown to be recover­
able. Higher energy prices as a result of 
immediate or phased deregulation will 
reduce demand, but there is no consensus 
as to how high prices must rise or in 
terms of projected consequences. Both 
"off the shelf" and new technologies ex­
hibit the best potential (see discussion 
for estimates) for reducing sectorial 
consumption and will entail fewer life­
style changes than other alternatives. 
Approaching energy conservation by means 
of a general tax on energy resources does 
not appear to be as effective as taxing 
investments for energy-using devices. 
Direct regulation by means of mandatory 
programs can produce immediate demand- 
restraining effects and lead to the 
gradual elimination of inefficient goods 
and services from the economy.
Duration of the 
solution
Education campaigns and financial incen­
tives require continued support and exhor­
tation; time required for public accept­
ance and diffuse support may ultimately 
shift the burden for conservation onto 
future generations. "Permanent replace­
ment cost pricing" as a market incentive 
may be one of the most effective long-term 
approaches to energy prices, but means 
prices will rise drastically from present 
levels. Increasing efficiency of end use 
energy devices buys time for development 
of rational energy supply policy. Use of 
federal consumption taxes affects current 
purchases and is therefore aimed at the 
long-term, but does not consider existing 
stock of inefficient goods and services. 
Curtailment and rationing are seen as 
interim crisis measures. Best permanent 
effects achieved through direct regulatory 
action through promulgation of efficiency 
and performance standards (i.e., once 
conservation technology is introduced, its 
demand-restraining effects are permanent).
Degree to which 
problems and 
issues are avoided
Implementation of alternatives with the 
best efficiency potential could help to 
aggregate parties-at-interest around sub­
stantive conservation goals. However, 
alternatives found to be potentially 
effective in short- to mid-term (as well 




and higher order effects. For example, 
direct regulation raises social and 
political acceptability issues; technical 
fixes do not attempt to deal with root 
causes of overconsumption and waste; and 
immediate deregulation has adverse equity 
consequences.
Efficiency 
-What will be the 







Information collection and dissemination 
strategies have not been shown to be 
cost-effective, but will require only a 
small percentage of the overall federal 
energy budget (e.g., a .10-week intensive 
campaign aimed at the two largest cities 
in each of the 50 states might cost 517- 
18 million, or an amount equal to about 
two percent of the total DOE 1979 budget 
request). R,DSD for conservation is not 
as economically-intensive as supply 
options (e.g., investments of 51 million 
in each of three new energy saving tech­
nologies were shown to capture environ­
mental benefits as well as reduce 
demand). Similarly, "off the shelf" 
technologies, such as insulation for 
retrofit purposes, have acceptable pay­
back periods. Current federal R,D&D 
budget for conservation is $386 million 
compared to about $5 billion for all 
energy R,DSD- However, until more pro­
mising substcuitive proposals for basic 
conservation research are identified, 
this may be all that the policy area 
can absorb. At individual level, ini­
tial costs of energy consuming products 
will increase as efficiencies improve.
A majority of the alternatives lead to 
increased public/private sector invest­ments.
Risks Expanded programs for conservation devel-
ojwaent and commercialization pose high 
degree of risks for the public sector 
since the marketability of new or poten­
tial technologies is uncertain.
Environmental
effects
Lowered consumption attributable to con­
servation alternatives reduces environ­
mental damage, for example, decreases air 
pollutants resulting from automobiles and 
reduces land disturbance associated with 
energy supply development
Equity
-How will these costs, 
risks, and benefits 
be distributed?
Costs Technical fix and regulatory alternatives 
will increase private sector costs; how­
ever, most of these will be passed on to 
consumer in higher first-costs for energy 




effects of efficiency standards and 
technical fix options favor middle- to 
high-income energy consumers over others 
because of increased out-of-pocket 
expenses. Consumption taxes on ineffi­
cient devices combined with a program of 
tax rebates can mitigate equity problems, 
but raises costs to government and lowers 
profits to energy industries. Require­
ment that fuel suppliers provide conser­
vation information and assistance to 
customers places burden of conservation 
education/exhortation on the private 
sector.
Risks Magnitude of impacts (e.g., unemployment, 
inflation, standard of living changes) 
due to immediate deregulation of energy 
prices is largely unknown due to inex­
perience in predicting demand-restraining 
consequences of higher fuel prices. 
Reliance on government induced efficiency 
standards affects private sector and 
consumer preferences and decision-making 
since certain goods and practices will be 
prohibited. In this case, social and 
political costs are uncertain. Any 
attempt to use the tax system to change 
consumption behavior will affect national 
policy goals in other substantive policy 
areas more than most alternatives.
Benefits In the long-term, future generations 
stand to benefit most since all conserva­
tion opportunities preserve range of 
supply options and reduce environmental 
pollution and damage. In a more immediate 
sense, society-at-large is the major bene­
ficiary from information collection and 
dissemination, financial incentives in the 
form of loans, grants, and tax credits, 
and better coordinated energy conserva­
tion planning and management. Improved 
technical devices also means energy sav­
ings will eventually accrue to everyone, 
whereas economic benefits of immediate and 
phased deregulation will accrue mostly to 
the private sector. R,D&D options dis­
tribute benefits across all major consum­
ing sectors. And better coordination of 






-Is the alternative 
sufficiently flexible 
to be applicable 
under a variety of 
conditions and over 
time?
Adaptability Centrally-directed federal coordination
of energy conservation policies and pro­
grams appears to be most inflexible route 
to deal with local-state-regional varia­
tions in ener^ use. In terms of substan­
tive alternatives, education programs 
(especially information provided by fuel 
suppliers) and technical fix alternatives 
are most capable of accommodating differ­
ent energy use needs and consumption 
patterns. Taxes on specific fuels offer 
another highly adaptable path to conser­
vation of nonrenewable resources, but a 
general Btu tax appears to be too inflex­
ible. Financial incentives and disincen­
tives allow discretionary decisions by 
energy policymakers to deal with a range 
of problems and issues. Direct regula­
tory action in the form of performance 
based standards is the least flexible 
approach to conservation end uses.
Adjustability Direct regulatory action by government can 
be counterproductive in that, once 
defined, standards often become the norm, 
acting as barriers to further innovation.
Implementability 
-How difficult will 
it be to implement 
the alternative?
Acceptability Improving the existing decentralized, 
fragmented conservation policy system by 
relying on state-local initiative is more 
acceptable than increased federal planning 
and management (but this must be weighed 
against tradeoffs in effectiveness and 
time required to achieve conservation). 
Host acceptable substantive alternatives 
are those which improve the economics of 
conservation, including financial incen­
tives and technical fixes which have a 3-5 
year payback period. Specific alterna­
tives with least government intervention 
are generally preferred. Policymakers 
and the public are confused as to the 
need for higher energy prices and what 
effects prices will have on existing 
energy problems and issues. Thus, 
immediate deregulation is for the present 
not acceptable. Direct regulatory action 
for national building standards, for 




Because efforts to manage energy demand 
are in the early stages of development, 
information on implementation is limited, 
especially concerning the ease and costs 
of administration. For example, there is 
no previous experience with direct mea­
sures to regulate energy use (EPCA mile­
age standards were to begin with the 1978 
model year), nor is there a base for 
evaluating the application of consumption 
taxes, or expanded R,D&D programs in the 
conservation area.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Introduction 
This research has identified and defined the 
substantive political issues and the policymaking system 
which led to the formulation and implementation of public 
policies and programs for energy conservation. Furthermore, 
chapter VI evaluated and compared policy alternatives and 
implementing strategies to improve and/or change the con­
servation policymaking system and policy results. Investi­
gation of the diverse ways energy is used in the U.S. 
economy and the analysis of conservation policies was 
facilitated by the use of an "issue systems" framework.
It has been demonstrated that the substance of energy con­
servation problems and issues leads to a policy system that 
can be differentiated from other systems on the basis of 
specific interests and values at stake, relevant institu­
tional arrangements, applicable laws and regulations, and 
governmental and nongovernmental participants. It has also
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been shown that the nature of energy use problems plays a 
principal role in shaping alternative policies and strategies.
This chapter offers several overall conclusions about 
policies to reduce national energy demand, recommends future 
research to refine the analysis undertaken in the preceding 
chapters, and concludes with a discussion of the role of 
applied policy analysis within the discipliné of political 
science. Although the potential for political science 
research to help resolve energy problems and issues is only 
now beginning to be realized, this chapter suggests that the 
prospects are greater now that social and institutional fac­
tors have become as important as technological characteris­
tics in the national energy debate.
Conservation and Emerging National 
Energy Policy
Three principal conclusions emerge from this research 
regarding the concept of conservation and its role in emerg­
ing national energy policy: (1) the debate over price-
induced conservation versus other approaches remains unre­
solved; (2) there is no single, "best" category of public 
policy alternatives to deal with conservation problems and 
issues; and (3) although generally recognized, the possi­
bility of significant energy savings from technical fixes, 
or new conservation technologies, has not achieved the kind 
of policy support warranted.
First, conservation measures which have been 
adopted to date reflect the tension between market and
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non-market approaches to the problem. While policymakers 
have avoided the singular goal of increasing energy prices 
to encourage reduced demand, this could be changing given 
the current emphasis on making energy prices more fully 
reflect the cost of producing new energy. Chapter VI indi­
cated that energy prices will continue to increase either 
through taxation or deregulation. However, the unresolved 
debate over government policy in this area exists as a bar­
rier to the development of a long-term, effective conserva­
tion program. The debate essentially centers on how long 
the U.S. can take to make the transition from an era of low- 
priced. energy to the era of expensive energy. Resolution of 
this issue has significant implications for both energy 
supplies and demands. On the demand side, energy prices 
will affect individual decisions with regard to present and 
future energy purchases and uses, and, ultimately, the 
average annual rate of consumption in this country.
Secondly, the analysis of alternatives and imple­
menting strategies suggests that there is no single, "best" 
category of policy tools to deal with conservation and no 
policy choice for a sector exists in a "pure" form. 
Alternatives chosen to deal with problems and issues in any 
one sector are clearly tied to existing or impending govern­
ment programs and actions in other policy categories. For 
example, education programs can provide information to 
encourage consumers to change their energy use habits or
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make more informed choices based on product efficiency 
ratings, which in turn are influenced by both regulations 
and technology development and commercialization decisions. 
Likewise, market prices of fuels within the consuming sec­
tors are affected by the tax system, price controls, and by 
federal standards. Thus, a range of specific and selective 
strategies tailored to meet the needs of energy uses in each 
consuming sector appears to be the appropriate path to 
follow.
Furthermore, the diversity of interests, end uses, 
and fuels indicates that implementation decisions for spe­
cific policies and strategies depend on decentralizing 
responsibility for some problems and policies. For example, 
the energy efficiency of new and emerging technologies can 
be more readily directed through federal regulatory and 
research activities, whereas retrofit programs for the exist­
ing stock of inefficient goods, such as housing, need to be 
addressed by states and localities.
The above considerations raise problems of inter­
governmental relations and program coordination which may 
be only partially resolved by the new Department of Energy 
organization (to what extent, remains to be seen. ) More 
importantly, recognizing the need for other levels of gov­
ernment to assume primary responsibility for improving the 
efficiency of existing products goes against the prevailing 
trend toward centrally-directed conservation policies and
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programs. This is not intended to suggest that strong 
national leadership is not needed or required, instead it 
underscores the fact that some conservation alternatives can 
be more effective and implementable if handled by states.
Thirdly, although generally recognized as offering 
significant opportunities to save energy, the development 
of new conservation technologies has lagged behind the dev­
elopment of energy supplies. Immediately, following the 
OPEC oil embargo, conservation was defined as a short-term 
crisis measure to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil 
imports. This early focus gave way to the development of 
conservation as a functional area of government activity 
when the Federal Energy Administration and the Energy 
Research and Development Administration were established.
It was increasingly recognized that energy waste could be 
managed through the adoption of technologies and practices 
which in turn would provide both economic and environmental 
benefits. Consequently, increased federal emphasis in the 
form of increased public investments needs to be placed on 
research, development, demonstration and commercialization 
for new and potential conservation technologies. As stated 
in chapter VI, the capital risks may be high, but probably 
not any greater than those currently being taken on the 
supply side of the energy system. This is especially the 
case if one considers the fact that a more efficient stock 
of energy using products can reduce demands with fewer 
major lifestyle impacts.
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Directions for Future Research
Based on the above conclusions, it is possible to 
identify both technical and political areas where additional 
policy-oriented research or where refinements in the informa­
tion developed in this study are required. The agenda out­
lined below assumes that the potential for social science 
research combined with technical analyses to help resolve 
energy problems and issues is greater than revealed by cur­
rent efforts.
For the research, development, and demonstration 
(R,D&D) category of alternatives, technology assessments 
should be conducted for new conservation technologies 
throughout the research-to-commercialization sequence. 
Identification of immediate or future impacts and mitigat­
ing strategies might encourage consensus-building for new 
technologies before high risk demonstrations or commercial­
ization efforts are proposed— i.e., before public investments 
are irreversibly committed. It would also help provide for 
social science input throughout each stage of conservation 
technology development.
In addition, the assessment of alternatives in this 
study could be refined by undertaking more narrowly-focused 
evaluations (according to the five specified evaluative 
criteria) of promising specific alternatives. In a number 
of cases, generalizations offered in this study need to be 
further explored and tested. Primary candidates for in- 
depth investigations are: (.1) the requirement that fuel
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suppliers serve as a link between consumers and conservation 
information; (2) the establishment of mandatory state energy 
management programs modeled after the federal program; and 
13) specific technical fix options (e.g., external combus­
tion engines for autos, alternative technologies for resi­
dential and commercial heating applications, and so on).
The purpose of additional research in these areas would be 
to identify more clearly the specific sectorial problems 
and options within the categories of alternatives to deal 
with the problems.
Another particular research concern is the role of 
energy use taxes and related social costs, risks, and 
benefits. As evidenced in chapter VI, a majority of the 
research on taxes to induce conservation is of a general 
nature and not focused on specific end uses. More detailëd 
comparative analyses of the consequences of consumption 
(excise) taxes and deregulation on energy end uses and pro­
cesses across economic groups, or income levels, would be 
useful to help resolve the political debate over the 
appropriate role of energy prices in restraining demand. 
Similarly, the economic costs and benefits associated with 
most of the specific alternatives discussed earlier merit 
further attention, especially since economic barriers (first- 
costs versus lifecycle costs) have been shown to be a major 
constraint for the implementation and utilization of energy 
saving technologies.
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Research is also needed to more fully document 
individual and interest group attitudes, perceptions, and 
behavior with regard to conservation and the willingness of 
individuals and groups to accept mandatory or coercive 
policies. In this respect, attention should also be cen­
tered on eliciting information to formulate better incen­
tives and techniques to build diffuse support for conserva­
tion programs.
Applied institutional decision-making research is 
required to better identify, define, and evaluate the func­
tions, roles, processes, and performance of relevant con­
servation agencies. A prime example of investigations in 
this area would be comparative analyses of what states are 
doing or have done to implement the conservation elements 
of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and the 
Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976. Such 
analyses could doucment whether or not new conservation 
legislation has been enacted, agencies created, appropria­
tions authorized, implementation strategies chosen, and 
outcomes. Other projects might: (1) evaluate conservation
program development within the newly established Department 
of Energy, looking primarily at problems of inter- and 
intra-governmental coordination; (2) assess the results of 
the Department of Transportation's mandatory fuel-economy 
program after its first full year of operation; and 
C3) examirae the efforts of the Department of Housing and
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Urban Development to formulate national building standards, 
concentrating especially on the politics of industry opposi­
tion to and lobbying against performance based conservation 
standards. Information of this kind would augment the search 
for better procedural alternatives to manage the emerging 
national conservation program, as well as improve the under­
standing of substantive policy outcomes.
Finally, more policy research needs to be aimed at 
what was earlier referred to as targets of social change, 
or "social fixes." Explicit in the third conclusion noted 
above regarding the role of conservation in national energy 
policy is the requirement for technical research to identify 
new or potential conservation technologies. More implicit, 
but just as important, is the necessity for "non-hardware" 
research. Policy innovations are needed that get at behav­
ior and energy use problems. For example, a fundamental 
question for all conservation R,D&D is how to couple tech­
nologies with inducements to encourage public acceptance and 
utilization. Useful social science research in this area 
can be contributed by economists, sociologists, and 
psychologists, as well as political scientists.
Integrating Applied Policy Analysis 
and Political Science
As demonstrated by this research and as indicated in 
the above agenda, political scientists have an important 
role to play in bringing their insights to bear on energy
345
and other critical policy problems. Despite this potential 
role, and despite the rapid growth and development of the 
"Policy Sciences," substantial debate— as discussed in 
chapters I and II— exists within the political science com­
munity regarding the place of applied policy analysis in 
traditional disciplinary concerns. The debate reflects a
genuine concern for professional political scientists since
/
support for the study of energy problems and policies comes 
largely from government agencies, nonprofits, and private 
research organizations.
The central question is whether or not applied 
research, such as this analysis of energy conservation 
alternatives, can contribute concurrently to society and 
the discipline. Those who oppose this kind of research 
activity for political science are concerned that: (1) it
diverts the attention of political scientists from the 
development of disciplinary knowledge (core theories, 
methodologies, or data bases); (2) applied research is 
limiting or damaging to the discipline because it results 
in political scientists giving premature advice on the 
basis of inadequate explanatory theories, methods, and 
data; (3) the discipline's research agenda will be estab­
lished by those who select the problems and provide the 
funds; and (4) political scientists will become the tools 
and accomplices of the "powers-that-be"— i.e., the
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government in office.^ Each of these arguments is worthy of 
attention, and as already noted, the risks are to some extent 
real. Because political scientists who choose to involve 
themselves in substantive policy areas should be aware of 
these concerns, the remainder of the chapter addresses the 
four arguments within the context of the design and conduct 
of this research.
Regarding the first argument that applied policy 
analysis will not contribute to the continued development 
of the discipline, two points stand out. In the first place, 
this study has attempted to contribute not only to our 
knowledge of energy conservation policy formation, but also 
to the development of theory and methods to study public 
policies and policymaking. The conceptual approach— the 
issue systems framework— was shown to be a useful model for 
structuring a complex social problem. Furthermore, the 
framework is applicable and adaptable to other policy prob­
lem areas. Indeed, the use of the framework to study a 
range of social problems could provide the basis for further 
developing and testing existing generalizations or empirical 
hypotheses about policymaking. That is, it offers an
These four points are a modified statement of Carol 
Weiss' summary of the arguments made by those opposed to 
involving social science in policymaking. See Carol H. 
Weiss, ed., Using Social Science Research in Public Policy 
Making (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1977),
p. 2.
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approach for organizing knowledge in different policy areas 
that can help structure a body of comparative information.
Secondly, this research has used substantive and 
theoretical knowledge bases from political science. 
Substantively, political science literature has been shown 
to be useful in understanding political institutions, public 
decision-making processes, and problem and issue categories 
affected by energy conservation policy demands. For example, 
political science literature was instrumental in developing 
knowledge of the social and political context of conserva­
tion problems and issues, participants in the policy process, 
and the importance of intergovernmental relations in planning 
and coordinating energy conservation policymaking. The 
study has also used and developed more theoretical knowledge. 
For example, the identification and evaluation of policy 
alternatives and implementing strategies emphasizes the use 
of five evaluative criteria rather than focusing only on the 
more traditional administrative concerns of efficiency and 
effectiveness. It is in this evaluative stage that political 
science concepts have much to offer policymakers, especially 
with regard to efficiency, equity, and implementability 
issues.
The study also suggests potential revisions to exist- 
ing theoretical constructs regarding the process of policy 
development. The prevailing decision-making literature 
assumes that policy formulation begins with a shared
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articulation or consensus of a problem and works toward 
resolution. This analysis of energy conservation problems 
and issues indicates that policymakers seldom begin with a 
consensual definition of the problem or issue to be solved.
In fact, the variety of policy problems and issues that 
make up "the conservation problem" leads to just the 
opposite finding— i.e., the conservation issue system is 
characterized by a conflictual policy process and problem 
definition.
The research also collapses the typical distinction 
between empirical, normative, and technical analysis. The 
actions, interests, and values of policymakers and other 
participants in the system are given the same status, at 
least in the logic of the issue systems approach, as empiri­
cal statements as to what caused a policy. In other words, 
the focus of policy is not just to understand or explain 
causes, it is also to know what kinds of arguments were 
brought to bear on the policy Cfor or against), how and where 
they were debated, how the adopted policy was assessed, and
what groups won or lost or might win or lose in the case of
2prescriptive alternatives.
As noted in chapter II, most behavioral political 
scientists argue that political science has a specialized
2For a recent discussion that makes similar points 
about the role of normative elements in policy analysis, see 
Charles W. Anderson, "The Logic of Public Problems; Evalua­
tion in Comparative Policy Research," in Comparing Public 
Policies: New Concepts and Methods, pp. 19-41, ed. Douglas
E. Ashford (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1978), pp. 19-41.
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concern for policy which is the impact of policies on the 
political system. The above revisions suggest that this 
must be tempered with concern about the impact of the sys­
tem on policies and the publics involved.
The second argument against integrating policy analy­
sis and the discipline holds that because political science 
is an embryonic discipline, premature advice to policymakers 
may be damaging to the reputation of the discipline. It can 
be easily concluded from a reading of this study that no 
effort has been made to overstate or misrepresent the state- 
of-knowledge with regard to the discipline. As has been 
demonstrated, policy analyses have high information demands, 
and the theories and tools of political scientists are viewed 
as a complement to the work of other policy analysts. More 
specifically, the interdisciplinary information requirements 
of the issue systems framework provides insurance against 
premature advice because it requires the tempering of one’s 
professional judgment with a spectrum of social, economic, 
technical, and related perspectives.^
The last two arguments against integrating applied 
policy analysis and political science— government determina­
tion of research agendas and the potential for political 
scientists to become handmaidens of government— have not
As discussed in chapter I, this research has bene- 
fitted from the insights and criticism of other social 
scientists and technical researchers in the field.
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been borne out by this research. However, they deserve 
attention because applied research is generally funded by 
federal, state, or local government agencies and also because 
the research agenda outlined above reflects a positive view 
concerning the place of conservation research in emerging 
national energy policy. As stated in chapter II, the ana­
lytical framework used to structure this analysis is in part 
the product of eight years of applied policy analysis con­
ducted by the Science and Public Policy Program (S&PPP) at 
The University of Oklahoma. All of the S&PPP studies, headed 
by political scientists during 1970-1978, have been funded 
by federal agencies (the National Science Foundation, Presi­
dent's Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Technology 
Assessment, and the Environmental Protection Agency). 
Similarly, this analysis of energy conservation began as a 
part of one of S&PPP's larger research projects. However, 
the relationship of both the Program, and this researcher, 
to the funding agencies has been succinctly summarized by 
the Assistant Director of S&PPP and primary investigator for 
several of the Program's recent energy studies:
We have never felt that our research agenda was 
being set by the funding agencies, in part because 
we have only taken on projects which were on our 
own agenda, but also because of the great degree 
of freedom the agencies have given us. We certainly 
have not become the tools and accomplices of the 
government in office.4
Irvin L. White, "An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Applied Policy Analysis," paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New 
York, N.Y., August 31-September 3, 1978, p. 15.
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While this statement alone does not lead one to the 
conclusion that those who criticize applied policy research 
on the above grounds should be ignored, it does suggest that 
the experience of one policy research group indicates the 
arguments are neither necessarily accurate, nor are the 
feared results inevitable.
In conclusion, this research has attempted to 
contribute to our knowledge of energy conservation policy­
making and policies— i.e., to both the political science 
discipline and to society. It has been further suggested 
that professional political scientists can play a key con­
tributory role in the realm of policy analysis and vice 
versa, especially through the use of political scientists 
to define the social and political context of policy prob­
lems and issues and to structure the evaluation of alterna­
tive policies and implementing strategies. As discussed 
throughout the preceding chapters, numerous social, economic, 
and political values are at stake with regard to energy 
policy decisions, and the costs and benefits may not be 
shared equally by all stakeholders since policies always 
have the potential to effect economic sectors and political 
jurisdictions in different ways. Thus, the basic challenge 
for applied policy analysis is to define and evaluate the 
costs, risks, and benefits of options in order to better 
inform policymakers about the possible impacts of choosing 
one alternative over another.
* * *
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